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Abstract 
 
Many scholars highlight the essence of a participatory governance approach to 
climate change adaptation and the positive impact of allowing multiple actors 
participation in the process of decision making as a determinant for successful 
adaptation to climate change. However, political culture in some societies does 
not support participation, and people are neither interested nor even aware of 
political actions. There are very few studies carried out that examine cultural, 
especially political cultural, influences over governing climate change adaptation. 
In response to this academic gap, this research aims to investigate how political 
culture influences a governance approach to climate change adaptation. Using 
an empirical case study of the process of formulating national climate change 
adaptation policies in South Korea, this study examines the way decisions are 
made about climate change policies under „dominant bureaucratic‟, 
„authoritarian‟ and „weak participant‟ political cultures and investigates how such 
political cultures will hamper or encourage a governance approach to effective 
climate change adaptation. This study therefore advances knowledge about 
how political culture influences climate change adaptation. It provides a basis 
for comparative analyses of other political cultures in different regions and will 
enable scholars to understand the challenges that particular forms of 
governance hold for promoting climate change adaptation. 
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The global community recognises the anthropogenic responsibility for climate 
change and collects opinions on how to reduce emission using the Kyoto 
mechanisms. The main instrument of the Kyoto Protocol is to mitigate climate 
change by using market mechanisms (Kane and Shogren 2000; UNFCCC 
1998). However, mitigation of climate change using market mechanisms does 
not take into consideration the developing countries where people are very 
vulnerable to climate change adaptation (Cameron 2012). Instead the Kyoto 
project developers are mainly interested in making profits from the market 
mechanisms. Although the Kyoto protocol is equipped with an adaption fund 
which is prepared to help developing countries to adapt to climate change, the 
main goal of project developers is making profit from selling emission reduction 
credits. And the Protocol Article 12 notifies that Clean Development Mechanism 
projects should be used for helping vulnerable developing countries to cope 
with adaptation (Paavola and Adger 2006; UNFCCC 1998), but the reality was 
different. As a CDM project developer, I observed vulnerable people who were 
influenced by climate change but they were not actually protected under the 
Kyoto mechanism. If the intention of the Kyoto protocol is to reduce harmful 
anthropogenic influences on climate change and to make the earth a 
sustainable planet, then climate change adaptation should be taken more 
seriously in the protocol.  
 
Poor environments in developing countries, where most projects using the CDM 
have taken place, made me think more about the lives of vulnerable people in 
the region and lead me to seek to do research about climate change adaptation 
from the perspective of governance. Climate change adaptation is better able to 
provide safe environments for the vulnerable and poor communities than 
mitigation using the Kyoto mechanisms. Poor communities adapt to the 
changing environment in their own ways but these adaptations often end up as 
maladaptation and make their lives more vulnerable to other changes in the 
environment. Poor local capacity to cope with climate change makes it 
imperative that help is provided by the government or global organisations. 
12 
 
Although local communities need support from upper-level governing 
organisations, the process of decision-making regarding local adaptation 
policies should include the public across multiple sectors and levels –if there is 
to be the effective delivery of adaptation strategies. However the rules of 
including non-governmental actors in the process of decision-making are not 
able to be applied to the local situation, because of weak capacity. This could 
be dilemma in governance approach to climate change adaptation. 
 
My personal experience as a Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) project 
developer, an interest in climate change adaptations of vulnerable social groups 
made me do research on the insight into the consequences of political 
structures and cultures for climate change adaptation policy and examine the 
reasons why some societies does not accept particiaparorty governance mode 
in the decision making about climate change adaptations.
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Chapter 1.  Introduction  
 
“Adaptation will be necessary to address impact resulting from the warming 
which is already unavoidable due to past emissions (IPCC 2007a, p.25)” 
 
 
 
1.1.Background to the research 
 
In 2002, the eastern part of South Korea was battered by a big typhoon, the first 
in 100 years; the cost of the accompanying damage was estimated to be as 
much as USD 5,094.9 million. In 2010, the middle of Seoul, the capital city of 
South Korea, experienced a big flash flood caused by sudden torrential rain 
which fell for only two days from 21st to 22nd September. The damage inflicted 
was tremendous. Such frequent extreme weather events posed by climate 
change have been occurring with increasing frequency and severity not only in 
South Korea but also in other regions around the globe. 
 
Climate is usually defined as the average weather over 30 years (IPCC 2007b). 
Any change in climate over time, whether due to natural variability or as a result 
of human activity, is defined as climate change (ibid, p.877). It is widely 
recognized that climate change is exacerbated by the increase of greenhouse 
gas emission caused by human behaviour (Fussel 2009, pp.16-18; Ford and 
Berrang-Ford 2011; Adger et al. 2007; Parry et al. 2008).The Interdepartmental 
Panel for Climate Change (IPCC) Assessment Report 4 (AR4) concluded that 
climate change is obvious, and human behaviour has exacerbated the 
meteorological phenomena (Adger et al. 2007). According to this report, the 
global temperature has increased 0.74 degrees Celsius over the past 100 years 
(1906~2005), and for the last 50 years the global warming trend has been twice 
as fast that of the previous 50 years. As temperature and precipitation changes, 
the frequency of floods, droughts, and heat waves has increased owing to the 
change in water circulation. This change makes people experience these 
adverse conditions; for example, they have to leave their familiar living 
environment to find food or shelter; this may be caused by extreme droughts, 
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floods or sea level rise (Ibid). Small island countries such as Tuvalu and Fiji are 
especially influenced by sea level rise exacerbated by climate change (IPCC 
2007a, p.12; Lata and Nunn 2012). 
 
In comparison to global climate change, South Korea has experienced more 
serious changed in particular ways: it has experienced more extreme weather 
events; for example, the number of days of torrential summer events (defined 
as more than 80 mm of rain per day) has increased from an approximate annual 
average of 5 events over the period 1940~1970 to an annual average of 8 
events over the period 1980~1999 (Myeong et al. 2010). On the Korean 
peninsula the surface air temperature has been increasing significantly over the 
past hundred years (1904~2006) (Ho and Yun 2010; NIMR 2009). Average 
annual mean temperature increased 1.5 degrees Celsius during that time, 
which appears to be twice as much as the average global temperature 
increases (NIMR 2009). The yearly precipitation pattern has changed as well; 
the annual mean precipitation has increased, precipitation has increased by 
5.6% when compared to precipitation in the 1970s, with the total number of rain 
days decreasing; this has resulted in an increase in rainfall intensity (Ho and 
Yun 2010). Increases of global temperature in the ocean causes seawater to 
expand and glaciers to melt, contributing to sea level rise (IPCC 2007b, pp.16-
18). The sea level on the shores of the Korean Peninsula has risen by 1.9mm 
per year for the period 1962 to 2006 along with the increase of ocean surface 
temperature (NIMR 2009). Table 1 compares global climate change with that of 
South Korea.  
 
Table 1: Comparison of global climate change with South Korea (Source: IPCC 
2007b, p.238 for Global data and NCCAM for Korean data) 
Region Annual 
Mean 
tempera
ture 
(oC) 
(1912~2
008) 
Sea 
surface 
temperat
ure 
(1968~20
08) 
Sea level rise 
(1964~2006) 
Annual mean 
precipitation 
 
Global + 0.74 + 0.5 
1.8±0.5mm/y
r 
(1961~2003) 
3.1±0.7mm/y
r 
(1993~2003) 
Increas
e over 
land 
north of 
30oN 
(1999~
2005) 
Decrease 
in the 
tropical 
region 
since 
1970s 
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South 
Korea 
+ 1.7 + 1.31 + 8cm +5.6% (1971~2008) 
 
According to the IPCC report regarding global climate projections which used 
simulation models, global mean surface temperature will increase throughout 
the 21st century  with accompanying more intense, more frequent and longer 
lasting heat waves (IPCC 2007b, p.750). Some regions are likely to experience 
decreased frost days in winter. The pattern of climate change is uncertain but 
the frequency of extreme weather events will increase (Planton et al. 2008). 
Global averaged mean precipitation, and the intensity of precipitation events, 
will increase with some variation regionally (IPCC 2007b, p.750). The results of 
simulations using the IPCC Special Report on Emission Scenario (A1B)1 for 
South Korea, show that the trend of climate variation will continue until the end 
of this century; annual air temperature will increase by 4 degrees Celsius and 
the precipitation by 17% compared to the year 2008; surface water temperature 
in the ocean will increase by 2 degrees Celsius and the sea level will rise by 
20.9 centimetres on average around the Korean peninsula (NIMR 2009; Jeon 
2010a). As temperatures increase, South Korea will tend to have shorter 
winters, or in the worst case scenario, no winter at all (ibid). The projection for 
South Korea shows that the meteorological phenomena caused by climate 
change will be more intense than global trends. 
 
Table 2: Prediction using IPCC A1B Scenario (Source: Global data from IPCC 
2007b and Korean data from NCCAM or Jeon 2010a) 
Classification 
2050 2100 
Annual 
mean 
temperature 
(Base 
period: 1980 
to 1999) 
Sea level rise 
(Base year: 
2008) 
Annual 
mean 
temperature 
(Base 
period: 1980 
to 1999) 
Sea level rise 
Global +1.8 17cm +2.7 +21~48cm 
South Korea +2.0 +9.5 cm +4.2 +20.9 cm 
 
                                                          
1
 A1B: In the A1 scenario: a future world of very rapid economic growth, global population that 
peaks mid-century and declines thereafter, and rapid introduction of new and more efficient 
technologies. Major underlying themes are economic and cultural convergence and capacity 
building, with a substantial reduction in regional differences in per capita income. A1B is an 
alternative with technical change in the energy system with a balance across all sources.  In A2 
scenario: a differentiated world. The underlying theme is self-reliance and preservation of local 
identities. Fertility patterns across regions converge very slowly, resulting in continuously 
increasing population. Economic development is primarily regionally oriented, and per capita 
economic growth and technological change are fragmented and slower than other storylines.  
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The change will result in seasonal imbalances of water resources and impact on 
marine and terrestrial ecosystems (Ho and Yun 2010; Met-Office 2010).(NIMR 
2009; Ho and Yun 2010). More frequent heat waves in summer will increase 
demand for electricity and negatively affect human well-being, too (Choi et al. 
2010; Bele et al. 2011). It is argued that although we have reduced greenhouse 
gas emissions through mitigation actions, these trends in climate change and 
global warming will continue at least until the end of this century (Adger et al. 
2007; Fussel 2009). These facts, make climate change adaptation imperative 
and essential for the globe (Adger and Barnett 2009; Smit et al. 2008; Ford and 
Berrang-Ford 2011; Parry et al. 2008; Parry et al. 1998; Burton 1997).  
 
Human reactions to climate change are generally classified into two major 
categories: mitigation through reducing greenhouse gas emissions, and 
adaptation to the changes posed by the climate. However hard may the global 
communities take actions to stabilise the concentration of greenhouse gases in 
the atmosphere using voluntary and compulsory emission reductions, while this 
research has been under way, the level of global emission of greenhouse gases 
has increased. According to a report of the World Meteorological Organization 
(WMO Press release 20 November 2012), the world hit a new record of 
emissions increasing 38% in 2011 from the level of 1990 (WMO 2012). Even if 
we succeeded in cutting off emissions of greenhouse gases, climate change 
would influence our lives for more than 100 years because climate change 
continues under the influence of existing emission (Adger et al. 2007). When 
this fact is taken on board, it becomes clear that adapting to the changing 
climate is critical and essential. Adaptation has been treated as a passive 
reaction and has received less attention than mitigation (VijayaVenkataRaman 
et al. 2012; Smit et al. 1999; Paavola and Adger 2006). But these two reactions 
to climate change are not adversarial rather are they compatible, together they 
reduce negative impacts posed by climate change (Klein et al. 2007; Biesbroek 
et al. 2009; Ayers and Huq 2009). Mitigation and adaptation work synergistically. 
If we ignore mitigation and only concern ourselves with adaptation, then the 
impact of climate change will be tremendously (IPCC 2000). Adapting to climate 
change has been treated as a passive and coward reaction (Saroar and 
Routray 2012). However, without taking appropriate and timely adaptation 
measures, the adverse impacts posed by climate change will be exacerbated 
17 
 
(Wolf 2011). Adaptation generally refers to the social and ecological adjustment 
of systems in response to environmental change. The United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change encourages countries to undertake 
adaptation and mitigation action in parallel over the same period of time, stating 
that „all the parties shall make national climate change adaptation strategies‟ 
(Article 4.1 of the UNFCCC). The uncertainty and complexity of the impacts of 
climate change or variability has been used as an excuse or pretext by decision 
makers for hesitancy in taking action to cope with the impacts (Falaleeva et al. 
2011).  
 
Some scholars argue that making climate resilient and transformational 
societies can be a goal of climate change adaptation (Nelson 2011; Picketts et 
al. 2012; Pelling and Manuel-Navarrete 2011). As an ecosystem persists in the 
face of changes or disturbances with good flexibility to the changes (Holling 
1973), human society can be more flexible and adjustable to the unexpected 
changes (Pelling 2011). Thus making a resilient system is often recognised as 
the goal of adapting to environmental changes (Gunderson and Allen 2009; 
Adger et al. 2011).  
 
Adaptation 
 
Before discussing the goal of climate change adaptation, I will explore concepts 
of climate change adaptation focusing in more detail on the governance 
perspective. Adaptation here refers to the social and ecological adjustment of 
systems in response to environmental change. Climate change adaptation aims 
to secure socio-economic and natural systems making them safe from the 
danger of climate change as well as the stimuli of climate change. It has been 
defined variously in accordance with differing goals and views. It is argued that 
successful climate adaptation is initiated by determining the concrete targets for 
climate change adaptation to achieve (Berrang-Ford et al. 2011; Parry et al. 
1998). Therefore it is meaningful to explore different definitions of climate 
change adaptation and to determine which of these will be applied to this 
research.  
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Different scholars define adaptation to climate change in different ways in their 
literature (Adger et al. 2007; Smit and Wandel 2006; Smit and Pilifosova 2003).  
Among them, a generally accepted definition is that used by the IPCC, where 
climate change adaptation refers to the actions that people take in response to, 
or in anticipation of, projected or actual changes or variability in climate, to 
reduce or eliminate adverse impacts or to take advantage of the opportunities 
created by climate change (Adger et al. 2007). When we take timely and proper 
adaptation measures, the impacts can be substantially and successfully 
reduced or avoided (Klein et al. 2007). Climate change adaptation is not simply 
to reduce the adverse impact posed by climate change but also to utilise 
opportunities generated by the change (Fussel 2007), as climate change may 
provide opportunities in some systems. The fact that climate change may create 
negative impact as well as positive outcomes cannot be denied. That is the 
sense in which it is also used by the South Korean academic community, and 
this is the concept of the IPCC. It is adopted for this research for it refers to 
climate change adaptation in a broad way, including natural and human 
systems responses to actual and expected climate stimuli and their impact, 
which reduces harmful effects or takes advantage of benefits posed by the 
change (IPCC 2007a, p.869).  
 
Adaptation to climate change is often interpreted as a series of planned, 
purposeful, intentional and strategic policies (Adger et al. 2005a; Adger et al. 
2009b; Smit et al. 1999), however, it can also include autonomous or 
spontaneous adaptation by individuals or local communities. There are some 
who are sceptical of such autonomous adaptation measures for the reason that 
they are likely to become mal-adaptations or produce unexpected outcomes 
(EC 2009, p.7; Mcbean 2011; Fussel 2007; Cash et al. 2006). Moreover, some 
critics are of the opinion that autonomous adaptations sometimes are not 
sufficient to reduce vulnerability or to improve adaptive capacity in the system. 
In contrast, planned adaptations are usually undertaken by public organisations 
to meet the needs of stakeholders (Smit and Pilifosova 2003). There are some 
other attributes used for conceptualising adaptations by international 
organisation which work for facilitating climate change adaptation. These are 
summarised in Box 1-1. 
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Box 1-1:  Examples of conceptualizing adaptation in international institutions  
              (Source: Adopted from the respective references) 
Source Definition 
IPCC 
(2001) 
Adjusting the activities of natural or human systems to climate 
stimuli or the effects of the stimuli which are actually happening or 
expected to take place. It refers to changes in processes, 
practices, or structures to moderate or offset potential damages or 
to take advantage of opportunities associated with changes in 
climate.  
UNDP 
(2005) 
Process of mitigating the results of climate change and developing, 
enhancing, and implementing coping strategies.  
UNFCCC 
(2012) 
Adjustment in natural or human systems in response to actual or 
expected climatic stimuli or their effects, which moderates harm or 
exploits beneficial opportunities. 
World Bank 
(Webpage of 
World Bank) 
The adjustment in natural or human systems in response to actual 
or expected climatic stimuli or their effects. Adaptation can be 
carried out in response to (ex post) or in anticipation of (ex ante) 
changes in climatic conditions.  
UKCIP 
(2003) 
The process of reducing losses and damages related to climate 
change and the risk associated with the damage; and determining 
the benefits or the results of the processes that affect future 
climate conditions. 
 
The concepts of climate change adaptation were formulated by the international 
organisations which are known to be advanced in addressing climate change 
adaptation. For example the Interdepartmental Panel for Climate Change (IPCC), the 
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the United Kingdom Climate Impact 
Programme (UKCIP), and the United Nations Frameworks Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC) are acknowledged as having worked actively on climate change 
adaptations. The IPCC Third Assessment Report (TAR) (2001) refers to adaptation as 
the adjustment of nature and human systems against climate stimuli and the 
stimulating effect of climate, while the definition of the UNDP (2005) is more concrete 
and practical (IPCC 2001). The UNDP uses the terms mitigation, coping, and utilization 
as the concrete forms of adjusting activities to address climate change (UNDP 2005).  
 
The UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) established an overall 
framework for interdepartmental efforts to reduce the risks posed by climate change, 
and recognized that the stability of climate systems can be affected by emission of 
greenhouse gases caused by industrial and other emissions (UNFCCC 2012). It 
identified adaptation as one of the five key building blocks of a future climate change 
deal. In order to support developing countries which will be vulnerable to climate 
change; the UNFCCC established „the Adaptation Fund‟ in 2001 in order to finance 
adaptation projects and programmes in developing countries (AF 2011). In Paragraph 
(e) and (f) of Article 4 (Commitments) of the UNFCCC, it recommends that all the 
parties which ratified the Convention shall cooperate for adaptation to the impact of 
climate change by suggesting specific and practical examples of adaptation measures; 
for example: developing plans for coastal zone management, water resources and 
agriculture, and for the protection and rehabilitation of areas affected by droughts and 
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floods. The United Kingdom Climate Impact Programme (UKCIP), on the other hand, 
uses the concept of risk management approaches to climate change adaptations. It 
refers to adaptation as a process, or outcome of the process, that leads to a reduction 
in impact; the risks posed by climate variability and climate change. For the purpose of 
effective implementation of adaptation, the UKCIP divides adaptation into three steps: 
recognition of risks associated with climate change; decision-making regarding 
management of the risks; and utilizing the opportunities (UKCIP 2004). The World 
Bank combines three of these institutions‟ definitions: the UNDP (2005), the UKCIP 
(2003) and the IPCC (2001) and refers to climate change adaptation as adjustment in 
natural or human systems responding to actual or expected climatic stimuli or their 
effects (WB 2012). Thus, adaptation can be responsive or anticipatory measures and 
behaviours to prevent, moderate, cope with and take advantage of, the influences of 
climate events in accordance with the objectives of actions or research.  
 
Adaptive capacity 
Some systems are able to adapt while others are not. The ability of the system 
to adjust to changes is referred to as adaptive capacity, which is the potential 
capability, or ability of a system to adapt to climate stimuli or the impact posed 
by climate change (Smit and Pilifosova 2003; Klein et al. 2007; Engle and 
Lemos 2010). In addition, adaptive capacity includes the ability to move the 
threshold of adaptation and expand the coping range of adaptations (Klein et al. 
2007). Adaptation to climate change is determined by a combination of many 
factors including non-climatic attributes; for example, socio-economic resources 
such as human capital, information, social capital, political capital, and the 
capacity of institutions, and physical and material resources: technology, natural 
resources and infrastructure, the accessibility of new technologies, social and 
economic development, people‟s willingness to change their behaviours, 
networks and social capital, governance structures and the degree of 
institutional capacity are all factors that influence the degree of adaptive 
capacity of communities or nations (Smit and Pilifosova 2003; Berkhout 2005; 
Adger et al. 2003; Klein et al. 2007; Engle and Lemos 2010). Thus the adaptive 
capacity is multi-dimensional and determined by aggregated interaction 
between numerous factors (Vincent 2007; Brooks et al. 2005). The 
determinants of adaptive capacity work slightly differently depending on the 
conditions of a society (Engle 2010; Adger and Vincent 2005; O'Brien et al. 
2009).  
 
Successful adaptation 
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What we want to achieve by adapting to climate change is determined variously 
within societies or sectors. Some societies set up the goal of returning to status 
quo through adapting to the environmental changes and returning back to the 
same condition before the changes occurred; others attempt to achieve 
economic development while adapting to climate change (Adger and Barnett 
2009). Generally speaking, achieving the goals through adaptation actions can 
be defined as reaching successful adaptation. However, conceptualising 
„successful‟ adaptation does not simply refer to the effectiveness of meeting the 
determined goals (Adger et al. 2005b). Successful adaptation is diversely 
conceptualised as much as „success‟ is defined differently from individual to 
individual and from society to society according to the values of the people. Also, 
the determination of successful adaptation can change spatially and temporally 
(Adger et al. 2005b). Sometimes short-term adaptation could lead to long-term 
vulnerability to climate change (Doria et al. 2009; Lahdelma et al. 2000). 
Moreover, when adaptation actions focus on one particular risk in a certain 
group in a society, the others in the region or other aspects of the social system 
may be made more vulnerable to different impacts or unpredicted risks (Cannon 
and Muller-Mahn 2010; Nelson et al. 2007). Therefore, taking into account the 
long-term effects or unexpected side-effects, some scholars argue that flexibility 
or resilience to climate change should be added to the criteria for evaluating the 
success of adaptation (Brooks et al. 2011, p.14). 
 
There are some suggestions for ways to increase the possibility of making 
successful adaptations; by increasing the number of options for adaptation and 
improving adaptive capacity of the systems (Fazey et al. 2010). Successful 
adaptation begins with deciding the appropriate adaptations for the system. In 
order to increase options for adapting to climate change, it is necessary to 
explore what people want to achieve through the adaptation, what impacts are 
likely to occur, and how much the society will be influenced by the impacts. For 
this process, multiple actors from diverse areas collect opinions and provide 
knowledge, because a variety of actors across multilevel sectors can produce 
more alternatives and better methods of implementation. In addition, climate 
change is so complex and dynamic that it is difficult for any single actor to 
provide proper ways to cope with it. Hence, for more effective policy 
implementation, decision makers within and beyond the state are encouraged to 
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share their powers and information. (Folke et al. 2005). So-called governance 
approaches to climate change adaptation may lead to more effective delivery of 
adaptation measures (Tompkins and Adger 2005; Bulkeley and Betsill 2005; 
Gustavsson et al. 2009; Adger et al. 2009b). The detailed advantages of 
adopting governance technologies to climate change adaptation will be 
discussed in Chapter 2.  
 
Another method of improving effectiveness in adaptations is to build up the 
adaptive capacity of a system. This generally leads a society to achieve 
successful adaptation to climate change (Klein et al. 2007). However, O‟Brien 
(2009) argues, citing empirical research in Norwegian‟s flood management that 
a high level of determinants of capacity for adaptation does not always lead to 
successful adaptation. Although  a society establishes a high level of adaptive 
capacity, it does not necessarily succeed in adapting to climate impacts 
(O'Brien et al. 2006; O'Brien 2009). Values also contribute to the probability of 
successful adaptation (O'Brien 2009). The values in a society are critical factors 
in deciding whether the adaptation actions are counted as success or failure. 
Climate change adaptation requires multiple actors from diverse sectors at 
different scales. In order to deliver effective and successful adaptation policies, 
it is necessary to determine whose values are most affected and how these can 
be secured from the risks of climate change (Adger et al. 2009a).Social norms 
and the ownership of values should be accounted as the essential determinants 
of successful adaptation (Eriksen and Kelly 2007).  
 
As discussed, there are many factors encouraging or hampering the taking of 
adaptation actions. Among these factors, Adger et al. (2009) classify essential 
elements into three types: system thresholds which refers to a point for a 
system from which it starts to take adaptive actions or to hold them when the 
system reaches beyond its capacity; individual and cultural values in a society; 
and institutions and governances (Adger et al. 2009b, p.2). Therefore, defining 
and evaluating successful adaptation cannot be handled in a simplistic fashion.  
  
23 
 
Due to the uncertain and unpredictable nature of climate change impacts, 
improving resilience2 and flexibility of a system will lead to effective adaptation 
rather than sustaining the status quo (Nelson et al. 2007). Somehow climate 
change adaptation aims to improve resilience so that a society can react to the 
unexpected risks posed by climate change or variability. As a way to generate 
more resilient adaptations, multilevel actors from variety of sectors should 
participate in the decision-making about adaptation actions (Nelson 2011). 
When a society is vulnerable, even small disturbances may cause critical 
changes in the system. By contrast, in a resilient social-ecological system, 
disturbance has the potential to create opportunities for innovation and for 
development (Folke 2006).  
 
In spite of our efforts to reduce emissions, the trend of climate change will 
continue. Without timely adaptation, human societies will face the risks posed 
by climate impact (Parry et al. 2008; Adger et al. 2009a; Parry et al. 2009; Smit 
et al. 2008; Ford and Berrang-Ford 2011). Climate change adaptation is 
inevitable, both in developing and developed countries, for human wellbeing 
and security. Climate change, including extreme weather events will be more 
apparent in terms of intensity and frequency than at the present. As a way to 
make timely climate change adaptation, this research focuses on the 
importance of planned adaptation through establishing strategies or making 
policies. For example, a governance-based approach that ensures the 
participation of multilevel actors may be an effective method of adaptation.  
 
I have discussed the background of this research by outlining the features of 
climate impacts in the world and in South Korea and explored the essence of 
taking adaptation measures to cope with the impacts and create successful 
adaptations by reviewing academic research and reports published by 
international organizations. The next section of this chapter will explore the 
rationale for this research, within the context of the broader literatures on 
climate adaptation and policy making.  
                                                          
2
In this research resilience refers to the capacity of a system to absorb disturbances while retaining the 
essential functions, structure, identity and feedbacks within the system for recombining and evolving or 
transforming by using the impacts as opportunities (Folke 2006). 
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1.2. The Knowledge Gap  
 
Research on adaptation to climate change has been undertaken in different 
ways in accordance with the interests and the methodologies of researchers 
(van der Sluijs and Dessai 2007). A governance approach to decision-making 
processes is generally recognized as a democratic process of policy making. 
Hence there is some literature published about climate governance, but very 
few studies have been carried out regarding the process of creating climate 
change adaptation policies from the perspective of political culture, and none 
have been done in South Korea. There are some studies regarding culture or 
values which influence the decision making about climate change adaptation, 
but little attention has been paid to political culture and how it has influenced the 
decision-making about climate change adaptation policies. However, political 
culture in the process of decision making about climate change adaptation will 
influence the outcomes of adaptation in negative or positive ways. Political 
culture can hinder or encourage climate change adaptation as cultural values in 
society (Adger et al. 2009b, pp.1-24). Therefore it is necessary to investigate 
the opportunities and barriers for successful adaptation to climate change and 
variability by examining the relatively understudied relationship between political 
culture and features of climate change adaptation governance. To achieve this 
purpose, I use a case study of climate change adaptation measures at the 
national level in South Korea. 
 
The South Korean study is a good empirical case study through which to 
examine the influence of political culture which hinders or encourages the 
effective governance of adaptation decision-making in the process of national 
climate change adaptation policies because of its distinctive political culture. An 
examination of governance applications to climate change adaptation in South 
Korea will show the characteristics of the decision-making about adaptation 
policies under this specific political culture.  
 
This is case specific research but the findings may apply to other regions and 
offer some directions as they consider how political culture undermines 
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participation of multilevel actors in taking action towards climate change 
adaptation, and may hinder successful climate change adaptation.  
 
1.3. Research aims and questions  
 
In order to fill this knowledge gap, I will investigate how political culture is 
expressed in the processing of the climate change adaptation policies of South 
Korea in the context of participatory governance. The aspects of political culture, 
attitudes or structures that are hindering or helping the governance of 
adaptation will be examined using primary data (that is, interviewing members 
of the Advisory Board) and secondary data (documents and literature). These 
data will help to answer the questions about whether the key challenges in a 
governance approach to climate change adaptation are external factors (for 
example, climate factors) or internal factors (for example, political cultures). The 
details of the methods to be used in this research will be discussed in Chapter 4. 
 
My research aims to investigate and identify how South Korea responds to 
climate change adaptation. This aim will be achieved by addressing the 
following objectives:  
(1) To describe and interpret the key components of the adaptation policies in 
terms of climate change; 
(2) To identify the influences shaping adaptation policies using a series of 
interviews with key stakeholders; 
(3) To explore the ways in which adaptation governance for climate change is 
framed; 
(4)To identify what aspects of political culture are involved in the process of 
making climate change adaptation policies; and 
(5)To identify how political culture influences the governance of climate change 
adaptation. 
 
Table 3 describes the research questions and the methodologies which were 
used in order to elicit answers to the above research questions. The details of 
the research methodologies will be discussed in Chapter 4 of this thesis. 
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Table 3: Research Questions and Methods (Source: Compiled by the author of 
this thesis) 
Research Question Methods 
What are the key components of the 
adaptation policies, in terms of 
climate change, of South Korea? 
Analyse documentary sources: laws and rules 
relevant to climate change policies established 
by the South Korean government; policy 
documents and reports published by 
governmental institutions; academic 
publications; news articles; and formal 
speeches, and interview data 
What influences the shape of 
adaptation policies in the context of 
climate change? 
Semi-structured qualitative interviews : face to 
face interview and supplementary telephone 
interviews 
Telephone interviews 
How is adaptation governance for 
climate change framed? 
Analyse documentary sources and interviews 
What barriers and challenges to 
successful climate change 
adaptation are identified by the 
interviewees who are members in 
the Advisory Board? 
Semi-structured and qualitative interviews 
 
1.4. Thesis Chapter Plan  
 
This thesis falls into three distinct groups. In the first group, the introduction, the 
theoretical background and methodological framework: Chapters 1 to 4, give 
the background of this research, the theoretical background and methodology 
are described. The first four chapters of this thesis provide the overall 
introduction and formulate the basic conceptual and methodological frameworks 
for the research. The second of group, from Chapter 5 to Chapter 7 presents 
the findings from the results of the analyses of policy documents, relevant 
literature and interview data; it discusses the results of this analyses in 
accordance with the theoretical frameworks introduced in the earlier parts of the 
thesis. Lastly, Chapter 8 is the final and concluding chapter of this thesis. This 
chapter summarises the findings of the research, demonstrating contributions to 
knowledge about climate change adaptation, and ends with concluding remarks 
and suggestions for further research. 
 
Chapter 1 introduces the background, the objectives and research questions of 
the research. Also, this chapter rationalises the need for this research by 
demonstrating the background of the research: identifying the gaps in 
theoretical knowledge, and problems related to the delivery of climate change 
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adaptation. This chapter summarises the research questions and how the whole 
chapters of the thesis fit into the whole. 
 
Chapter 2 and 3 set out the theoretical background of the whole research 
package. In these chapters, key concepts of the thesis are presented and 
critiqued: the advantages and disadvantages of governance, type of political 
culture; and the characteristics of the South Korean political culture by 
reviewing relevant literature.  
 
Chapter 4 explains the framework of the methodology used for this research 
and briefly describes the socio-cultural background and topographic features of 
the case study area. This chapter also describes the process of selecting 
interviewees; the ethics adhered to with respect to the interviews, positionality 
of me as an interviewer, the details of practice of interviews, and the methods 
employed in the analysis of the documents. This chapter provides the general 
methodological structures used to answer the research questions and to 
achieve the research aims.  
 
Chapter 5 critiques the climate policies and the governance structure in South 
Korea from the perspective of the governance concepts and political culture 
outlined in Chapters 2 and 3. This chapter presents findings about the 
expression of political culture in the process of policy making by analysing 
government documents and relevant literature published by government 
institutions or the government of South Korea. In addition, this chapter identifies 
governing instruments currently used for climate change policies in South Korea. 
Chapter 5 provides the basis for the guidelines provided to the interviewees‟ to 
direct their responses and the backgrounds of those who responded.  
 
The result of the interview analysis is divided into two chapters based on the 
attitudes of those who took part in the interviews regarding climate change 
adaptation of South Korea. Chapter 6 discusses the complacency of many 
interviewees regarding the progress of climate change policies; and Chapter 7 
the concerns expressed in some of the responses. As the first chapter 
analysing the responses of interviews, Chapter 6 explores the reasons given by 
interviewees for what they considered to be the successful delivery of 
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adaptation policies and interprets the reasons for their complacency. An 
analysis of the interviews addresses the question of the policy cultures and 
political culture expressed in the policy decision-making about the National 
Climate Change Adaptation Measures.  
 
Chapter 7 is the second part of the analysis of the findings produced by the 
interview data. In contrast to Chapter 6, the focus of this chapter is on those 
who showed by their responses that they were dissatisfied with adaptation 
policies and governance systems in South Korea. Also, barriers to, and 
challenges facing climate adaptation governance are investigated.  
 
Chapter 8 is the overall conclusion to this research. This chapter summarises 
the findings of the research and discusses it in within the context of the 
conceptual framework and research questions. Based on the findings of this 
research recommendations will be made for policy makers to consider when 
making climate change adaptation policies at national or local levels. In addition, 
this chapter will demonstrate how my research makes a contribution to 
knowledge advance and in the end addresses the limitations of the research. 
The chapter will close with suggestions for further research and policy 
implementation.   
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Chapter 2. Critically assessing the governance of climate 
change adaptation: The lesser of two evils? 
 
 
“Governance is…constantly evolving and responding to changing circumstances 
(Walters 2004, p.29)”. 
 
 
 
2.1. Introduction 
 
There is general agreement that for our own safety, it is of paramount 
importance that we respond to climate change adaptation. Among the various 
possible responses to climate change precautionary and planned adaptations 
have been described as being more effective than spontaneous and reactive 
adaptation (IPCC 2007a; Grothmann and Reusswig 2006; Fankhauser et al. 
1999; Paavola 2008). However, in reality, it is difficult to take precautionary 
adaptive actions and make policies before there is a felt need for them (Wolf 
2011). Another issue is that it is usual for the state to play the core role in 
adaptation by adopting a top-down approach. However, it is argued that such a 
traditional approach may be inadequate to respond to the complex impacts of 
climate change and variability. Accordingly, many scholars argue that the 
success or failure of climate change adaptation depends on the effectiveness of 
governance and so undertake research on the linkages between governance 
and adaptation (Adger et al. 2011; Adger et al. 2009b,Chapter 25).  
 
Then what is governance? Are there any disadvantages associated with it? 
Governance is an approach that does not see the exercise of power as being 
limited to the actions of government or the state, but includes all forms of 
activities taken by multilevel actors (Kooiman 1993; Chhotray and Stoker 
2009a; Richards and Smith 2002). In particular, the governance approach 
highlights public participation in decision making (Rhodes 2007; Rhodes 1997). 
Governance also has some limitations even though it is recommended by many 
scholars as a more appropriate approach to climate change adaptation than a 
top-down direction from central government. One of the key issues for 
governance is how to manage the relationships between diverse actors and 
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ensure that they share collective goals (Chhotray and Stoker 2009b), while 
improving the effectiveness of policy delivery. Another constraint is the 
ambiguity of accountability. As more actors participate in the process of making 
policies and sharing rights, accountability for these decisions becomes more 
ambiguous (Kjaer 2004). There are some sceptical views of the governance 
approach because of its disadvantages, which will be discussed later in this 
chapter. Notwithstanding the disadvantages, it is argued why the governance 
approach can provide the lesser of two-evils: that is, it can provide effective 
methods for adaptation to climate change. The following section will explore the 
disadvantages and advantages of adopting the governance approach in the 
context of climate change adaptation before I present the reason for supporting 
governance approach to climate change adaptation.   
 
2.2. Limitations of a governance approach 
 
Bob Jessop argues that just as the market and the state may fail, so may 
governance (Jessop 1998). He lists several limitations that may lead to a failure 
of governance:  these include oversimplification of conflicts occurring among 
actors; the ambiguity of accountability; weak steering and mediating 
mechanisms and lack of legitimacy related to the non-elected participants. If 
there are some limitations to governance, it is reasonable to discuss how they 
will constrain a governance-based approach to climate change adaptation.   
 
The potential disadvantages of governance will be discussed by classifying the 
types of governance according to whose role is emphasized in the structures 
(Kim 2002a) ; the state-centred governance where the state retains the central 
role in decision making; civil society-centred governance where democratic 
development is a main concern; market-oriented governance in which 
competitive corporatism is the key doctrine; and multilevel governance; as 
exemplified by the European Union governance.  
 
2.2.1. State-centred governance 
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This form of governance includes New Public Management (NPM), Good 
Governance of the World Bank (WB 1994), and Corporative Governance 
(Osborne and Gaebler 1993). This approach involves governmental and 
administrative management becoming more entrepreneurial and seeking to 
transfer public service functions to civil society organisations (Kim 2002a; Pierre 
and Peters 2005), but the states retains the central role in decision making. The 
state generally focuses on the outcome of policy delivered rather than on the 
relationships among actors. The success of this type of governance depends on 
how well it retains the balance between political bureaucracy and collectivism, 
and manages conflicts and tensions between the varied actors involved (Kim 
2002a; Rhodes 1996). When conflicts and tensions between participants are 
too serious for the state to manage, the equity and democracy of the social 
system will be called into question so that there will be little prospect of 
achieving policy goals. 
 
By adopting some of the desirable features of private sectors, NPM seeks to 
increase the efficiency and effectiveness with which public services are 
delivered while rejecting the bureaucratic culture (Rhodes 1996; Pierre and 
Peters 2005). Although NPM is supposed to deliver better outcomes, its critics 
stress that it has weaknesses: these are listed by Rhodes (1996) as focusing on 
intra-organisational matters; concentrating on objectives; being result-focused; 
and suffering from the contradiction between competition and steering  (Rhodes 
1996).  
 
Osborne and Gaebler (1993) argue that the government should be catalytic 
(through steering), competitive, mission-driven, result-oriented and anticipatory 
in order to be efficient and effective in providing best services to its customers. 
They suggest that if government discharges its administrative duties in a more 
entrepreneurial way while abandoning traditional bureaucratic culture, it will 
become more innovative, more flexible and have higher morale. They argue 
that entrepreneurial governments are inventive in choosing outcomes to pursue 
so that public entrepreneurs make heroic efforts to give good performance. 
However, if market competition is not carefully structured or managed, the 
policies cannot be equitably or efficiently delivered (p.104). In addition, there are 
some sectors where it is difficult to introduce competition into the public service. 
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The system for rewarding such public entrepreneurs may raise ethical issues 
and may not work in some institutional contexts.  
 
The World Bank‟s „Good Governance‟ approach allows the states in the third 
world to manage limited resources and public goods with transparency, 
accountability and fairness (WB 1994). It is argued that the „Good Governance‟ 
is accomplished by changing power-distributions, developing the democratic 
political structure and creating an open administrative system, for example 
independent public auditor (Rhodes 1996). The „Good Governance‟ approach of 
the World Bank suggests privatisation for solving complex societal problem in 
developing countries; however in reality privatisation is very political and it is not 
neutral or a natural response (Walters 2004). In addition, it is not a simple task 
for the states in developing countries to reform the decision making process 
(Chhotray and Stoker 2009b). 
 
The key feature of the state-centred governance is that the state remains as a 
central actor, the central decision maker with the power to share with other 
actors (Pierre and Peters 2005). This type of governance can be applied to the 
society where democracy in its political structure or participatory culture is less 
developed, so the state gets involved in determining who will participate in 
policy making and decides what policy will be prioritised with the help of 
institutionalized systems (Pierre and Peters 2005).  
 
2.2.2. Civil society-centred governance 
 
The second type of governance sees civil society organisations as key players. 
The civil society-centred governance model is operated on the basic theories of 
participation and collectivism by plural actors (Kim 2002a; Kjaer 2004). 
Governance without government is categorised in this type of governance, and 
this type of governance does not take the role of government seriously (Kjaer 
2004). Non-governmental organizations or civil society organisations play a key 
role if this type of governance is to be effective by establishing well-ordered 
networks and efficient partnerships (Kim 2002a). As the key actors of this 
governance are plural civil society organisations, they are supposed to have the 
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capacity to represent and address the collective interests of citizens. Therefore, 
the participants usually are non-elected actors in contrast to government 
elected officials and their legitimacy and capacity  is often doubted (Pierre and 
Peters 2005).  
 
It is claimed that this governance type is appropriate for societies where citizens 
have high levels of self-autonomy and ethical values (Kjaer 2004). Rhodes‟ 
social-cybernetics, self-autonomous networks and corporative governance, and 
Peters‟ participatory governance are examples of this type of governance 
(Rhodes 1996; Pierre and Peters 2000; Kim 2002a). It did not seem problematic 
for social-democratic Western European countries to adopt this type of 
governance in order to govern social welfare, because there civil society 
organizations have the capacity to participate in political activities (Kim 2002b). 
However, this type of governance may not be appropriate if there is a low level 
of public capacity in participating with political decision making or information 
systems are rarely open to private sector. 
 
This type of governance can be ineffective for a society where citizens do not 
actively participate in political activities or are indifferent to political objectives 
and there is less opportunity for information sharing with government. Moreover 
where social inequity exists in power sharing among social members, the 
inequity may be exacerbated by adopting this type of governance. If strong 
CSOs support for this system for their own benefits without representing the 
collective goals of their  society or considering socially vulnerable and 
marginalised groups, public service is not delivered equally to all members 
(Pierre and Peters 2005; Chhotray and Stoker 2009b).  
 
2.2.3. Market-oriented governance 
 
Those advocating this governance type believe that public service can be 
distributed more efficiently by market competition rather than by the command 
and control of government (Kim 2002a). Governmental officers are motivated by 
incentives and rewarded differently depending on their duties and their 
achievements in delivering policies. However, it is argued that there is a 
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problem for managing public services by the rule of the market, as the 
management of public services is fundamentally different from that of the 
commercial market (Kim 2002a). With regard to this, Jessop argues that the 
failure of the state‟s intervention for solving the inefficiencies through 
privatisation and deregulation can lead to deficiency of democracy and 
degraded social governance (Jessop 1998).  
 
When this argument is applied to the climate change discourse, global market 
based governance to mitigate climate change must be added to the equation. 
Discourse of on global governance in climate change began with international 
negotiations regarding the allocation of responsibility for climate change and the 
extent of burden-sharing among countries (Dicken 2010, p.2). However, for the 
past decades, the cooperative efforts to cope with climate change have 
revealed limitation in effectiveness (Jagers and Stripple 2003; Bulkeley 2010b). 
In addition to the limitation of governance itself, spatial and temporal uncertainty 
and the different scales in of impacts related to climate change, make 
international cooperation challenging (Meadowcroft 2009). If we talk about 
governing climate change, we need to take account of the characteristics of 
climate change which are complex and dynamic (Adger et al. 2005b). Members 
of the global community take advantage of this making it an excuse for delays in 
taking action. Climate governance tilted towards market solutions and 
depending on good-wills does not seem to reduce the risks posed by climate 
change (Rothe 2011).  
 
Such market-based governance for mitigating climate change is not working 
successfully. The world‟s biggest greenhouse gas emitters which have the 
greatest  power in global community do not take responsibility for climate 
change or take undertake obligatory reductions of greenhouse gas emission 
(Keohane and Victor 2011; Kern and Bulkeley 2009). As global financial and 
economic governance manifested inequity of power sharing between developed 
and developing countries, a similar situation is observed in international 
negotiations on climate change (Shirlow 2009, p.42). Powerful developed 
countries are reluctant to taking historic responsibility for climate change, while 
developing countries, which usually are more vulnerable to climate change than 
developed countries, are blaming the presently posed risks on the industrialised 
35 
 
countries (Dicken 2010). For example, the Kyoto Protocol was introduced in 
order to make provision for the initiation of substantial action against climate 
change (Dicken 2010; Haug et al. 2010). The same protocol set the numerical 
target of reducing emissions within a limited timeframe using three mechanisms 
(UNFCCC 1998). Therefore it was difficult to make an agreement following on 
from the Kyoto Protocol which had run its course in December 2012, although 
global communities did achieve a collective goal of reducing emissions of 
greenhouse gas (Dicken 2010, pp. 537-550).  
 
2.2.4. European governance: Multilevel governance  
 
The term „multilevel governance‟ was first used in 1992 and developed to 
explain the structure of the European Union‟s decision making (Bache and 
Flinders 2005, p.2). It  refers to a system of continuous negotiation among 
interdependent actors at several territorial levels and the distribution of decision 
making across multiple territorial levels while states share power with diverse 
actors (Bache and Flinders 2005, p.95). As such, multilevel governance is 
defined as the interlinked governance between international (or sometimes 
supranational), national and subnational governments with diverse actors from 
non-public and public (Pierre and Peters 2000, p.72; Hooghe and Marks 2003). 
Decision making processes in the European Union (EU) do not reside solely in 
member countries but also on the negotiations between subnational, national, 
and supranational actors (Pierre and Peters 2000). Literally, multilevel 
governance refers to a multilevel decision-making process that is steered by 
plural actors across multiple locations and sectors (Keskitalo 2010).  
 
Multilevel governance is considered to be more efficient in making policies than 
a monopoly of central states for the reason that governance at multiple levels 
can more readily capture various policy externalities, and solve the problems 
(Marks and Hooghe 2005). As climate change generates complex, diverse and 
dynamic impacts in societies, any single actor alone does not have sufficient 
capacity to solve the problems (Jordan et al. 2003). Therefore responding to 
climate change, the multilevel governance approach in the EU can achieve 
successful goals. In a case study of the Norwegian municipalities‟ role in 
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governing climate change, Amundsen et al. (2010) demonstrate that a multilevel 
governance framework is preferable to making proactive adaptation policies by 
removing the barriers occurring between national and subnational governments 
(Amundsen et al. 2010). The subnational level governments are likely to find 
their interests less well represented when determining goals (Pierre and Peters 
2005). 
 
However, multilevel governance has its weaknesses. The autonomy of 
subnational actors is overstated while the importance of the state‟s role as the 
important decision maker is underestimated. When there are conflicts between 
these actors, there are few means of resolving those conflicts among the 
participants (Pierre and Peters 2005). When the role, power and responsibility 
are not explicitly distributed among the actors, collective decision making in this 
governance is in fact dictated by the stronger players, which is a more serious 
problem associated with multilevel governance (Biesbroek et al. 2010; Pierre 
and Peters 2005; Kjaer 2004). Moreover, the capacity of subnational actors is 
not developed and weak capacity may result from taking actions by themselves, 
thus this governance type is likely to fail. Lack of motives or incentives to attract 
subnational actors to the process of decision-making tends to make people 
apathetic to the policies made in the multilevel governance system.  
 
In multilevel governance, decision about policies is largely made by negotiation 
between participants rather than by formal rules and constitutions (Pierre and 
Peters 2005). Peter and Pierre (2005) argue that such informal and multilevel 
negotiations can result in the darker consequence (p.83). In the process of 
policy making, the powerful countries take control over the weaker in setting the 
policy agenda, determining goals of policies and the measures to achieve the 
goals. Walters (2004) expresses a sceptical view of the large scale of EU 
governance and of such power relations shaped in the multilevel governance. 
Besides, there are no proper systems to solve conflicts which occur between 
the varieties of participants. Therefore the conflicts tend to be solved at other 
locations or not solved at all (Walters 2004). It is argued that a regulatory 
framework should be defined in order to make multiple-level governance work 
effectively.  
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Well-coordinated networks across multiple tiers of governance and well-
organised interrelationships between formal and informal institutes are required 
for multilevel governance to work successfully (Juhola and Westerhoff 2011). 
As another pitfall of multilevel governance, it is remarked that it generally 
focuses on subnational authorities rather than subnational private actors. By 
arguing that multilevel governance might overlook the role of local level 
governance, instead of vertical multilevel governance, Bulkeley suggests that 
transnational networks for solving global climate change are working better than 
horizontal governance, because transnational network governance has fewer 
vertical relationships among members (Bulkeley 2005). State and non-state 
actors build horizontal cooperation in achieving the negotiated goals (Betsill and 
Bulkeley 2004). This horizontal collaborative governance among states has 
limitations, as the willingness of the members and leadership of the states 
decides the effectiveness of the governance. The negotiations and policies 
achieved by transnational networks may not be accepted by state governments 
and some states do not have the resources to participate in international 
networks and express their rights as members of the governance structure 
(Kern and Bulkeley 2009). If this is the case, the policy will be decided by strong 
and powerful members. 
 
As a response to the failure of state intervention and alleged inefficiency in 
delivering public services, the governance approach using the market, building 
networks or establishing partnership with non-governmental sectors are 
introduced (Jessop 1998; Kjaer 2004; Chhotray and Stoker 2009b), but 
governance also reveals some limitations and faces a problem of unclear 
accountability arising from various and multiple participation. Although these 
disadvantages exist, governance can increase the flexibility with which the 
system can adapt to changes, and respond to public needs more effectively 
(Kjaer 2004). Accordingly, in order for governance to work effectively, there is a 
need to address these issues by a greater clarification of roles and 
responsibilities and by developing new mechanisms that stress power-sharing 
and joint learning. Besides, governance provides more opportunities for various 
actors to generate more policy options (Chhotray and Stoker 2009b; Richards 
and Smith 2002).  
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As discussed in this section, governance has limitations and, in practice, has 
definite disadvantages. Nonetheless, scholars argue that governance be 
considered as a positive determinant in building adaptive capacity. Governance 
approaches have weaknesses and may not be the perfect method to approach 
climate change adaptation, but it can be the lesser of two evils. I suggest that 
governance is better than bureaucratic and authoritative governing by fiat.  
 
2.3. Advantages provided by a governance approach 
 
The previous section examined the disadvantages of a governance approach. 
Although there are some constraints, I suggest that the governance approach 
be accepted as a pragmatic approach for adapting to climate change. 
Accordingly, this section identifies the reasons for my support for the 
governance approach by exploring its advantages. I begin with adverse effects 
posed by a top-down approach which is assumed to be the opposite approach 
to governance; as an example the governance approach to environmental 
disputes in South Korea is given; and current research on global climate change 
governance is examined. 
 
2.3.1. Comparisons with the top-down approach  
 
The term „top-down‟ approach is used to describe the structure of a policy 
process which involves strong governmental command in the management of 
public policies (Hare et al. 2010). It is also defined as the process of decisions 
making made by government officials and implemented and evaluated mainly 
by governmental command and control (Sabatier 1986).  
 
Many states adopt a top-down approach in climate policies, for example the UK 
and the Netherlands have, for the most part, adopted a top-down approach to 
governing climate change through governmental institutions (Keskitalo et al. 
2012; Urwin and Jordan 2008; Meadowcroft 2009; Hoppner 2010; Brooks et al. 
2005). It is argued that a top-down approach is more effective in obtaining 
global coordination for achieving the global goals of reducing emissions and can 
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provide the transparent and accountable process of monitoring and evaluating 
emission reductions (Wheeler 2008; Hare et al. 2010).  
 
However, talking about adaptation to climate change is different from the 
discourse of mitigation. There are many who worry that by addressing issues 
using the top-down local approach has often been undermined hindering the 
development of more robust and locally attuned adaptive responses (Urwin and 
Jordan 2008). Many scholars argue that climate change adaptation requires 
multiple actors from diverse areas at different scales to achieve effective 
implementation. A top-down approach may solve problems fast in terms of 
speed, but it reduces the opportunities to interact with diverse actors and to 
learn from their response to changing circumstances, problem solving and 
conflict resolution (Fazey et al. 2011).  
 
Challenges imposed by a top-down approach to policies are more serious than 
achieving policy goals (Sabatier 1986). Firstly, in the case of complicated and 
unexpected situations which occur and hinder effective policy implementation, 
state cannot manage all the current complex issues by itself. Secondly, the 
social equity issues must be taken into account. A top-down approach excluding 
diverse actors is likely to pays less attention to the needs of vulnerable groups 
(Adger et al. 2009a). And the third factor is related to the issue of 
underestimating the roles of stakeholders who can provide local knowledge and 
information which may be helpful for making more effective policy options 
(Sabatier 1986). When the focus is directed to local level policies, it is evident 
that by excluding local actors or by ignoring particular local situations, the efforts 
of policy makers often result in poor cooperation from local communities at the 
implementation stage (Hess 1998). Central government is not in a position to 
know everything in all regional conditions or the strength of local interests 
(Brondizio et al. 2009). In addition, the implementation of adaptation strategies 
should be a two-way information exchange between policy makers and target 
groups (Corfee-Morlot et al. 2011). Without active involvement of local actors or 
by ignoring the particularities of local situations, the efforts of policy makers 
adopting a top-down perspective, often results in the temporary upsetting of 
local players (Hess 1998). 
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Some policy makers support a top-down approach by levelling the criticism that 
a bottom-up approach to climate change adaptation is likely to result in ad hoc 
reactions prevailing which may reduce resilience to future change (Gagnon-
Lebrun and Agrawala 2007; EC 2009). Or, that in the cases of local 
communities, they  have weak capacity; consequently policies made by a top-
down approach and government support in the form of technical support, are 
recommended (Bele et al. 2011). However, a top-down approach may solve 
problems rapidly in the short-term, but it will reduce the opportunities to interact 
with stakeholders or local actors. Shared learning, problem solving and conflict 
resolution are considered necessary to deliver effective adaptation policies 
(Fazey et al. 2011). This goal can be achieved through the governance 
approach rather than a top-down approach. Due to the restrictions imposed by 
short-term central budgetary cycles or other factors, a top-down approach is 
preferred by some states (Carter 2011). However, for long-term and resilient 
coping with climate change, a top-down approach is not the appropriate 
strategy.  
 
2.3.2. Governance in South Korea  
 
As discussed in the previous section, when compared to problems arising from 
a top-down approach to climate policies, the weakness of a governance 
approach are not as serious and can be mitigated by providing some 
supplementing mechanisms. It was in the 1990s that South Korea introduced 
governance as a new administrative mechanism. Since the 1960s, South Korea 
has focused on economic development without paying attention on 
environmental damages. As it achieved social and economic development at 
some level and the level of participatory culture of people increased, they pay 
more attention to the importance of environment rather than focusing on 
economic development. Whenever the government plans to implement a large-
scale development project which may result in detrimental impacts on 
environment, stakeholders want to express their opinions or objections to the 
projects. Reflecting on such social and cultural condition, the government has 
adopted collaborative governance approach in effective delivery of such public 
projects as large-scale construction (Kim 2010).  
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As governance paradigms were derived from the Western experience, there are 
those who are sceptical regarding their application to the South Korean 
governance policy culture (Kim 2002a). Some scholars are not convinced of the 
capacity of private sectors and argue that therefore the central government 
should stand at the centre of decision-making even for governance to work 
properly (Kim 2002a, p.48). And a lack of the knowledge of the process of 
making policies resulting from the short history of private participation, and 
CSOs‟ depending on government for their financial supports may limit their role 
as independent political actors (Ra 2006). This is not simply a rejection of 
political culture of South Korea; central government stands in the centre as the 
most important decision maker and commander. The underlying idea of a 
traditional, vertical, top-down and hierarchical policy structure has been 
recognised as a cost-effective and quick way to achieve policy goals (Eun and 
Oh 2009).  
 
Sharing power with private actors by inviting them to engage in the process of 
policy delivery is not usual way to solve social conflicts in South Korea. 
Governance theories which originated in the West should be adjusted in 
accordance with Korean culture and political structures goals (Eun and Oh 
2009). When governance is applied to climate change adaptation in South 
Korea, it is expected to take account of non-climatic factors as well as climatic 
factors. The details of the political culture of South Korea will be discussed in 
Chapter 3 in this thesis dealing with its political culture.  
 
I have discussed how governance is adopted in South Korea. Although the role 
of the state is still located at the centre, there is some progress in terms of 
governance development through allowing private actors to participate in the 
decision making process in South Korea.  
 
2.3.3. Governance approach to climate change adaptation 
 
I have explored the negative effects of a top-down approach to climate change 
adaptation and the attempts of South Korea to using a collaborative approach to 
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take account collective public opinions. This section explores how governance 
operates in its responses to climate change and adapting to it. 
 
It is generally argued that climate change generates complex, diverse and 
dynamic impacts in societies so that the state alone does not have sufficient 
capacity to solve the problems (Jordan et al. 2003). Undoubtedly the effective 
way to govern climate change should be flexible, accountable and practicable. 
Therefore, well-coordinated networks across multiple tiers of governance and 
well-organised interrelationships between formal and informal institutes are 
required in a multilevel governance framework for effective climate change 
adaptation (Juhola and Westerhoff 2011). In other words, climate change 
adaptation needs multiple actors from multifaceted sectors, multiple levels of 
government, and diverse institutions, in order to achieve effective outcomes 
(Keskitalo 2010; Hooghe and Marks 2003; Pahl-Wostl 2009).  
 
Owing to a lack of legitimacy of the participants, and a distrust of the capacity of 
civil society organisations, and the strong bureaucratic attitudes of some states, 
some of limitations of the governance approach to overseeing climate change 
adaptation must be acknowledged. However, these challenges can be 
overcome by adopting appropriate governance arrangements (Pierre and 
Peters 2005; Jessop 1998). The Climate Change Act in the UK is seen as a 
good example of a multi-level framework used for governing climate change 
adaptation. The multilevel organisations of adaptation in the UK include both 
horizontal partnerships and vertical partnerships (LRLP). It is argued that the 
reason of such multilevel approach to climate change adaptation is the express 
of NPM characteristics of the UK system, in which the UK government takes a 
state-led approach to climate change adaptation (Keskitalo 2010). The example 
of the UK shows disadvantages or constraints in the governance approach to 
the delivery public service related to climate change adaptation. But there are 
ways to overcome the limitations.  
 
As a way of overcoming the challenges posed by governance and taking into 
account of the political structures (Pierre and Peters 2005; Jessop 1998), I 
attempt  three types of governance arrangements which are fabricated from the 
existing governance types formulated by other scholars and these are also 
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(Refer to Table 4). These can be applied to governing climate change 
adaptation depending on social capacity.  
 
Table 4: Suggestion of governance arrangement 
Governance arrangement Description 
State-led The state has is in the centre of decisions regarding 
adaptation policies, because civil society organisations or 
subnational actors have weak capacity.  
 
Unlike command and control by the state, this type of 
governance arrangement gives opportunities to the private 
sector to improve its ability by opening up information and 
the decision-making process. 
State-tiered The state reduces its bureaucratic steering and entices the 
stakeholders into the system of governance. The state 
should collaborate with the private sector and civil 
organisations.  
 
The state shares power with a variety of actors in making 
decisions. 
State-facilitated The state facilitates governance by providing technical 
support and resources.  
 
Civil society organisations, private actors and local level 
actors should have the capacity to evaluate and participate 
in decision making. The state also acts as one of the 
decision makers by sharing power and information with 
private and local level actors. 
 
The private sector has greater power than in the two other 
types of governance and the state facilitates the 
governance mechanism. 
(Note: Terminologies in the table are made by the author, but the contents are a 
reflection of the existing governance theories)  
 
All the types of governance admit the state as one of important actors in 
governing climate change adaptation. The first type of arrangement is called 
state-led governance. In this governance arrangement, the state has a steering 
role and coordinates the process of policy making with the help of political and 
technical experts groups: this reflects the capacities of civil organisations which 
are very limited and weak or even which are not really interested in political 
activities. Until civil organisations are able to participate actively, the state plays 
the major role in the procedures of decision making. The second type of 
arrangement is called as state-tiered governance. In this type of governance, 
power sharing is the order of the day and the role of the state is reduced. The 
state collaborates with private actors and civil organisations from the stage of 
setting a goal of climate change adaptation through to the stage of monitoring 
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and evaluating the adaptation measures. People are more interested in political 
objects than is the case in the first type of governance arrangement. And lastly, 
the third type of governance arrangement is called state-supported governance. 
In this type the state remains the role of steering but its key role is that of the 
provider of data and resources. In cases of conflict or the unequal distribution of 
power or resources, the state will monitor the exercise of governance properly 
by establishing independent institutions. For this type of governance to work 
effectively, private actors and local governments should be willing to participate 
in political activities and be interested in the political objects.  
 
2.4. Summary 
 
In this chapter I have argued that the governance approach can provide the 
most effective coping strategy for adapting to climate change in spite of some 
constraints: I have done this by comparing the disadvantages and advantages 
posed by a governance approach. I don‟t support governance because it is a 
perfect method to cope with social and environmental change but because it is 
a lesser evil than an authoritarian approach to decision making. In order to 
support the argument, I have compared the disadvantages of a top-down 
approach which has been the traditional and general decision-making process 
in South Korea to the governance approach. I have expressed my support for 
the governance approach to climate change adaptation in that it will provide 
more diverse and substantial policy options which can promote the building of 
adaptive capacity and prove s society to become more resilient to uncertain 
changes in the future. 
    
Governance is adopted as the process of decision-making, planning and 
implementing various public policies in order to improve the effectiveness of 
policy delivery. The methods could include building inter-organizational 
networks, adopting market mechanisms or establishing partnerships. A 
governance approach has some limitations, but it should reflect interactions 
between actors, and the political and social cultures of the society (Doherty and 
Schroeder 2011). For the purpose of achieving collective goals regarding 
climate change adaptation, actors at different levels should share responsibility 
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(Schreurs 2010). However, it is not a simple matter of deciding who has how 
much accountability (Betsill and Bulkeley 2006; Lebel et al. 2006; Eakin and 
Patt 2011). Besides, there is temporal and spatial discrepancy between the 
cause and effect of climate change. Issues related to climate change are 
experienced on a multitude of scales, so it should be solved at these scales 
(Buizer et al. 2011). Therefore it is necessary to establish some type of 
platforms of for including as many multiple and multilevel actors as possible (EC 
2007; Bulkeley 2010a).  
 
Sometimes there exists a big gap exists between government policy for climate 
change adaptation and the views of community-level stakeholders in local 
communities; this hinders the implementation of the adaptation policies (Lata 
and Nunn 2012; Raaijmakers et al. 2008). Well operated collaboration and 
coordination from each level of governance based on joint partnerships can 
facilitate adaptation to climate change and make societies more resilient to the 
uncertainty of impacts posed by climate change stakeholders (Loring et al. 
2011; Paavola and Adger 2006). Governance types can become diverse in 
terms of scales and the techniques used to incorporate actors at each level. 
Such a variety of governance might be differently arranged depending on 
cultural and political structures and differences. For example governance 
arrangements between in Northeast Brazil for governing prolonged drought 
(Nelson and Finan 2009; Toni and Holanda Jr 2008) and in the UK for 
governing flood management of the Thames, are different. Governance 
approaches to the South Korean policy environment is modified according to 
the South Korean political culture (Kim 2002a, p.48; Kim and Kang 2004).  
 
Then in order to understand how South Korea responds to climate change 
adaptation using the governance approach, it is necessary to explore the main 
characteristics of the political culture and how it influences political activities. To 
address this question, the next chapter will discuss the political culture of South 
Korea along with the background theories of the political cultures. 
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Chapter 3. Political culture in governing climate change 
adaptation 
 
 
“Political culture is defined as the set of attitudes, belief, and feelings about a political 
system and a set of orientations toward a special set of social objects and processes in 
a nation at a given time” (Almond and Verba 1963, p.25). 
 
 
 
3.1. Introduction 
 
This study focuses on how political culture influences decision-making with 
respect to climate change adaptation policies. This is done by interviewing a 
group of experts in South Korea and by an analytical review of documents 
related to the process of developing the national climate change adaptation 
policy of South Korea. To investigate the procedural characteristics of decision-
making about climate change policies, this research will be carried out in the 
context of the political culture in order to examine how the policy culture has 
influenced climate change adaptation in South Korea. Therefore, in this 
research I will concentrate on political culture as a factor that has exerted a 
significant influence over this decision making.  
 
As stated, the intention is that this chapter will explore a process policy decision 
making regarding the climate change adaptation policies of South Korea. In 
order to understand the way such political cultures are expressed in the process 
of making the NCCAM, it is necessary to address the characteristics of the 
political cultures and political structures. The chapter will begin by exploring 
background theories related to political culture and examine political cultures 
and how these have influenced the governance approach to climate change 
adaptation in South Korea. Firstly, I will explore briefly the theories which relate 
to relevant political cultures and to the characteristics of the political cultures of 
South Korea. Later before closing this chapter, I will discuss possible 
governance arrangements which can be incorporated into the types of political 
cultures. 
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3.2. Understanding political culture 
 
Culture in a society is described as the collection of values, beliefs, and 
thoughts, which influence the process of decision-making and behaviours in the 
society. People are influenced by their cultures when they live lives, think and 
behave. The culture expressed in the daily civic life in the forms of their feelings, 
thoughts and behaviours is called their political culture (Rosenbaum 1975, pp.4-
7). Political culture, which is also called political orientations, appears in the 
values or the beliefs people hold regarding political systems, and the roles of 
political participants and the foundation for judging their decisions about political 
actions (Almond and Verba 1963). People evaluate and respond differently to 
governmental institutions and public policies made by governments based on 
their political orientation to political systems (ibid). Political cultures of people 
influence their attitudes when they make decisions towards political objects and 
express opposition to other people‟s decisions (Kavanagh 1972, p.10; Eatwell 
1997). 
 
This study aims at identifying what challenges are faced by using the 
governance approach to climate change adaptation when impinged by political 
culture. This is done by interviewing members of the Policy Advisory Board 
which is composed of political elites and climate experts in South Korea. Their 
political attitudes and orientations, in other words their political culture, may 
directly or indirectly influence their decision-making regarding national climate 
change adaptation policies. Therefore, it is necessary to explore the concepts 
and characteristics of general political cultures in South Korea in order to 
understand the background of decision-making, and its procedural 
characteristics with regard to the governance of climate change adaptation. The 
importance of political cultures in this study of a governance approach is not in 
question (Almond and Verba 1963; Kavanagh 1972). Therefore, it is desirable 
to take into account the theories of political culture in any discussion, of a 
governance approach to climate change adaptation policies and in an analysis 
of the opinions of policy advisors.  
 
48 
 
3.2.1. Conceptualising political culture for the purpose of this 
research 
 
Political cultures are conceptualised by scholars using different typologies; for 
example, Almond and Verba classify political cultures based on one‟s political 
attitudes and orientations towards the political process (Almond and Verba 
1963), and Rosenbaum uses  more integrated and fragmented political cultures 
depending on the degree of political stability of a nation than those of Almond 
and Verba (Rosenbaum 1975). There is a slightly different approach to the 
analysis of political behaviours of people. Lowi and Richardson focus on policy 
and highlight the importance of policy style in decision-making processes rather 
than political culture (Lowi 1964; Richardson 1982). Some scholars argue that 
policy style changes the process of policy making; however, there are other 
argument saying that policy styles are not easily generalised in different political 
systems or different types of policies. For example, the criteria suggested by 
Lowi for classifying policy styles are ambiguous and not exclusive of each other. 
Therefore, scholars redefine or modify Lowi‟s approach depending on their 
research aims when they adopt the approach (Richardson 1982; Cook 2010). 
As this research is studying a single type of policies regarding climate change 
adaptation in South Korea, it does not intend to compare different policies or 
generalise policy style in South Korea. Rather, the study is investigating the 
political orientations of political actors in the processes of policy decisions, 
which is similar to Almond and Verba‟s approach to political culture. Their 
approach puts weight on political culture as an essential factor for political 
structure or behaviours. In order words, they adopt political culture as a variable 
for political structure or behaviour. As argued by Almond, values, memories and 
cultural contexts are critical elements for explaining the political behaviours of 
people. Their argument is consistent with the questions I set out in Chapter 1 of 
this thesis. In addition, the concepts of political culture of Almond and Verba 
include traditional and modern culture. The political culture of South Korea is 
argued to have both traditional and modern characteristics. The details will be 
discussed later in this Chapter.  
 
Political culture is defined as „the set of attitudes, belief, and feelings about a 
political system and a set of orientations toward a special set of social objects 
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and processes in a nation at a given time‟ (Almond and Verba 1963, p.25). A 
typology for political cultures is conceptualised based on the dimensions of how 
much individuals are cognitive of political objects, how much affection they have 
for the objects, and how they evaluate the objects. These are identified as: a 
parochial political culture, subject political culture and participant political culture 
(Almond and Verba 1963). Political orientations in each political culture are 
affected by various factors, for instance, social, cultural, economic and political 
conditions. The political attitudes are expressed in allegiance, apathy, or 
alienation in different political structures (Almond and Verba 1963; Kavanagh 
1972). It is argued that if the three political cultures perfectly match each 
political structure, all individuals in the political structures show allegiant political 
attitudes (See Table 5). Where a parochial culture is perfectly congruent with 
the diffuse structures of the tribal or rural community, people are aware of it, feel 
affected by it and evaluate political objects positively, that is, they are an 
allegiant parochial political culture. Where subject culture and participant culture 
are congruent respectively with centralised authoritarian political structures and 
a democratic political culture, people in the political culture have allegiant 
attitudes towards political objects (Almond and Verba 1963, p.21).  
 
Table 5: Theoretical Political orientation when political culture is perfectly 
congruent with political structure 
Political cultures congruent with 
political structures 
Political Orientation Towards Political 
Objects 
Cognitive Affective Evaluative 
Parochial political culture 
congruent with the diffuse structures 
of the tribal or village community 
+ + + 
Subject Political culture congruent 
with centralised authoritarian 
political structure 
+ + + 
Participant Political culture 
congruent with democratic political 
culture 
+ + + 
 
However, it is not possible to create a perfect congruence between political 
cultures and political orientations; instead there is always incongruence so that 
people feel apathetic or alienated towards political objects or public policies. As 
incongruence increases, the instability of the political system grows. People will 
become more apathetic and be alienated towards political objects. Table 6 
explains the relationship between political culture and structure when congruent 
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conditions or incongruent ones apply. If the incongruence between political 
culture and structure increases, people‟s attitudes shift from allegiant to 
alienated.   
 
Table 6: Congruence and incongruence between political culture and structure 
(Source: Almond and Verba p.22) 
 Allegiant Apathetic Alienated 
Cognitive orientation + + + 
Affective orientation + 0 - 
Evaluative orientation + 0 - 
(Note: „+‟ indicates positive orientation, „0‟ indifference, and a „-„a negative (or hostile) 
orientation) 
 
As will be demonstrated the attitudes of advisors for the NCCAM are allegiant or 
apathetic towards the policies or political objects because they have been 
impacted by the general political cultures of South Korea. 
 
I will now proceed to discuss each type of Almond and Verba‟s political cultures 
in the context of climate change adaptation policies and the governance 
approach. Firstly, a parochial political culture is generally observed in traditional 
societies where no professional political activists exist or lay people seldom 
understand political actions or are not interested in political activities (Almond 
and Verba 1963). In this type of political culture, people generally take 
autonomous adaptation actions to climate change in local communities using 
historical and traditional knowledge. However, their autonomous actions are 
sometimes regarded with scepticism for the reason that they are sometimes 
considered to be maladaptations in that they may reduce adaptation options or 
undermine adaptive capacities to potential or unexpected future changes by 
narrowly focussing on particular impacts (EC 2007; Walker et al. 2006; Nelson 
et al. 2007). However, a parochial political culture can be used for make the 
society effectively adapting to climate change by transforming the process of 
decision-making. A case study of adapting to chronic drought in the north-
eastern region of Brazil shows the possibility of transforming adaptation 
governance from traditional and a dominant parochial political culture to a more 
democratic and effective governance. More details of this case study will be 
discussed later in the section on theoretical integration.  
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In the second type, the subject political culture, people recognize governmental 
authority and usually show a passive relationship towards public authorities 
(Almond and Verba 1963). Individuals acknowledge their political systems and 
are mostly interested in political actions but do not make an effort to participate 
in political activities (Almond and Verba 1963; Kavanagh 1972). Such passive 
attitudes in subject cultures are sometimes claimed to create authoritarian 
political systems or even a totalitarian system (Almond and Verba 1963, p.26). 
The history of dictatorship in South Korea supports that argument. This history 
is imputed to a subject political culture combined with Confucianism which has a 
profound influence on cultures in South Korea (Ringen et al. 2011; Lee 2003). 
More detail of this history will be discussed in the section on the South Korean 
political culture.  
 
The third type of political culture is a participant one. Typically with this cultural 
attitude, citizens show an interest in political systems and tend to get involved in 
governmental and political activities (Almond and Verba 1963; Kavanagh 1972; 
Rosenbaum 1975). On the whole this political attitude matches democratic 
political structures. A governance approach to climate change adaptation will be 
very effective under this political culture, given that people usually adopt 
participant attitudes towards political objects.  
 
The political culture of the UK is an example of this participant type, although it 
is claimed to have a mixture of both a subject and a participant culture (Almond 
and Verba 1963). It is considered that the British populations generally pay 
attention to the process of policy making and participate actively in the process 
(Rosenbaum 1975, p.60). As far as this participant political culture is concerned 
it is expressed in its well kwon participatory structure which determines people‟s 
responses to climate change. There are those who have voiced some sceptical 
views regarding the UK‟s climate policies (McLean 2008; Carter 2008; Pielke 
2009), but in general the way of responding to climate change is evaluated as 
being progressive and successful in terms of timely responses and well-
structured political actions through participatory culture (Tompkins et al. 2010; 
Biesbroek et al. 2010; Gawith et al. 2009). Given that the general orientation of 
the UK political culture is participant, it is rational to choose a governance 
approach for climate change adaptation which includes stakeholders and local 
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and regional governments in the decision making process thus ensuring that 
external advice is incorporated (RCEP 2010, p.37). It is claimed that all levels of 
actors from national government to those from the private sector play their 
political roles in governing climate change (UKCIP 2011; Gawith et al. 2009). 
The UK government leads the climate change adaptation policies with its efforts 
to engage multifaceted stakeholders using partnerships with private sector 
participants and establishing a public awareness system, for example the UK 
Climate Impact Programme (UKCIP) (Tompkins et al. 2010; Hopper 2009; 
Keskitalo et al. 2012). However, the efforts are sometimes successful and 
sometimes not. Although the UK demonstrates a participatory political culture, 
there are some challenges to participatory orientations towards climate change 
adaptation, therefore sometimes  responses to climate change are government-
lead (Kern and Bulkeley 2009). Compared to other countries, the UK 
government shares more authority with multiple actors in terms of climate 
change governance (Meadowcroft 2009; de Bruin et al. 2009; Termeer et al. 
2011).  
 
I have discussed three types of political culture based on a classification 
proposed by Almond and Verba. Parochial political culture is usually prevalent 
where traditional social structures are dominant; subject political culture is well 
observed in the behaviour of passive political actors; and participant political 
culture is congruent with democratic political structures. Among these three 
types of political culture, the Korean political culture is generally conceptualised 
as a mixture of subject and participant (Lee 2003). Both the UK and the South 
Korean political culture are a mixture of subject and participant orientations; 
however the cultures are expressed differently in their political activities. It is 
likely that the South Korean political culture is more of a subject-oriented 
political culture. 
 
It is claimed that people with such subject-participant political cultural attitudes 
accept the norms of a participant culture uncritically and without a confident 
sense of legitimacy (Almond and Verba 1963, p.25). It is interesting to examine 
how such a cultural orientation influences the governing of climate change 
adaptation and the procedural behaviour in decision making of political actors. 
When we make a choice and behave in a particular way in our lives, we are 
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oriented and influenced by values, norms and ethical and spiritual standards. 
Similarly political culture is generally observed and expressed in political 
behaviours towards political objects (Rosenbaum 1975).  
 
This study will take political culture as a factor which explains the procedural 
characteristics of decision-making (Stone 1989; Wildavsky et al. 1997; Rootes 
et al. 2012), regarding climate change adaptation policies. I assume that in the 
context of climate change adaptation, the types of political culture can be 
interpreted with reference to three types of governance approach, namely: 
state-lead governance, state-tiered governance, and state-supported 
governance. The theory will be discussed in detail later in this chapter. Before 
proceeding to the section on the relationship of theories of political cultures to 
governance types, it is necessary to briefly discuss their general concepts and 
their historical, cultural and political origins in the South Korean context. 
 
3.2.2. The value of adopting a political cultural approach 
 
The reason I adopt a political approach for my research is that political cultures 
are the general political orientations which overarch political traditions, customs, 
nationality and citizenship and individual values and beliefs. They have been 
framed through historical and social events over a long period of time. Such 
political cultures play an important role in their member‟s political action and 
inaction in the political systems.  
 
In order to enhance the effectiveness of policies, political culture needs to be 
taken seriously. For example, a comparative study regarding nuclear power 
policies in the United State and South Korea highlights the fact that people in 
these two countries feel differently towards nuclear power (Jasanoff and Kim 
2009). Taking account of individuals‟ orientation towards nuclear power, the two 
countries approach nuclear power policies differently: the USA focuses on 
effective containment; by contrast, the South Korean government leads people 
to see nuclear power as a tool to achieve national development and indigenous 
nuclear technology (ibid). As such, people‟s orientation towards political objects 
and the characteristics of political cultures are important in the formation and 
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implementation of policy. This example is a case of how political culture can be 
taken advantage of in order to deliver government policies.  
 
There is another study which indicates how political culture influences the 
choice of policy types in South Korea (Kim 2011a). The study examined the 
process of making the policies of GMO (Genetically Modified Organism) of 
South Korea and found out the techno-authoritarianism of policy makers 
hampered precautionary approach to regulation of risk assessment of the 
GMOs (ibid). The author of the study argued that the assessment process, long-
term risk assessment, a participatory risk assessment, LCA (Life Cycle 
Assessment) and tracking historical records are not sufficiently institutionalized 
because of the culture (Kim 2011a). The study shows that such a new policy as 
control of GMOs is adopted, the process of making decision follows the routine 
of policy making in the society.  
 
In support of this I cite a case related to climate change and how climate 
change policies are shaped in a certain political culture. A case study in the 
Rakai District in southern Uganda shows how different cultural styles of 
participation affect the interpretation of the forecast and the formulation of 
response strategies in climate change policies (Roncoli et al. 2011). The study 
highlights the importance of the cultural aspect in the practice of adaptation 
arguing that the political culture of local people should be considered as a 
critical factor in the delivery of climate change adaptation, because participation 
in the political activities is shaped differently depending on cultural norms of the 
people of different regions. 
 
This study intends to investigate how South Korea responds to climate change 
adaptation especially in the context of a governance approach. As discussed 
thus far, political culture influences the procedural behaviours of political actors 
towards public policies and other political actors. Similarly, it is assumed that 
the behaviours and advice of members of the advisory board are also 
influenced by political cultures when they make their recommendations 
regarding national climate change adaptation policies. I will now identify the 
characteristics of the political culture of South Korea. 
 
55 
 
3.3. Political culture of South Korea 
 
The general characteristic of South Korean political culture is authoritarianism 
created by a mixture of subject and participant political culture which is probably 
closer to a subject culture than anything else (Lee 2003; Lee and Lee 2007; 
Ringen et al. 2011). The term „authoritarian‟ refers to „the orientations of weak 
participants towards a different view and to a domination and suppression of the 
younger or subordinates‟ (Lee and Lee 2007, p.47; Janowitz and Marvick 1953). 
Such an authoritarian political culture is considerably influenced by 
Confucianism which was first introduced in the Joseon Dynasty3. Therefore 
when discussing the political cultures of South Korea, it is essential to explore 
the influence of Confucianism. Since it was introduced into Korea by the Joseon 
aristocratic class, it has determined the ethical standards of all the social 
classes of Korea and not only the aristocratic class. Familism and the filial 
culture of Confucianism became the root of the patriarchal systems. Under the 
patriarchal system, the younger should obey and respect the older and the 
higher in power request obedience from the lower. The culture of familism and 
filial culture also remains in the regionalism and kinship in present South 
Korean culture, so people choose candidates from their home turf rather than 
from some other region. Owing to these characteristics, authoritarian political 
cultures are likely to suffer from an abuse of power and a lack of accountability 
(Dalton 2005; Lee and Lee 2007). It is certain that such authoritarian attitudes of 
government officials will hinder democratic decision-making about policies (ibid). 
It is likely that such political cultures adversely act on a governance approach to 
decision-making regarding climate change adaptation.  
 
This authoritarian political culture has been blamed for creating the history of 
past dictatorships in South Korea. This history results from the subject political 
culture combined with Confucianism and its profound influence on cultures in 
South Korea (Lee 2003; Lee and Lee 2007; Ringen et al. 2011). In addition to 
Confucianism, anti-communism is alleged to have legitimized the dictatorships. 
If someone has negative attitudes towards the state, he could have been 
tagged as a communist. And communism is regarded as an anti-social ideology 
                                                          
3
 Joseon Dynasty (1392~1910)   
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in South Korea. After the Korean War, anti-communism became a critical part of 
political and social culture in South Korea (Lee 2003; Lee and Lee 2007; Ringen 
et al. 2011). Table 7 describes the political structures under the presidents after 
South Korea was established in 1948 through to 2013 (Ringen et al. 2011). 
South Korea has experienced quiet a long period of authoritarianism from the 
early 1960s to the late 1980s. 
 
Table 7: South Korean Government Regimes (Source: Ringen et al. 2011, p.2) 
Types of government regime President Time 
Tentative democracy 
Syngman Rhee 1948~1960 
Yun Po-son 1960~1962 
Hard Authoritarianism 
(Military government) 
Park Chung Hee 1963~1979 
Stop-gap president  Choe Kyu-ha 1979~1980 
Hard Authoritarianism  
(military government) 
Chun Doo Hwan  1980~1987 
Re-democratization 
Rho Tae Woo 1987~1993 
Kim Young Sam 1993~1998 
Democratic consolidation 
Kim Dae Jung 1998– 2003 
Roh Moo Hyun 2003–2008 
Lee Myung-bak 2008~2013 
 (Note: The typology in the table was conceptualised by the original authors) 
 
Another characteristic of South Korean political culture, conventionalism or 
conservatism, is rooted in Confucianism (Lee 2003). A conservative political 
culture is that oriented towards keeping social customs and is hostile towards 
diversities or differences. Climate change adaptation is a novel political agenda 
which may challenge the state-led policy style. To reform the conventional 
attitudes of responding to climate change which must be faced because of the 
unprecedented impacts posed by climate change; this challenge is made all the 
more difficult by the fact that if policy makers have a strong orientation towards 
conservatism or conventionalism. Adapting to present or future climate change, 
especially in a precautionary way requires agreement through openness of 
various policy options and sharing information with the private sector in order to 
generate more appropriate adaptation options which builds adaptive capacity 
(Adger 2003; Folke 2006; Finan and Nelson 2009). Therefore, the way and the 
extent to which conservative political culture influences the formation of climate 
change policies needs to be investigated.  
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Scholars argue that many South Korean government officials or civil servants 
have authoritarian or bureaucratic attitudes rooted in Confucianism (Lee and 
Lee 2007). The parochial attitude underpinned by Confucianism accepts the 
idea that the rulers are chosen by heaven (god) and it provided the rationality 
for the past dictators, reduced resistance from the people and created the past 
dictatorships (Lee 2003). 
 
In addition to Confucianism and anti-communism, anti-Japanese attitudes are 
characteristic of South Korean political orientation. Its attitude was generated 
from the history of Japanese colonization. These attitudes are now much 
weakened but still have some influence on political cultures in South Korea 
(Ringen et al. 2011; Lee and Lee 2007; Lee 2003; Lone and McCormack 1993). 
Unlike anti-communism and anti-Japanese attitudes, Confucianism can 
undermine the effectiveness of climate change adaptation. Because of its 
tendency to stabilize a society, Confucianism frequently resists against social 
and systemic changes. However, it has been argued that democratic and 
participatory governance is critical for effective practice of climate change 
adaptation (Adger 2003). Accordingly, Confucianism which is seen to be in 
opposition to liberal social systems and generally contextualised as a non-
democratic ideology (Lee and Lee 2007) is likely to adversely impact on climate 
change adaptation.  
 
As discussed so far, political culture of political actors influences the formulation 
of policies and the procedure of decision-making. This theory can be applied to 
the empirical research of climate change adaptation. For a further development 
of the theoretical framework for this research, I attempt to integrate Almond and 
Verba‟s three types of political culture with the governance type as integral to a 
discussion of effective climate change adaptation in the following section. 
 
3.4. Integrating theories: political culture and governance 
 
I attempt to identify relationships between political cultures and governance 
types as they tackle issues associated with climate change adaptation. In order 
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to come to an understanding of the relationship between governance theories 
and political cultures, I conceptualise three types of governance which 
describes a level of development of civil society organization and that of the 
non-governmental sector in a society. It is assumed that these governance 
types can be applied to societies when they formulate climate change 
adaptation policies in accordance with their political cultures or the political 
attitudes of the people. Three types of climate change adaptation governance 
are conceptualised as state-led governance, state-tiered governance and state-
facilitated governance. 
 
The first type, state-led governance is appropriate for a society mainly showing 
the characteristics of parochial political cultures. Members of these societies 
hardly understand their roles in political systems and do not even have 
appropriate capacities to perform these roles. A governance approach to 
climate change adaptation policies in a state-led and top-down political structure 
is a challenge on account of a low level of political activity or a lack of political 
interest on the part of the private sector. Some states do not allow civil society 
organisations or non-governmental organisations to operate. Such political 
structures are usually seen in parochial or subject political oriented societies. If 
a governance system is applied to such societies, it is designed as state-led 
governance. In order to offset the strangle-hold of central government, 
appropriate governance instruments can be employed. The general public has a 
minimal knowledge of policies (here for climate change adaptation) and most do 
not know their roles in the political system or in some cases they are not 
allowed to have a role.  
 
Governance is rarely taken into account when considering political objects 
under this political culture. Therefore, in the context of climate change 
adaptation, the power of central government is still strong and local 
governments are usually controlled by central government. Under such political 
structures, such governance instruments such as transnational networks or 
inter-municipal networks between local governments are located under climate 
change impacts.  
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A case study in north-east Brazil shows how traditional political structure can be 
transformed to participatory governance by encouraging local people to 
participate in the process of decision-making about adaptation. The region has 
been suffering from chronic drought over generations (Finan and Nelson 2009). 
Local coping strategies seeking to respond to extreme droughts were performed 
in a manner typical of parochial type communities: lay people acted as subjects 
of protection and support from the local governor‟s own charitable 
disbursements. Local people did not know their rights as citizens to receive 
relief from government (ibid). The parochial relationship between lay people and 
a local governor makes people passive actors in adaptation practice (ibid). 
Public policies with regard to adapting to drought are under the control of the 
local governor and frequently operate for his own benefits (ibid). In order to 
enhance the effectiveness of adaptation practice and to enforce democratic 
governance in the region, adaptation projects are carried out by transforming 
the traditional governance system and encouraging local people to engage in 
political activities and earn their civic rights through attending the process of 
collecting information and data for more effective adaptation strategies (ibid). 
That case study is an example of introducing participatory governance in a 
parochial political culture in order to increase local adaptive capacity.  
 
The second type of governance, the state-tiered type can be applied to subject 
political cultural societies, where people are interested in outputs more than 
inputs of policies or in less active participants in the political systems. This 
typology of governance is borrowed from a term suggested by Kim and Kang as 
a type of governance for the environmental management (Kim and Kang 2004). 
Where people know and admit the role of government, this second type of 
governance can be employed to a society where the political culture is generally 
a mixture of subject and participant. As the political system is more democratic 
than that of a parochial cultural society, private actors are invited to the 
decision-making process. However, the state under this political culture is likely 
to be bureaucratic and exert a considerable influence over local government 
and private sectors. In order to adopt more democratic governance, the state 
will make efforts to invite diverse stakeholders and civil organisations by 
establishing partnerships or providing public forums. For this type of 
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governance to be effective, populations should be cognitive of climate change 
adaptation and have the capacity to evaluate policy options. 
 
 
Figure 1: Relationships between political cultures and governance types for 
climate change adaptation (Source: Made by the author of this thesis) 
 
And in the third type, that is state-facilitated governance, central government 
has less power over political objects of the participant political culture than in 
the other two types of governance. Policy-making about climate change 
adaptation is known to diverse political actors including members of the private 
sector and evaluated by their active participation in the decision-making process. 
The state will set up a policy goal for climate change adaptation through sharing 
information and collecting ideas from multi-faceted actors in the process of 
decision-making. The role of government is much reduced; the main role of 
central government is to invest in science and technology for providing accurate 
data and resources for making climate change adaptation strategies. Political 
actors representing the private sector will actively participate in the process of 
policy making from determining policy issues to the monitoring and evaluation of 
the implementation of policies, as they have the capacity to evaluate and 
understand climate change adaptation policies. This type of governance is 
appropriate to the most democratic structures and is congruent with a 
participant political culture. Table 8 summarises the above discussion of 
matching governance types with political culture and suggests examples of 
governance tools. These are suggested taking account of political cultures or 
political structures.   
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Table 8: Types of governance for climate change adaptation matched to political 
culture (Source: Made by the author of this thesis) 
Types of 
Governance  
General Features of society 
Examples of potential governance  
tools 
State-led 
 The society may have 
parochial and subject 
political culture 
 Authoritarian political 
structure 
 Hierarchical and bureaucratic 
government  
 Transnational networks  
 Inter-municipal networks  
 Inter-organisational networks 
(usually government 
institutions) 
 Policy advisory committee 
system 
State-tiered  
 The society may have a 
mixture of subject and 
participant  
 Partnerships between 
government and experts  
 Public forum for collecting 
private actors‟ opinions 
State-
facilitated 
 The members of the society 
have mostly participant 
political culture 
 Government is the final 
decision-maker but the role 
of government is very limited: 
the state makes decision 
about policies by consulting 
the private sector; it acts as 
the provider of data and 
resources.  
 Public has capacity to act in 
political systems; and 
participate in the process of 
decision-making 
 Networks of NGOs or CSOs 
 local governments as the 
local decision-maker about 
adaptation policies at local 
levels  
 
3.5. Summary  
 
This chapter discusses political culture as a theoretical background for the 
research. It highlights the importance of political culture in policy procedure and 
suggests the integration of governance to political culture in its approach to the 
analysis of climate change adaptation practices. And as an instrument for 
conducting an empirical study for this research, the political characteristics of 
case study area, South Korea, are analysed in the context of Almond and 
Verba‟s theory. The reason for choosing Almond and Verba‟s theory is that their 
argument is appropriate for explaining and matching political culture to a 
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democratic governance approach to climate change adaptation. The next 
chapter will analyse the climate change policies of South Korea on the basis of 
this theoretical framework and investigate the extent of political culture influence 
the formulation of climate change adaptation policies. For these objectives the 
following questions are asked: How does political culture shape the decision-
makers‟ orientation toward climate change adaptation? And did the culture 
favourably or adversely act on the governance approach to climate change 
adaptation? These questions will be answered by analytically reviewing 
government documents and using semi-structured interview methods. The 
details of the methodology for this research will be discussed in the following 
chapter.  
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Chapter 4. Methodological framework  
 
 “the aim of an interview of a semi-structured interview is not to be 
representative but to understand how individual people experience and make 
sense of their own lives (Valentine 2005, p.111).” 
 
  
 
4.1. Introduction 
 
The previous two chapters, Chapter 2 and 3 explored the conceptual 
frameworks for this research: climate change adaptation and governance. 
Based on the selected conceptual frameworks, the list of interviewees was 
made and an interviewee guideline was drawn up. Following the conceptual 
framework chapters, Chapter 4 provides an overview of the methodological 
framework used in carrying out the research.  
 
As introduced in Chapter 1, the aim of this research is to identify how a 
particular government is responding to climate change adaptation using 
governance as a framing device, and to explore the barriers and challenges 
observed in the process of making adaptation policies by interviewing policy 
makers and advisers. This chapter provides information regarding the 
methodologies used in answering the research questions and achieving the 
goal of the research: semi-structured interviews using as a case study of South 
Korea.  
 
In order to identify the challenges and limitations applying to climate change 
adaptation, the interviewees‟ opinions and experience are investigated using a 
semi-structured interview method. The case study area is selected for the 
following reasons: South Korea traditionally exhibits a top-down culture in policy 
decision-making. The choice of case study as South Korea will provide the 
opportunity to carry out an empirical research to examine what practically 
happens when this culture of top-down policy making is directed towards 
climate change adaptation; and whether there are any efforts to adopt a 
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governance approach to decision-making about climate policies; and what 
challenges are identified in changing the policy culture to a multilevel 
governance structure. As all the interviewee and I speak Korean, I can make 
the point clear by understanding hidden meanings behind their answers and 
even their facial expressions. Speaking the same language as the interviewees 
has greatly facilitated the creating of a helpful  rapport (Twyman et al. 1999). In 
addition, the knowledge of the social, political, cultural, economic and other 
backgrounds elements pertaining to South Korea was helpful in the practice of 
interviewing actors, although such as background knowledge can influence the 
impartial assessment and critical analysis of the interviews and hinder 
objectivity when viewing the situations under discussion (Mandiyanike 2009). 
However, the fact that I am an overseas postdoctoral student and not a Korean-
based researcher or government officer did help the interviewees to express 
their own opinions as much as possible.  
 
The reason a semi-structured interviews were chosen is that closed 
questionnaires are not appropriate for this research for two reasons: firstly, 
climate change adaptation is a broad and wide subject and it was not possible 
to narrow it down to some defined categories of responses. Secondly, closed 
questionnaires cannot provide deep and open opinions about their experience 
in making national adaptation policies. Therefore it was felt to be better to use a 
qualitative and semi-structured method interviews for this research.  
 
In general three methods form the structure of this case study: critical analysis 
of literature and policy documents as a preliminary data collection; interviews 
(mostly face to face with recorded with the permission of the interviewees), and 
qualitative interview data analysis. The background socio-cultural, climate and 
topographical characteristics of the case study area are briefly described before 
beginning a justification of the methodology used.  
 
4.2. Description of the case study area 
 
As an empirical study regarding adaptation governance in the context of climate 
change, South Korea was selected. South Korea has made progress in devising 
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climate change policies, including adaptation policies, but this has been over a 
short time period. The South Korean government created the first legal basis 
(the Framework Act on Low Carbon, Green Growth) for the purpose of 
enhancing the implementing climate policies (Jeon 2010a). The case study will 
provide the opportunity to examine if the progress made in South Korea is good 
or bad from the perspective of governance approach to making policy decisions. 
It is worth investigating what the driving forces behind the progress in climate 
change policies in South Korea really are. As argued in Chapters 2 and 3, 
multiple actors from various sectors and levels should be engaged in decision 
making, if there is to be successful climate change adaptation. It is a fact that 
there is no empirical study regarding climate change governance as practiced in 
South Korea. This research will be the first to approach climate change 
adaptation from the perspective of governance in South Korea.  
 
A case study is used in order to investigate and obtain an understanding of the 
complex social phenomena (Yin 2003), and the process of dynamic and 
complex climate change adaptation from the perspective of governance. This 
research seeks to investigate how South Korea is responding to climate change 
adaptation from the perspective of governance, and to identify challenges and 
limitations to the process of governing climate change adaptation. By taking this 
as a case study, it has been possible to investigate the actual conditions of 
making climate change policies in South Korea, and to analyse the opinions of 
participants; and then to generalise out to other regions with similar 
development histories as South Korea. Before beginning to discuss the details 
of the interviews, the next section will explore the features of South Korea in the 
context of its socio-economy, culture, climate, and topography. 
 
4.2.1. Social and cultural aspects of South Korea 
 
South Korea is a democratic republic with a presidential system (Korea 2012). 
The South Korean government is comprised of three independent branches: the 
legislature, the judiciary, and the administration (ibid). After Korea was liberated 
from Japanese colonisation, it underwent a civil war and political instability. In 
spite of these unfavourable conditions, South Korea has achieved rapid 
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economic growth and is now 34th in the world in terms of Gross Domestic 
Product per Capita (IMF 2012). Along with the economic growth, the benefits 
associated with citizenship and lifestyles have much changed. Responding to 
public needs to engage in policy procedure, the South Korean government 
launched on a system of local autonomy in 1991, and five years later in 1995 
local governments were operated by directly elected mayors, governors and 
municipal assemblies (Korea 2012). Henceforth, adopting the Local Agenda 21, 
public engagement was recommended in the process of making policies (Eun 
and Oh 2009). However, weak financial capacity, and a lack of professional 
knowledge about policy making, held public back from engaging in the policy 
decision-making (Park 2010a; Huh et al. 2008). In addition, there is a deep-
rooted socio-cultural ethos. Social norms in South Korea are based on the idea 
of loyalty and filial piety rooted in „Confucianism‟, and traditional Korean social 
values put a high priority on internal and mental influences (Hwang 2009; Park 
2010a). Loyalty and filial piety are interpreted in such a way that a person 
should devote himself to the nation-state and respect his elders. Standing 
against the state (state policies) and the older people might be treated as being 
morally compromised. Under the influence of this traditional and socio-cultural 
background, it is not easy to express one‟s opinions, especially antagonistic 
opinions.  
 
Attempts to include the public in the process of the development governmental 
policies had been made by the previous Rho government (from 2003 to 2008). 
However, Western-born liberalism collided with deep-rooted bureaucratic inertia 
in Korean society, and premature civil organisations did not succeed in playing 
their role in participatory policy process influences (Hwang 2009; Park 2010a). 
When the government makes a big urban development plan, it is legitimised by 
requesting public opinion through public hearings or other types of public 
awareness initiatives (Kim 2010). However such consultations are not properly 
announced to stakeholders or are occasionally, just to abide by the regulations 
without substantial public engagement. Such socio-cultural characteristics can 
reflect on the policy process. Some scholars suggest that the Korean type of 
network system is more effective than the western type of governance non-
governmental organisations for compensating for the low level of capacity of 
non-governmental organisation (Kim 2001; Park 2010). 
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As climate change adaptation in South Korea is treated as an environmental 
policy and managed by the Ministry of Environment, policy making is 
determined somewhat differently. But the decision making structure of climate 
change policies is not much different from the general policy making process. 
Figure 2 describes the general process of policy making in South Korea (Jeong 
2003). In the figure, the solid lines show that policy agendas are proposed or 
ordered and controlled. The dotted lines are unofficial interrelationships 
between policy proposer and policy makers (Jeong 2003, p.112). If there is 
litigation in the process of decision making, the judiciary can be involved in the 
procedure (ibid). The final decisions on national policies is agreed in a cabinet 
meeting; however, in the case of environmental policies, the final decision 
maker is the President of South Korea (Jeong and Byun 2011). It is the 
responsibility of the President of South Korea to decide whether the proposed 
policies can be optimised both in terms of socio-economic benefit and natural 
protection (Lee and Lee 2000).  
 
 
Figure 2: General policy making procedure in South Korea (Source: Translated 
from Jeong 2003, p.112) 
 
As an environmental policy, climate change adaptation policies are managed by 
the Ministry of Environment and the Presidential Committee on Green Growth 
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which is located under the Presidential office and gives advice to the President 
about climate change policies (PCGG 2009).  
 
4.2.2. Administrative structure and topography of South Korea 
 
The present Korean administrative structure is composed of the Seoul Capital 
government, six metropolitan governments, one special autonomy city and nine 
DOs (Provinces) at the regional level, and at the local level (MOPAS 2013).   
 
 
 
Figure 3: Administrative structures of South Korea (Source: Made by the author 
of this thesis) 
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South Korea is located in northeast Asia. The Korean peninsula is surrounded 
by the Yellow Sea to the west, the East Sea to the east and the South Sea to 
the south (Korea 2012). The Korean peninsula is roughly 1,030 kilometres long 
and 175 kilometres wide at its narrowest point. The land area of South Korea is 
100,140 square kilometres. In the year 2009, South Korea had a population of 
48.7 million. Mountains cover 70% of the land area (KTO 2013). The mountain 
range that stretches along the length of the east coast falls steeply into the East 
Sea, while along the southern and western coasts, the mountains descend 
gradually to the coastal plains; these produce the bulk of Korea‟s agricultural 
crops (ibid). 
 
As the Korea peninsular is located in the mid-temperature zone, it has four 
seasons. Winter is cold and dry under the influence of a cold and dry 
continental high pressure system; summer is hot and humid because of the 
effect of the North Pacific anticyclone. In spring and autumn the weather is, for 
the most part, clear and dry due to the influence of a mobile high pressure (KTO 
2013; NIMR 2009). Table 9 summarises general information regarding weather 
in South Korea. However, climate change is influencing the general pattern of 
weather in the Korean peninsula. For example, the length and pattern of the 
seasons in the Korean peninsula: the winters are from 22 to 49 days shorter 
and the summers from 13 to17 days longer than 100 years ago (ibid). These 
calculations are based on a division of the seasons using temperature threshold 
methods (NIMR 2009). The details of currently observed phenomena or 
expected phenomena caused by climate change were discussed in Chapter 2 
of this thesis.  
 
 Table 9: General information regarding Korean Weather Data (KMA 2013). 
Weather element Attributes 
Temperature Annual average temperature is 10~16oC except for the central 
mountainous areas where the mean maximum temperatures is 
23 ~27oC and the mean minimum is -6~-7oC. (The data is 
based on continuous observations from 1971 to 2000.)  
Annual rainfall The central region receives 1100~1400 mm and the southern 
region 1,000~1,800mm. Seasonally 50~60% of the rain falls in 
summer.  
Wind Generally in winter the wind blows from the northwest and in 
summer from the southwest.  
Humidity The months with the highest humidity are July and August, 80% 
nationwide, and around 70% in September and October. 
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Rainy season It generally starts in the middle of June in the southern area 
and   extends to the central region in late June. The length of 
the rainy season is approximately 30 days.  
Typhoons Annually about 28 typhoons occur in the western North Pacific 
ocean,   these directly or indirectly affect the Korean peninsula.   
 
The social, cultural, and natural environments of South Korea have been 
described which can provide a general picture of Korean policy culture.  In the 
next section the overall methodologies used for this research are explored in 
detail. 
 
4.3. The framework of the research methodology 
 
This research is composed of two key themes: climate change adaptation and 
the instruments of governing adaptation policies in South Korea, the conceptual 
framework has been explored in Chapters 2 and 3. The aim of this research is 
to explore how adaptation governance is working in the context of climate 
change and to identify the challenges if the governance does not work well. As 
stated in Chapter 1, the aim will be achieved by answering the research 
questions and addressing the following objectives. Table 10 describes the 
overall frameworks used for this research. By eliciting answers to the research 
questions, and using the prescribed methods of analysis, this research will 
achieve that goal. 
 
Table 10: Research methods for investigating adaptation governance in South 
Korea (Source: Made by the author of this thesis) 
Research Question Methods 
Main question: 
How does adaptation governance 
work in the context of climate 
change in South Korea? 
Primary data: Semi-structured, open-ended 
interviews with government officials, advisory 
boards composed of experts, and local 
participants 
 
Secondary data: systematic review of policy 
documents and textual analyses of the literature 
Sub-questions: What is happening 
regarding climate change 
adaptation in South Korea? 
What barriers are hampering the 
progress of governance approach 
to climate change adaptation? 
 
The following sections will describe the details of the methodological framework 
for collecting data: how to collect secondary and primary data using systemic 
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reviews of documents, the method of selecting interviewees, the practice of the 
semi-structured interviews and analysis of the interview data.  
 
4.4. Methods of Data Collection 
 
In addition to conducting interviews as collecting primary source, climate 
change documents published by the South Korean government and 
government institute are analysed as the secondary data which also are used to 
provide information who are included in the interviews. The documentary 
sources are obtained from governmental climate change policies, official 
government reports, national laws and regulations, departmental climate 
change policy documents, and relevant literature. The documents are analysed 
from the perspective of conceptualised frameworks in Chapter 2 and 3 of this 
thesis.  
 
4.4.1. Analysis of documentary sources 
 
Documents deriving from the government, official documents published by 
governmental institutions and binding regulation and rules are critically analysed 
for the purpose of knowledge about South Korean climate change and providing 
the preliminary basis for interview questions (Bryman 2004, pp.380-397). 
Analysing the documentary sources focuses on the contextual meaning under 
the conceptual framework of climate change adaptation and governance from 
the perspective of political culture; it provides background knowledge of climate 
change policies and policy culture which appeared in the process of decision-
making about climate change policies in South Korea. Content analysis which 
was originally used for interpreting the Bible (Hoggart et al. 2002) is used for 
analysis of the documents under the theme of governance and climate change 
adaptation. Through the document analysis it is possible to understand the 
social, cultural and historical aspects as revealed by these documentary 
sources (Bryman 2004, pp.380-397; Hoggart et al. 2002; Patton 1980). 
Most of the documentary sources regarding climate change policies and 
sciences are published by government and governmental organizations so that 
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the documents may well reflect the governmental points of views. The list of 
documents is provided at Table 11. Analysis of the documents should be critical 
and objective as far as possible and should be supplemented by referencing 
interviews and relevant news articles. Newspaper articles will add details of 
factual information about arguments made by interviewees.  
 
Table 11: The Secondary source of data (Source: Made by the author of this 
thesis) 
Document Title Publisher 
The 3rd General Coping Strategy for Climate 
Change Conference 
The Committee for Convention 
on Climate Change 
The 4th General Coping Strategy for Climate 
Change  
The Committee for Convention 
on Climate Change 
The Master Plan for Climate Change Adaptation 
(2007) 
 The Ministry of Environment 
The Strategy for Green Growth & Five Year Action 
Plan  
The Presidential Committee for 
Green Growth 
The National Climate Change Adaptation Measures 
(2011-2015) 
The Ministry of Environment 
The National Action Plans for Climate Change 
Adaptation (2010) 
The Ministry of Environment 
The Climate Change Coping Strategies of the 
Ministry of Food, Agriculture and Fisheries 
The Ministry of Food, Agriculture 
and Fisheries 
The Climate Change Basic Strategy of the Ministry 
for Food, Agriculture and Fisheries 
The Ministry of Food, Agriculture 
and Fisheries 
The Climate Change Impact on Health and Coping 
Strategies 
Korea Center for Disease 
Control and Prevention 
The Framework Acts on Low carbon Green growth 
(FALG) 
South Korea 
Working papers published by the KACCC the Korean Adaptation Center 
for Climate Change 
 
4.4.2. Type of interviews 
 
The interview is the primary method used for this research, which is an 
excellent method of gaining access to information about events, opinions and 
experiences (Dunn 2000; Bryman 2004, pp.318-344). Through a form of 
conversation it aims to bring about an understanding of how individuals 
perceive and identify the procedure of making adaptation policies. Types of 
interviews are generally divided into three forms: structured, unstructured, and 
semi-structured (Dunn 2000).The structured interview or standardized interview 
(Bryman 2004, p.110) uses an interview schedule that typically comprises a list 
of carefully worded and ordered questions. Each of the respondents receive 
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exactly the same interview questions and in the same order. By contrast, semi-
structured and unstructured interviews are flexible in terms of the questioning, 
the order and the contexts of questions (ibid). Interviewers using semi-
structured interview techniques ask a varied sequence of questions and ask in-
depth questions in response to the replies (ibid). Unstructured interviews use an 
interview guide or sometimes they do not use any formal guide. The interviews 
are unique to the topics or issues (Dunn 2000).  
 
Table 12: Types of interview (Source: Modified form Dunn 2000, p.102 and 
Bryman 2004, p.113). 
Types of interview Features Material used 
Structured interview It uses an interview schedule that typically 
comprises a list of carefully worded and 
ordered questions.  
Each interviewee is asked exactly the same 
questions in exactly the same order. 
Interview 
schedule 
Semi-structured 
interview 
It uses an interview guide.  
The interview is organised through ordered 
but flexible questions. 
Interview guide, 
sometimes an 
interview 
schedule 
Unstructured interview The questions are determined by the 
interviewee‟s response.  
Interview guide 
 
Among these interview types, this researcher chose semi-structured interviews 
for most of interviews and the unstructured type for some interviewees who 
were not bound by the questions listed in the guideline; instead they talked 
about wide ranging subjects. Through semi-structured interviews, interviewees 
can express their own opinions to the questions outlined in the interview 
guideline. Their opinions are diverse reflecting on their various occupational and 
professional backgrounds. The interviews were conducted by using a semi-
structured interview guideline for the conversations to lead to an in-depth 
discussion, but encouraged them to keep to the points, and not range too widely 
from the key points of the research (Bryman 2004, pp.318-344). Structured 
interviews are not appropriate because it is not possible to predict how the 
interviewees would respond and organise the responses into certain categories. 
On the other hand, unstructured interviews are likely to depart in too many 
directions and it is difficult to generate any theories from the interviews (ibid). 
Therefore, the general interview methods employed for this research were 
semi-structured interviews. 
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An interview guide was framed before beginning to conduct interviews. 
However some of the interviews did not follow the interview guideline, this 
depended on the situation. The questions and the order of questions outlined in 
the guideline changed in accordance with the conversations at the interviews. 
For example, even though interviews were scheduled beforehand to take 
around one hour, sometimes unexpected circumstances occurred or 
unanticipated visitors appeared at the interview spots. In such cases, the 
interviewer could not help closing immediately without asking the rest of 
questions. When the interviewees were not directly engaged in the advisory 
board for national climate change adaptation policies, these questions were 
skipped or changed in accordance with their situations. The interview guide 
used in the interviews was written in Korean. It is given in Appendix II with a 
translated into English for the purpose of this thesis.  
 
4.4.3. Positionality 
 
By positionality is meant a strategy employed to contextualize research 
observations and interpretations (Cloke et al. 2004). As it influences the data 
collected, the researchers should present themselves appropriately for the 
situation (Rice 2009). I was the interviewer: in terms of this concept of 
positionality in the interview was: a middle-aged female, studying in a doctoral 
programme at a university in the UK, having working experience in one of the 
big (Chaebul) companies at a manager level, and having graduated from one of 
the three prestigious universities in South Korea. This positionality was helpful 
to attract attentions from my interviewees. Firstly, the fact of studying a doctoral 
programme at a British university would help me to receive positive replies 
when the interview was requested by electronic mail and telephone. People in 
Korean society recognise studying abroad as advantaged and privileged. 
However being a middle-aged female student does not give a good impression 
to interviewees, which may adversely influences on the interviews. Koreans 
generally perceive a middle-aged and single female as difficult to have 
conversation.  Therefore when I practiced interviews, I intentionally exposed my 
identify of studying at an overseas university, working as a manager at the 
Chaebul company and graduating from the same university as the President, 
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which was in order to make interviewees think that they and I are in the same 
social group and might help to create a rapport with the interviewees. That was 
one way to induce the interviewees to take the interviews seriously, and not 
regard it as just a school project. The recent development of the social 
networking services (SNS) (internet-information sharing) in South Korea was 
also helpful to making interviewees respond to my request for interviews. On 
account of the rapid information sharing through SNS, government officials 
could readily accept requests from citizens. If they did not without giving a 
specific reason, the fact might spread over the networking service so quickly as 
to tarnish the name of that official (This information was volunteered by an 
interviewee). Also, the fact that my research is funded by the Korean 
government makes the interviewees recognise its importance and take the 
interviews seriously. Although my positionality is comparatively supportive what 
the government officials did not want was to be involved in a controversial 
situation or to be seen as taking responsibility; this sometimes prevented them 
from expressing in-depth opinions.  
 
Most interviewees participated in this research belonged to, so called, the elite4 
group in South Korea. When interviewing the elites, the positionality had to be 
formed in order to create an intellectual discussion environment which led to the 
interviewees thinking that they could also learn from the interviewer, that is, that 
there would be a bilateral flow of knowledge. However, most of my interviewees 
were older than this researcher. In Korean culture, the younger person is to be 
humble and listen to the elder, which is considered to be more polite than 
showing off knowledge in front of the elder. It was important to strike a balance 
between being humble and being knowledgeable (Moser 2008) when I 
conducted the interviews. Generally speaking, in the interviews my personality 
was that of a humble listener rather than a knowledgeable-presenter as Moser 
argues (2008).  
 
                                                          
4
  There is no particular Korean word for „elite‟. Koreans use the English word elite to mean a 
group of people in a society, etc  who are powerful and have a lot of influence, because they are 
rich, intelligent, etc (p.495). HORNBY.A 2005. In: WEHMEIER, S., MCINTOSH, C., TURNBULL, 
J. & ASHBY, M. (eds.) Oxford Advanced learner‟s Dictionary of Current English. 7th ed.: Oxford 
University Press. 
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4.4.4. Ethics 
 
In advance of each interview, I requested consent of the interviewee to be 
interviewed. I informed them that their participation in the research would be 
voluntary and that the interview might be discontinued at any time, also that  the 
data collected from the interview would be kept strictly confidential and would 
not be used for any other purpose than research (Refer to the consent form 
attached to Appendix 1). I practiced interviews in two phases. For the first round 
of interviews (from October 2010 to March 2011), the consent forms were not 
officially available on the spot because there was an implicit agreement that if 
they accepted the interview invitation, it meant that they had agreed to their 
participation in the research. However, when I undertook the second round of 
interviews (From October 2011 to November 2011), I explained the purpose of 
the research and requested the interviewees sign a consent form. When I came 
to Korea for the second round of interviews, I requested the interviewees 
attending at the first round to sign the consent form and received the signed 
consent forms as scanned files or paper documents. The consent form was 
written in Korean. Appendix 1 is the copy of the English translation of the 
consent form.  
 
The whole process of research followed the ethics policy of the University of 
Exeter; the Code of Good Practice in the Conduct of Research, and respected 
the integrity of interviewees, and it was strictly adhered to at each stage of my 
research. 
 
4.5. The Practice of the interviews  
 
Based on the framework of methodologies, the interview guideline and consent 
form, semi-structured interviews were outlined and carried out. Most interviews 
were in practice as face to face conversations, except for two telephone 
interviews and one electronic mail response. The details of the practice of the 
interviews are explained in the following sections. 
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4.5.1. Selection of interviewees 
 
The interviews took place over six months comprising two phases: (1) the first 
field work was carried out from the middle of October 2010 to the end of March 
2011; and (2) the second was from the middle of October 2011 to the middle of 
November 2011. During the first phase, interviewees were selected from the 
lists of key authors of the National Climate Change Adaptation Measures 
(NCCAM) who work at the Korean Adaptation Center for Climate Change 
(KACCC), and key persons who lead climate change science and policy in 
South Korea. The reason for these choices was that they could provide a 
detailed account of the whole process of creating national adaptation policies. 
The plan was to interview 30 people for the first round of interviews, but some of 
the contacted individuals did not reply to my request for interviews or cancelled 
the interview appointment. I interviewed 14 people from the advisory board and 
9 people from a list of climate change scholars who performed government-
funded climate change projects. In order to make an interview appointment, the 
first contact was made by sending an email and one or two days later, I 
contacted the candidates by telephone using the numbers which were provided 
on their institutions‟ web sites. However, some of the candidates did not reply to 
the electronic mailings or did not provide telephone numbers at their institutions. 
In those cases, I sometimes used my personal network to contact them and 
receive an interview agreement. However, I realised that this personal network 
was not always helpful. In a couple of the cases of the interviews arranged 
using my personal network, the interviewees did not speak their mind or did not 
express in-depth opinions about the questions, and the interviews became 
token meetings. When the interviewees replied promptly to my request emails 
and suggested a potential interview time, the interviewees became actively 
involved in the interviews and expressed in-depth opinions.  
 
For the second round of interviews, I contacted again the interviewees of the 
first round and more individuals who were members of advisory boards for 
national climate change adaptation policies. I contacted 55 people who were 
members of the advisory board (Ministry of Environment 2010, p.xxv) and 
received agreement for interviews from 14 members.  
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Most of the listed interviewees for both the first and the second phase belong to 
the elite group in South Korea: a high level of government official, doctoral 
degree holding professors and institutional researchers. As discussed in the 
„positionality section‟, I made an effort to respect their reputation for  the 
process of the interviews (Rice 2009).  
 
Table 13: The interview category of the research (Source: Made by the author of 
this thesis) 
Interviewee category Number of Interviewees 
State actors Ministries 5 
 Presidential Committee on Green 
Growth  
1 
National Institutes 9 
Institutes funded by government 15 
Local Government official 2 
Local environment foundation  1 
Private actors University 5 
 
Table 13 briefly describes the categories and numbers of interviewees. More 
details regarding the interviewees are explained in Appendix 3. The 
interviewees for this research are divided into two categories based on where 
they work: the first one is the government employees, and the second group is 
employees of private institutions. The interviewees of the government employee 
group are working at the departments of central government or government 
funded or affiliated organizations. The interviewees in the second group are 
professors or doctors acting as advisors or consultants who are recommended 
for the advisory board by the government organisations. The government 
employee category is sub-classified according to the types of the organisations: 
(1) the governmental ministries, where the interviewees work in central 
government ministries; (2) the national institutes which are owned by the state 
government; (3) the institutes funded by government which are partly funded by 
central government and partly local government or government affiliated 
organisations; (4) local government officials; and local Environment 
Foundations which are financially supported by the local governments; and (5) 
private actors who are academic researchers employed by the private 
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universities. As shown in the Table 13, most interviewees are partly or entirely 
employed by government. Even the second group are not entirely to be 
identified as private actors because the professors or researchers participate in 
projects funded by the government. They were selected as the members in the 
advisory board by the government.  
 
4.5.2. Interview guide 
 
An interview guide was drawn up for carrying out semi-structured interviews. 
According to the situation, the order of questions and the contexts of questions 
were changed introducing a measure of flexibility. The interview guideline was 
organised under three categories. The first category was questions requiring 
factual answers. For example, questions about which sector of climate change 
adaptation policies they were involved in making policies for; how long the 
interviewee had worked in climate change; or if he or she had engaged in 
making environmental or climate policies before the national climate change 
adaptation policies. Following the factual questions, interviewees were asked 
their opinions regarding the present national adaptation policies, and what they 
thought about the process of making national adaptation policies in South Korea. 
When the interviewees started to get involved in the conversation in earnest, 
interview questions developed into in-depth discussions. The key questions 
included barriers to and challenges facing making adaptation policies, and 
individual views on making climate change policies, and suggestions for 
improving the structure of making climate change adaptation in the future.    
 
Based on the interview guideline, and with some changes depending on the 
interview situations, the interviews took place for six months over two years 
from 2010 to 2011.  
 
4.5.3. Interviewing  
 
Before proceeding with the interviews, I explained the ethics of the interviews: 
the interview should be voluntary and anonymous, and whenever they wanted, 
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they could discontinue the interview, and that the data would be used only for 
research purposes (refer to Appendix 2 of this thesis). If they agreed to 
participate in the interview, I requested the interviewees read the consent form 
and sign it.  And I also asked them if they had any objection to the interview 
being recorded. Except for three interviewees (Interviewee No.1, Interviewee 
No.22 and Interviewee No.25), the rest of the interviewees agreed to be 
recorded.  
 
Most interviews took place at the interviewees‟ work place, where the 
interviewees wanted to have their interviews. However, three interviews were 
held in different environments: interview No.11 at a coffee shop; interview No.37 
at the National Assembly House of South Korea; and interview No.41 at a hotel 
where the interviewee attended a conference. I preferred to have the interviews 
at their office assuming that the interviewees would feel comfortable  and would 
have a relaxed conversation during the interviews (Valentine 2005). However, 
the work place of the interviewees could not always provide a comfortable or 
quiet environment for holding an interview. When interviewees shared an office 
with other colleagues or their supervisors were working in the same office, 
interviewees seemed uncomfortable and did not fully express their opinions in 
the ensuing conversation. There were other disadvantages when the interviews 
took place at the interviewee‟s office; for example, frequently, interviews were 
interrupted by telephones or visitors. In general the ideal situation is for the 
interview to be held a separate meeting room located inside the interviewee‟s 
organisation so that the interview is not interrupted and the interviewee feels 
comfortable and relaxed. 
 
As explained in section 4.5.1, the research interviews took place over two 
phases. When I began the interviewing, it was the time of year-end reporting 
and national holidays. Some of the interviewees cancelled their interview 
appointment and changed the interview dates. When I had interviews, the 
interviewee sometimes forgot the interview appointments and had other 
meetings, or they ended the interviews after less than 30 minutes on the 
pretence of other urgent businesses. I scheduled to conduct interviews from the 
end of October 2010. But I realised that this season was the busy time for most 
interviewees who worked for national institutions and government offices; it was 
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the time to submit annual reports and to have December year-ending meetings, 
and January year-beginning meetings. In addition, it was time for people to 
celebrate the Christmas holiday, year-ending and year-beginning holidays, and 
a Korean traditional holiday. As a novice researcher, I made the mistake in 
choosing a bad time for fieldwork and interviews.  
 
For the first phase, the interviews were intended to follow the guide exactly 
without going into an in-depth discussion in most of the interviews. When the 
interviewees were losing interest in the interviews or reluctant to answer 
questions, I felt embarrassed and hesitated to continue the interviews or even 
asked if they wanted to stop. When the interviews were interrupted by visitors or 
phone calls, I had difficulty in directing interviewees to returning to the 
interviews. The mistakes resulted in superficial data collection. It became 
necessary to do more in-depth and supplementary interviews.  
 
After finishing the first round of interviews and preliminary data analysis, I 
decided to proceed with the supplementary interviews. The second round of 
interviews was scheduled to take place for one month from the middle of 
October 2011 to November 2011. The reason I chose this period was that 
South Korea has a traditional holiday early in October; and after the end of 
November in 2011. This had a bearing on the time I chose for the second round 
of interviews. For the second round of interviews, I made interview 
appointments before departing to conduct field work. During the second phase, 
I could collect more diverse and in-depth opinions regarding climate change 
adaptation and the policy making process in South Korea. Compared to the first 
phase, I felt that I could manage the interviews with more confidently and that 
this made interviewees feel more at ease and able to express their thoughts 
more freely.  
 
As this research focuses on change adaptation on the national rather than the 
local level, local actors were not selected for the interview lists. However, a 
couple of interviewees talked about successful local climate change policies. 
Therefore, I contacted local actors in three cities; people based in Seoul City, 
JEJUDO, and ANSAN City. I telephoned the persons-in-charge of climate 
change policies in Seoul City, JEJUDO special authoritative sector, and ANSAN 
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City. Of these three local actors, the person-in charge of climate change in 
Seoul city did not want to be interviewed, claiming that Seoul city was in the 
process of making adaptation plans at that time (in November 2011). The two 
people from the other cities gladly accepted the invitation for interviews. I asked 
questions which were slightly different to those outlined in the interview guide, 
and which had a more local focus. When the local actors were asked about 
climate change adaptation, it became apparent that each of them was not 
aware of the concept but recognised climate change policies as only reducing 
emissions. Therefore the questions were about the local climate change policies 
rather than climate change adaptation: who initiated policies to cope with local 
climate change; what were their roles in the policies; and if there was public 
engagement in making climate change policies? Local actors were not well 
informed about climate change adaptation. 
 
The method of interviewing was face-to-face methods except for one electronic 
response, and two telephone conversations. The total number of interviews was 
forty-one. On average each interview lasted 40 minutes, with the shortest 
lasting a mere 10 minutes and the longest 75 minutes. The shortest interview 
was due to the illness of the interviewee. In the longest interview, the 
interviewee talked about many subjects, and some of which were not even 
related to climate change policies. The average travel time was more than three 
hours for each interview with six hours by train as the longest.  
 
Most interviews were audio recorded as agreed with the interviewees, but some 
of the interviewees did not want to be recorded, and for two interviews 
mishandling of the recorder meant that the interviews were not recorded. When 
I could not record the interviews, I transcribed the interviews by hand. After 
each interview, I made notes of key points about the interviews and the 
environment of the interviews. These notes were helpful when coding the 
interviews. Transcriptions could not provide the feelings and facial expressions 
of the interviewees. When I completed each interview, I transcribed the audio 
recorded interviews, usually on the same evening when I came back home. But 
if that was not possible, I finished transcribing no later than within a week of the 
interviews having taken place. For one interview to be transcribed, it took four 
times as long as the interview itself. The tedious but important transcribing of 
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the interviews was repeated more than three times in order to prevent missing 
essential dialogue. Whenever I completed an interview, I always expressed my 
gratitude electronically (Valentine 2005).  
 
 4.6. Analysis of interview data 
 
 This research was designed to explore the current situation of adaptation 
policies and the perceptions of policy makers from the perspective of 
governance in South Korea. Understanding climate change adaptation in the 
context of governance required an examination of policy documents across the 
full range of political, social and economic considerations. Interviewing 
participants involved in the making of climate policies can provide information 
about how climate change adaptation and the role of governance are perceived 
by them in the process of making national policies. The data collected from the 
research are qualitative data which can help to answer the research questions 
and thus achieve the objective of the research (Ritche and Spencer 1994). 
 
The collected qualitative data are categorised, and coded  as a basis for 
theorizing them (Strauss and Corbin 1998). Analysing interview data began with 
identifying the concepts repeated most frequently (codes), and these coded 
concepts are grouped under categories based on the concepts that pertain to 
the same phenomenon (Corbin and Strauss 1990; Strauss and Corbin 1998). 
Coding is a key process to generating a theory based on any research (Bryman 
2004, pp.398-416). In the process of coding the interview data, I made efforts 
not to fragment the conversations arbitrarily and tried to understand the whole 
sequences. The categories for coding were drawn from the conceptual 
frameworks and the research questions: negative attitudes towards the process 
of decision making; complacent attitudes towards the general procedure of 
policy making; and neutral opinions which are not negative or not positive but 
just providing information. The categories were grouped so as to identify the 
repeated themes and conceptualise in order to generate a theory (Maxwell 
1996). The coding of the data was performed by using the QSR Nvivo 9 
computer programme. 
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The data collected from the interviews were particular to South Korea, but with 
the process of generating a theory, it becomes abstract and general so that it 
could be transferable to climate change adaptation governance in other 
countries where the civil organisations or private actors are not sufficiently to 
participate in policy decision making. 
 
4.7. Summary 
 
This chapter has given an overview of the analytical framework of my research 
methodology. Table 14 shows an overview of the methodology used for this 
research. Data were collected using qualitative and semi-structured interviews 
over a period of six months from thirty eight interviewees. The collected data 
were analysed using open-coding and classifying coding methodologies, in 
order to explore and answer the research questions. 
 
Table 14: Overview of the research methodology (Source: Made by author of this thesis) 
The study Adaptation governance in the context of climate change  in South Korea 
Type of Research Qualitative, exploratory, contextual, grounded theory 
Aims or 
objectives 
To examine  adaptation policies in Korea 
To identify the challenges in making policy  
To generate a theory regarding a multilevel governance system in climate 
change adaptation 
Interviewees 38 individuals (refer to  Appendix 3 of this thesis for the details of 
interviewees ) 
Type of Interview In-depth, semi-structured interviews 
Time-scale 5 months (November 2010 to March 2011) 
and one month (October 2010 to November 2012) 
 
This case study aims to examine the climate adaptation governance system in 
South Korea, using in-depth interviews to elucidate the process of making policy. 
The interviewees were selected from the group of experts who attended 
meetings to make climate policies in South Korea. Although this research is 
carried out only in one country and is a single case study, the findings could be 
transferable to other cases if  they are selected carefully (Baxter 2010; Yin 
2003). 
 
From the following chapters, the analysis of the data based on the methodology 
considered in Chapter 4 will be discussed and analysed. First, Chapter 5 
focuses on a comprehensive and systematic review of policy documents and 
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literature regarding climate policies in South Korea. The following Chapter 6 and 
Chapter 7 discuss this analysis of the interview data. 
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 Chapter 5. Structure of climate change policy in South 
Korea 
 
“Building a safe society through climate change adaptation and supporting 
green growth (Ministry of Environment 2010, p.vi).” 
 
 
5.1. Introduction 
 
As is happening elsewhere the reactions to climate change have been 
concentrating on mitigation rather than adaptation: therefore the political 
discourse regarding climate change adaptation has lagged a little behind 
mitigation in South Korea (Han et al. 2008; Han 2007). Increased frequency of 
extreme weather events and pressures from international agreements 
encourage politicians to show a greater interest in making policies about climate 
change adaptation in South Korean (Han 2007). By examining the process of 
adopting climate change adaptation measures, this chapter aims to use 
empirical arguments which demonstrate how political culture influences the 
development of general climate change policies; this will be done by analysing 
secondary material. These consist of policy documents, reports related to 
climate change published by governmental institutions and relevant literature. 
This analysis shows what is missing in the process of the development of 
national adaptation policies and the characteristics of political culture which 
have influenced decision-making regarding climate change adaptation. In order 
to achieve these aims, this chapter focuses on the stage of initiating and 
setting-up a policy agenda and the decision-making process. In addition, this 
chapter will analyse the contents of policy options listed within the National 
Climate Change Adaptation Measures (NCCAM), and examine the institutional 
structures for implementing the policies. 
    
The analytical framework of this chapter is a mixture of two approaches; the first 
approach analyses policies in terms of a process beginning with agenda-setting 
and decision-making; and the second focuses on power and its distribution 
among groups and elites and the way this shapes policy-making (Parsons 1986, 
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p.39). The first analytical focus is on the procedural characteristics of initiating 
climate change policies. How did the peripheral policy item (here climate 
change) gain interest and become a policy agenda? Who or what initiated the 
policy agenda-setting? And at the stage of decision-making, how were policy 
options decided? These questions will be answered by investigating documents. 
The second approach focuses more on the distribution of power as it affects the 
procedures of climate change policy making. With regard to the institutional 
structures overseeing climate change policies, who is the practical power-
holder? To what extent is decision making shared among participants? The 
main research materials are policy documents or working reports published by 
government or governmental organisations; this does not include any primary 
research data. Therefore the analysis may have limitations in terms of depths. 
Using the two approaches I will investigate what has happened during the 
process of making climate change policies in the perspective of political culture.  
 
5.2. Styles of policy making in the context of climate change 
 
This section investigates the way climate change became a policy agenda and 
who made decisions about policy options. It is done from the perspective of 
political culture and political structure. By analysing documents, I will find out 
who and what has been missing in a context of participatory governance. In 
analysing this process the practical delivery of policies is not considered; 
because climate change adaptation has just begun in South Korea there are no 
official documents regarding it. The secondary materials used for this chapter 
are listed in Chapter 4. Here I argue that what is missing is the participatory 
element in the governance of climate change policies; basing my assertions on 
an analysis of these documents. 
 
5.2.1. Initiating climate change adaptation policy 
 
As the reason for directing attention to climate change adaptation is examined, 
three things are generally addressed; the commitment to Article 4, Clause 1 (b) 
of UNFCCC as a member party of this international body; growing public 
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concern regarding increased damage caused by more frequent extreme 
weather events; and politicians‟ awareness of the impacts. However, it is 
necessary to examine these reasons carefully. In fact, the pointed first reason 
was not practical key driver for promoting policy makers into taking actions. The 
climate change-related policies were initiated for the commitment to the 
UNFCCC but to cope with the impacts of climate change. The increased 
damage caused by extreme weather events did not play as key focusing events 
either. The damages produced knee-jerk reactions. When big natural disasters 
as floods and typhoons occur, people pay attention to the incidents. However, 
as time goes, people lose interests and do not make policy makers adopt 
proper coping strategies or policies. According to the research sources, 
substantial progress in climate change adaptation policies began with a new 
government. Taking account of these facts, I discuss the procedural 
characteristics of agenda-setting and decision making about climate change 
adaptation in more detail, and answer the question-what is the key actor?  
 
A state chooses a policy agenda taking account of policy issues, the process is 
usually led by powerful groups motivated by certain political conditions (Kingdon 
2003). In South Korea, the President plays a crucial role in deciding the political 
agenda in responses to social issues (Jeong 2003). In South Korea, whenever, 
a new president is elected, there is usually a big change in the key political 
agendas. Taking account of such a political culture, this section explores what 
actually initiated the making of climate change policies and who really was 
behind it.  
 
The literature shows that the beginning of making climate change policies in 
South Korea was the intentions of preparing for international agreements, this 
was led by the central government (Han 2007; Jeon 2010a). Policy goals of the 
first and the second General Strategy to cope with Climate Change Conference 
support these arguments. The Strategies were formulated by a special 
committees composed of only high level of government officials, namely, 
governmental ministers chaired by the Prime minister (CCC 2006; Han 2007; 
Han et al. 2008). The General Strategy was updated every two years until the 
fourth one was drafted and succeeded by the Green Growth Strategy when the 
new government announced a national regime of „low carbon and green growth‟ 
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(Korea 2008) .The general strategies focussed on how the government could 
negotiate the international agreements without doing harm to domestic 
industries. Figure 4 in Box. 5-1. describes the brief history of climate change 
policies made by the South Korean government by establishing a special 
committee. The committee system is generally arranged when governments 
face the need to handle new political agendas (Cheong 2003; Lee 2005a). The 
committee is expected to provide professional knowledge and share information 
between policy makers and experts. However, as most members of the 
committees are recruited from governmental institutions, there are those who 
are sceptical regarding the role of the committee as a genuine representative of 
public opinions (Lee 2005b; Kim 2009). Box 5-1 describes the committees 
employed by the South Korean government for climate change policies from the 
late 1992 to 2010.  
 
Box. 5-1. The Summary of governmental committees for climate change policies 
 
The Ministerial Commission on Global Environment was established in 1992 as the first 
governing structure for climate change policies, which seven years later was reformed to the 
Commission on Convention on Climate. The Commission on Convention on Climate Change 
was transformed into the Commission on Climate Change in 2001. The Commission on Climate 
Change existed until it was integrated into the Presidential Committee on Green Growth in 2008. 
The history of the Committee systems for climate change policies is illustrated in Figure 4. 
 
The general structure of the Presidential Committee on Green Growth is not very different from 
that of the previous committees. It is composed of one high level board of decision makers on 
which government ministers are members, one steering board and one working group 
supported by groups of experts (Cho 2002; PCGG 2009). The key difference is that the 
Presidential Committee on Green Growth enforces the new national regime of green growth and 
low carbon (Kim and Lee 2010). The main role of the committee is to provide technical advice 
pertaining to climate change and green growth. 
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Figure 4: Climate Change Policies in South Korea (Source: Modified from 
NCCAM & Jeon 2010 
 
However, the committee members are selected from well-reputed persons who do not 
necessarily have expertise in climate change or sometimes work as duplicate members of other 
governmental committees. Besides, some of the members are selected to ensure compliance 
with the government directives and reflect the needs of government rather than representing 
public opinion (Lee 2005b). In order to reduce the power exerted on the committee by 
government, it adopted a co-chair system for the Presidential Committee with a view to building 
partnerships with private actors: one chair is the Prime Minister and the other is appointed from 
a NGO by the President. But there is concern that this the co-chair appointment system might 
not have produced truly participatory governance (Kim 2009).  
 
Before the 3rd General Coping Strategy, the term, „climate change adaptation‟ 
was not in use, nor were there terms with a similar meaning in climate change 
policies of South Korea. Not until the 3rd Strategy, did the government begin to 
set up a policy trajectory of building adaptive infrastructure among three 
trajectories (CCC 2006). The government feels the need to build infrastructure 
for climate change adaptation, it plans to invest 0.1% of its total budget in the 
3rd General Coping Strategy for the purpose of assessing vulnerability and 
monitoring climate change (ibid). The experts‟ pool is established for providing 
technical and professional advice for creating the 3rd General Strategy. The 
critics point out that most of the members in the pool are working at working at 
governmental institutions (CCC 2006), it is obvious then that the consultation 
process is mere window dressing, a sham. Also it seems there are no 
participants from private sector, and if there are any, it is not clear regarding the 
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degree of their involvement in the initiation or shaping of the 3rd General Coping 
Strategy. 
 
After the presidential election in 2008, the new government chooses, „Low 
Carbon and Green Growth Society‟ as a new national paradigm (Korea 2008). 
Accordingly, there was a change in general political agenda-setting in the South 
Korea government. Most policies formulated were required to consider the 
paradigm. The political initiative seemed to make a positive impact on climate 
change adaptation. Climate change issues along with green growth are given 
more weighed on by this government than the previous government (Kim 2009; 
Yoon 2009b). Some documents argue that the increased economic and 
financial damages caused by natural disasters which are interpreted as being 
due to the adverse effects of climate change played in part a role in setting 
climate change as a policy agenda in the new government (Han et al. 2008; 
Jeon 2010a). However, there is no evidence that natural disasters make policy-
makers initiate adaptation policies. On the other hand, according to a report, the 
general people know climate change but they do not have knowledge specific to 
climate change adaptation (Ministry of Enviornment 2007). Although South 
Korea has experienced extreme weather events, it does not mean that such 
events are working as focusing events in initiating the debate in policy 
discourses.   
 
The Climate Change General Plan (2008) rationalises the necessity of 
establishing national climate change adaptation policies by citing international 
obligations  and citing examples of the advanced actions of other countries 
(UNFCCC 2012). The contents of the policy documents show the variety of 
participants involved in the process of making the policy document. The projects 
in the policy document become very technical and concrete. Nevertheless the 
making of the policy is still initiated by top-down command by central 
government. As a party member of the UNFCCC, the South Korean 
government is obliged to take actions for adapting to climate change at a 
national and local level (the UNFCCC, Article 4, Clause 1 (b)). In response to 
this the Climate Change Committee decided to make a master plan for a 
national climate change adaptation (CCC 2008). Although there is recognition of 
taking action at the state level of the need to take action on climate change 
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adaptation, the climate change policy still focuses on reducing emissions of 
greenhouse gases rather than on adaptation.  
 
After the binding law of the FALG was enacted in 2010, the government 
reformed and renamed the national adaptation master plan as the National 
Climate Change Adaptation Measures (2010). The NCCAM was proudly 
highlighted as the first statutory national adaptation policy. It works as a master 
plan for national and local actions plan for climate change adaptation (NCCAM). 
The NCCAM announced the vision of the national adaptation strategy as 
„constructing a climate-safe society and supporting green growth‟(Ministry of 
Environment 2010, p.vi). Taking into account the fact that the government has 
set up „low carbon and green growth‟ as a national paradigm, it is not surprising 
that the NCCAM includes the term „green growth‟ in its vision. It seems that 
policy makers feel that it is their duty to use the term green growth no matter 
what is their policy objects are.  
 
The driving force for creating climate change policies was international and 
national commitments entered into by the central government. The process of 
policy making follows the usual path of top-down and commanded by 
government, although climate change is a new policy agenda. It is evident that 
the state-centred political culture strongly influences agenda-setting and 
initiating climate change policies. If a variety of actors is excluded in the process 
from initiating climate change adaptation policies, then what happens during the 
process of decision making about policy options? The following section is a 
critical review of the NCCAM reports regarding the process of the decision 
making and in particular the NCCAM itself. The reason for this analysis focusing 
on the NCCAM is that there is a report on the process of decision making (Jeon 
2010b); however there are no other reports specifically about the decision 
making process about other climate change policies which I investigate in this 
chapter. 
 
5.2.2. Decision makers 
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When the South Korean government initiated climate change policies, it missed 
the opportunity to collect opinions from multiple actors. This, it is argued, might 
lead to narrow and near-sighted policy decisions. This section will argue about 
the missing points in the process of decision making and discuss how decision-
making is shaped by the power structures and the way power is distributed 
among the participants. South Korean political culture is a mixture of „subject 
and participant culture‟ in the context in which Almond and Verba, expresses 
authoritarianism and bureaucracy influenced by Confucianism. Such a political 
culture was observed in initiating climate change adaptation policies as 
discussed in the previous section. Then it is necessary to investigate to what 
extent such a political culture is expressed in selecting policy options and 
generating practical action plans. According to the documents, the government 
attempts to adopt interdepartmental cooperating mechanisms, institutional 
networks and advisory boards for integrating multifaceted opinions about the 
decision-making process with a view to enforcing participatory governance. I will 
examine how such governmental efforts worked in creating the NCAM. The 
discussion will begin by exploring this from the point of establishing a binding 
legal framework (the Framework Acts Low Carbon, Green Growth).  
 
After the Framework Acts Low Carbon, Green Growth (FALG) became effective 
in accordance with Article 48 of the Framework Act on Low Carbon, Green 
Growth, it was required that within six months detailed implementation plans be 
drawn up; accordingly the ministries in central government were obliged to 
make the first statutory national adaptation strategy, which would be called the 
National Climate Change Adaptation Measures (Article 48 of FALG, Article 38 
of Ordinance for the FALG). In order to make and implement the NCCAM, the 
South Korean government formed a consultative group which is coordinated by 
two institutions (the National Institute of Environment Research and the Korean 
Adaptation Center for Climate Change). The two institutions acting on the 
instruction of the Ministry of Environment made the draft of the NCCAM. 
According to a report about summarising the process of making the NCCAM, 
the drafted NCCAM was worded by researchers of two institutions and a group 
of experts - the advisory board (ibid). Through a series of meetings (according 
to the report), the field researchers decided on the draft NCCAM and held a 
symposium – a public hearing (Jeon 2010b). However, there is no information 
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about the detail of symposium; whether-or-not the attendees included private 
actors and what was discussed or raised as issues (ibid). After the event, 
government consultative groups were invited to give their opinions about the 
draft document and to adjudicate where there were conflicting opinions (ibid).  
According to the report, the adjustments were generally related to changes of 
expression or terms used in the policy options.   
 
The objective of the NCCAM is to provide a master plan for the future practical 
adaptation measures at national and local level. As it reflects the objectives of 
its master the policy contents are very broad and abstract (NCCAM). As a 
follow-up of the NCCAM, government ministries and local government are 
required to make the detailed Implementation plans for Climate Change 
Measures based on the NCCAM. All government ministries should create 
department coping master plans by 2012, but only three ministries announced 
ministerial master plans (MIFFAF 2011; Ministry for Food 2011; Choi et al. 
2010). The department policies are more practical, concrete and technical than 
that of the NCCAM. 
 
I have explored the process of making the NCCAM for six months from April to 
October 2010 (Jeon 2010b). There are no details giving information about the 
attendees at the public hearing and how their comments were treated 
afterwards. Although various actors seem to have been involved in the decision-
making process than was the case with the previous climate change policies, 
most tasks were completed by researchers working at KACCC; this included 
wording the policy and aggregating opinions from advisory boards. Analysing 
the overall process of decision-making about the NCCAM, the power seemed to 
be concentrated in the hands of a few groups of government officials in central 
government and groups of experts.  
 
5.2.3. The methods employed in the creation of the NCCAM 
  
The previous section discussed the power blocks shaping the process of 
agenda-setting and decision making with respect to climate change policies and 
the fact that it is an expression of the political culture. The vision of the NCCAM 
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includes the term „green growth‟, even though the policy is not directly related to 
this agenda. Such an attitude on the part of both the policy makers and 
government-employed researchers involved can be interpreted as the 
expression of allegiant political culture to the governmental politics. In this 
section there follows an analysis of the decision making during the process of 
creating the policy contents listed in the NCCAM.  
 
More than 51% of the national adaptation measures aim to build national 
adaptive capacity by scientific and technological development and by collecting 
data about climate change (NCCAM). Focusing on building data and scientific 
information is similar to how other countries operate. Australia, the UK, the USA, 
and European countries are also focusing on building adaptive capacity rather 
than delivering adaptive actions (Preston et al. 2011; Tompkins et al. 2010; 
Biesbroek et al. 2010). Most projects in the adaptation measures focus on 
scientific and technological development. This is similar to what was observed 
by Biesbroek et al. (2010) regarding adaptation strategies (Biesbroek et al. 
2010). It is rational that policy makers generally should intend to have concrete 
evidence deriving from their decisions or clear rationales. To implement the 
vision of „constructing a climate-safe society and support green growth‟, ten 
sectors set up sectoral adaptation goals. Table 15 describes the sectoral goals 
addressed in the NCCAM(Ministry of Environment 2010). 
 
Table 15: The goal of Adaptations in South Korea (Source: Translated from the 
National Climate Change Adaptation Measures by the author of this thesis) 
Sector Policy goal 
Health To protect people from heat waves, infectious 
diseases, air pollution and allergies exacerbated by 
climate change 
Disaster To reduce damages through disaster prevention and 
social infrastructures enforcement 
Agriculture To transform agricultural system so that it becomes 
climate-friendly  
Forestry To enhance forestry vitality and reduce forest 
disasters 
Coast/Fishery To secure fisheries and reduce damages 
Water  To secure water resource management systems from 
climate change  
Ecosystem To maintain biodiversity through ecosystem protection 
and restoration 
Climate change 
monitoring/ prediction 
To provide scientific adaptation data and reduce 
uncertainty 
Adaptation business/ To develop new business opportunities  
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energy 
Public communication, 
education/ 
international 
cooperation 
To ensure national and international public 
communication 
 
The health sector is comprised of 29 projects each with the vision of protecting 
people from heat waves and air pollution which will be exacerbated by climate 
change; the disaster/accident sector has 46 projects for the purpose of reducing 
damages through enforcing social infrastructures and precautionary actions;  
the agriculture sector has 40 projects to achieve the vision of transforming the 
sector into environmentally friendly agricultural systems, while the forestry 
sector has 19 projects to achieve the vision of improving forestry productivity 
and reducing damage to forests;  the coast/fishery sector is pursuing the vision 
of adapting to sea level rise by predicting changes to fish species and securing 
the fishery resources with 26 projects. As climate change affects the rainfall 
patterns and can intensify flood and drought events, the Korean government 
created 33 projects for securing the water management system. The ecosystem 
sector has 29 projects for protecting and preserving the biodiversity of 
ecosystems. Building a scientific database and evidence is believed to be 
critical to the adaptations. In order to achieve the goals, the South Korean 
government has selected 27 projects for monitoring and predicting climate 
change, 11 projects involving the business and energy sectors with climate 
change, and 9 projects for advancing climate technology, producing the 
standard Korean scenarios and building international networks (Ministry of 
Environment 2010). Based on the analysis of the NCCAM, the South Korean 
government is focusing on the advancement of technology and science by 
developing scenarios and making vulnerability maps and so on. 
 
5.3. Institutional arrangements for climate change adaptation 
 
I have investigated what has been missing in the process of policy agenda-
setting and decision-making, and who plays the dominant role in those 
processes. I have provided evidence to support the following assertion: agenda-
setting and decision-making have been initiated by the central government 
under the pressure of international agreements, and even who participated in 
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the process was decided by the central government. Power is mainly in the 
hands of central government as it controls the process of making policy 
decisions about national climate change adaptation. The questions which have 
been addressed are :what practical roles have been played by other institutions 
participating in the process and providing technical knowledge? To what extent 
have the researchers or participants in the institutions expressed their own 
opinions? These are the questions which are the main focus of the discussion in 
this sections. 
 
There were two institutions which were inaugurated in order to oversee the 
newly established programme for implementing climate change adaptation in 
South Korea; these are the Korea Adaptation Centre for Climate Change 
(KACCC) and the Presidential Committee on Green Growth (PCGG). The 
PCGG is designed not only for adaptation policies but also other policies related 
to green growth and low carbon agenda. According to the recommendations of 
the National Climate Change Master Plan which is the prototype of the NCCAM, 
the South Korean government established the KACCC in 2009. It is supported 
financially and overseen by the Ministry of Environment and provides technical 
information and professional advice to the Ministry. In the process of making the 
NCCAM, the KACCC plays a key role; writing the documents and collecting 
opinions from ministries and advisory boards (Jeon 2010b). The special 
committee, the PCGG located in the President‟s office, is supposed to give only 
technical advice to the President, but it sometimes act beyond this limited remit 
(Kim 2010). An example is the initiation of the FALG.   
 
It was decided that the Division of Climate Change Cooperation in the Ministry 
of Environment should take general charge of climate change adaptation in 
South Korea (Jeon 2010a; Ministry of Environment 2010). The Division has the 
responsibility of directing and monitoring the whole process related to climate 
change adaptation from national to local level. Other ministries are expected to 
submit progress reports to this Division (Ministry of Environment 2010). The 
Division cooperates with the PGCC in the matters of climate change adaptation 
policies and reports to the President of South Korea about the process of 
creating the policies. When it comes to decision-making regarding climate 
change adaptation, it is the President of South Korea that heads up the process. 
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Global policies, extreme weather events and mass media and public opinion 
about climate change adaptation also influence decision-making about policies 
(Swart et al. 2009). However, there is no official document about the 
participation of the private sector. Unlike the UK‟s efforts to include the private 
sectors (Cimato and Mullan 2010), institutional arrangements for climate 
change adaptation do not formally include private sector. Figure 5 illustrates the 
institutional decision flowchart of South Korea.  
 
Figure 5: Flow chart of decision making about the NCCAM (Source: Made by the 
author of this thesis) 
 
Concerns have been voiced regarding the decision making process with respect 
to the South Korean adaptation policies, on the grounds that the government 
has set boundaries and may have removed the opportunity for diverse and 
useful policy options which might have been raised by other actors (Jeong and 
Byun 2011). In addition, the advisory board should reflect on the guideline 
provided by the government officers, does this limit the flexibility of policy 
making. The special relationship with the government constrains active 
participation in the process of decision making.  
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Accepting that the NCCAM is a national level master plan for climate change 
adaptation, it does not seem appropriate to exclude local level actors where 
most adaptation measures will, in practice, take place. A state-led and top-down 
approach with strong leadership, it is argued, is a way to make the efficient. 
However such an approach to climate change has limitations for it reduces the 
diversity of policy options and this may increase vulnerability and reduce 
resilience to unexpected impacts.  
 
According to the FALG, the next step is to make the Action Plans for the 
NCCAM and local adaptation policies. In the same Act, Article 38 states that as 
part of this process, the authorities should invite the public to participate in the 
process of decision making. However, there are some who are sceptical about 
the practicality of the Act (Park 2010a; Huh et al. 2008; Hwang 2009); one of 
the reason given is that civil organisations lack of knowledge about climate 
change adaptation (Ministry of Enviornment 2007). 
 
5.4. Summary 
 
This chapter has aimed at investigating what does and what does not happen 
vis-à-vis government and governance mechanisms in the process of making 
climate change adaptation policies, from the stage of agenda-setting to 
decision-making policy options, as well as what happens at the stage of 
implementation; it has asked questions about what has, and what has not done 
once the research state has been completed. The main thrust of this chapter 
has not been a technical examination of policy but rather an analysis of how the 
expression of political culture and governance influences the process. This has 
been done by reviewing the secondary materials analytically.   
 
By seeking what has been missing in the process of making national climate 
change adaptation policies in the context of the governance, I have found out 
that, from the point of policy agenda-setting to the stage of decision-making, the 
process is more influenced by „subject‟ political culture rather than participant 
culture. The political culture of the South Korean bureaucracy and 
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authoritarianism are clearly observed in the making of climate change policies 
and relevant policies. Substantial power sharing between government and 
private sectors is not a recognizable feature of the political activities. The key 
players in the agenda setting and the decision makers about policy options are 
high level politicians. Experts for the advisory board were recruited in order to 
give technical and profession advice for formulating the NCCAM, however, their 
exact roles are not clearly indicated in the documents. Their limited role of 
providing professional knowledge as directed by government is interpreted in 
the light of a political culture based on Confucianism: the will of government is 
the will of heaven. In order to examine the degree of involvement of the experts 
in the practical decision making process, more specific and evidence-based in-
depth research, based on face to face interviews, is necessary. Interviews will 
show how South Korean political culture has been expressed in the decision-
making; and what are the constraints which limit participatory governance 
arrangements attempted by the government, Therefore, the next two chapters, 
Chapter 6 and Chapter 7 discuss the empirical findings derived from 
interviewing advisory board members who participated in making national 
climate change adaptation policies in South Korea. They set out examine the 
reasons why some interviewees are complacent about the current procedures 
for creating climate change adaptation policies, while other express 
dissatisfaction with the policy making process. They will also identify barriers to 
adopting governance approach in South Korea. The division between Chapter 6 
and Chapter 7 is made on the basis of the negative and the positive responses 
recorded in interviews. 
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Chapter 6.  Complacency about climate change policies 
in South Korea 
 
“ With respect to the vertical dimension, adaptation may be guided or constrained 
through top-down mandates or national policy, but its implementation will be inevitably 
local in character (Corfee-Morlot et al. 2011, p.176).” 
 
 
6.1. Introduction 
 
Chapter 5 examined the expression of political culture and limitations in the 
process of formulating a national adaptation policy in the context of a 
governance approach. Due to limitations posed by secondary documentary 
sources, the argument needs to be supplemented by the participants‟ 
experience. For that reason, this chapter and the next investigate the attitudes 
expressed in the process of policy making: this is based on semi-structured 
interviews. The interview data collected in South Korea from October 2010 to 
March 2011, and October 2011 extended to November 2011, was obtained by 
interviewing advisory board members who participated in making the NCCAM 
and other climate researchers. 
 
The general characteristic of South Korean political culture is authoritarianism 
created by a mixture of a subject and participant political culture, comparatively 
strong conservatism rooted in Confucianism, and bureaucratic attitudes 
resulting from political elitism. This chapter aims to investigate how such a 
political culture is expressed through the experts and policy makers who have 
participated in making national climate change adaptation policies. 
 
The analysis of the results is categorised according to the attitudes of 
interviewees with regard to political objects; are they complacent about the 
process of policy making or do they challenged by the political structures? The 
first theme is discussed in Chapter 6 focusing on why the interviewees have 
optimistic attitudes towards the progress of climate change adaptation. By 
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contrast, the following Chapter 7 discusses the sceptical and cynical responses 
of some of the interviewees.  
 
Chapter 6 is arranged under two major headings: the first part examines the 
drivers and preconditions pointed out as essential conditions for successful 
delivery of adaptation policies, and analyses what determines the policy goals. 
The order of the listed preconditions is based on the frequency of statements 
made by interviewees, the most frequent comes first. The later part investigates 
the reasons why some of the interviewees feel satisfied with the present 
governing structure. The reasons for the complacency with regard to current 
climate change adaptation are examined, and in particular whether this 
satisfaction is rooted in policy inertia which arises from being accustomed to 
top-down decision making, or to practical improvements in a participatory 
governance approach. The question about whether the culture of policy 
decision-making has positively or negatively influenced multiple actors‟ 
participation in a governance approach to climate change adaptation will be 
examined in Chapter 6.  
 
6.2. What makes a successful climate change adaptation? 
 
Climate change adaptation in this research adopts the definition of the 
IPCC(2007), which conceptualises it as the actions that people take in response 
to, or in anticipation of, projected or actual changes in climate, to reduce 
adverse impact or to take advantage of the opportunities posed by climate 
change (Adger et al. 2007). The South Korean climate change society also 
adopts the definition produced by the IPCC.  
 
The first part of this investigation examines the way in which the advisory board 
members and policy makers conceptualise what it takes for successful 
adaptation to influence the direction of climate change adaptation policies. 
Sound decisions regarding policy directions would be conducive to a successful 
outcome. When interviewees are asked about the goals of adaptation policies in 
South Korea, their responses are divided into two types: a utilitarian approach 
and an egalitarian approach (Brooks et al. 2011). The first, the utilitarian 
approach is commonly observed in the responses of policy makers who worked 
103 
 
in government offices. They state that the goal of climate change adaptation in 
South Korea should focus on obtaining maximum benefits for the greatest 
number acting within the constraints of a limited budget. As an interviewee 
states, if the goal of adaptation measures is to provide more people with a 
public service, the policy options should be decided very carefully. According to 
the decisions made, the target group of the adaptation measures will change. 
  
“if possible, we should invest in nationwide. But we have very limited resource, 
so we usually take account of demographic distribution and priority… 
[…]…where we should invest? We should invest in the place of more people 
affected.” (No. 17 a senior level of government official)  
 
By contrast, an egalitarian approach aims to assist some specific vulnerable 
people who are in danger of suffering the impact of climate change, which is 
also called a „vulnerability approach‟ (Tompkins et al. 2010; Eakin and Patt 
2011). Interviewees who work in health sectors state that adaptation should 
focus on reducing the impacts on socially marginalised groups who usually live 
in vulnerable environments and are seriously impacted by extreme weather 
events. If the call for social justice and welfare is to be addressed, vulnerable 
groups should raise their voices about their needs (Ahmed et al. 2009). 
Adaptation strategy in the health sector includes some measures for caring for 
vulnerable groups (Choi et al. 2010). However, the key concern of the majority 
of the interviewees was that government should invest limited resource in the 
projects which give benefits to as many people as possible by reducing the risks 
posed by climate change rather than focusing on some specific vulnerable 
group. Their statement is in some ways consistent with the vision of the 
NCCAM: „to establish a climate-safe society through green growth‟. But no one 
has attempted to explain why climate change adaptation should be achieved by 
green growth. However, there remain some doubts about how many of their 
opinions were taken into account in the process of goal-setting for adaptation 
policies. 
 
I asked the interviewees what should be done in South Korea in order to 
achieve successful delivery of policies listed in the National Climate Change 
Adaptation Measures. Based on the answers to the question, the following 
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section discusses what the interviewees have said regarding the way to a 
successful delivery of adaptation policies. 
 
6.2.1. Raising public awareness  
 
As scholars argue, understanding public perceptions of climate change risks is 
an essential element of successful adaptation (Lata and Nunn 2012; Pittock and 
Jones 2000; Eakin and Patt 2011; Carter 2011; Hartz-Karp and Meister 2011; 
Wheeler 2008; Carmin et al. 2012; Berkhout 2005; Picketts et al. 2012; Eakin et 
al. 2011; Eriksen 2005; Bele et al. 2011). Some interviewees recognise the 
importance of public engagement, and they argue that public behaviour can 
change, if the public perceives the risks of climate change, this is very important 
for effective adaptation delivery. This section discusses how public opinion has 
in reality been addressed in making the NCCAM.  
 
One interviewee suggests an ideal way to make a policy; the government 
understands the social consensus on the importance of adaptations, so that it 
takes actions by making practical policies. But the suggestion ends by 
proposing the routine way of making policies in South Korea (the sentences are 
highlighted by italic fonts).    
 
“To perceive the discourse of the general public is the role of government: the 
prevalent discourse of local people based on common sense. (Government) should 
know what projects should be carried out and what the public want. And the level of 
knowledge the government has is persuasive enough to make them realise the 
public demands. […]. Both (the government and the general people) should work 
together. If the public are not interested in, policy makers don‟t feel the needs to 
spend money on the issue. When only the public are interested but policy makers 
aren‟t, then it is impossible to make a policy. If both (the public perception and policy 
maker‟s attention) go together, then it is easy to allocate funds and to make a policy. 
I think it is best to raise public awareness and to let people know (about climate 
change adaptation), and then to request a policy to be formulated. […]. They want to 
achieve tangible results during their terms of office. […]. I think that the National 
Climate Change Adaptation Measures, as well as any other national strategy can be 
established only by a change of perception on the part of the policy makers. […]. If 
policy makers feel that it is really necessary, then they allocate budgets and 
resources to it. I think that then it could take place quickly. The first thing is to make 
a policy maker perceive the importance and the essence of the issue; to do this it is 
necessary to demonstrate the scientific background of the arguments in favour of 
the projects.” (Interviewee No.28, a researcher working at KACCC) 
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As the interviewee states, public awareness is a very important element for the 
formulation of a policy and when the public understands the essence of 
adaptation actions and forms a social consensus regarding the need to adapt, 
policy makers may move in accordance with public opinions. But in reality that 
is not true all the time. Two more interviewees express much the same opinions 
regarding public awareness and consensus. However when they are asked 
about the need for participation from the private sector, they rarely acknowledge 
the role of private actors in making the NCCAM (The detail will be discussed in 
Chapter 7).  
 
“Public consensus should be transferred to the members of parliament as the 
main form of public opinion.” (Interviewee No.2, a senior level researcher 
working at a government institute) 
 
“Forming a public consensus (about climate change) leads to national 
prioritizing on climate change adaptation […]. If we are talking about only 
adaptation (to climate change), I think, national economic power and public 
awareness should be significantly formulated.” (Interviewee No.29, a 
university professor) 
 
Another interviewee argues that the advisory members know the importance of 
the involvement of private actors and social learning for effective delivery of 
adaptation policies, and expresses a concern that the importance of this is not 
realized by policy makers:    
 
“The key point of adaptation is how to raise public awareness. For example: 
reducing energy consumption, operating air-conditioners less in spite of hot 
temperatures and saving water. We need to raise public awareness and change 
public behaviours towards climate change adaptation through repeated public 
communications and public education. Public communication and social education 
are very important, but these are not sufficiently understood in our country (South 
Korea)”. (Interviewee No.6, a university professor) 
 
An interviewee (Interviewee No.11) argues that responsibility for adapting to 
climate change should be shared with the general public because adaptation is 
not only the responsibility of the government, but also of all of us. This 
interviewee blames the passive and non-participant public attitudes towards 
adaptations:  
 
“People have taken it for granted that government should be responsible (for the 
damage caused by extreme weather events), but the risk and damage should be 
prevented by individuals. […]. If people are informed about the danger (posed by 
climate change) beforehand, then they can choose whether to buy insurance or not 
and prepare for the risks.” (Interviewee No.11, a researcher working at a 
government-funded institute) 
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Although the interviewee (No.11) argues that the general public should prepare 
for the risks posed by extreme weather events, this interviewee misses the fact 
that taking out climate change insurance in South Korea is not commonly 
accepted as necessary. In addition, taking into account that private actors are 
not invited to engage in the policy making processes, it does not seem 
reasonable to place the responsibility on the general public. Under the 
circumstance of limited information and exclusion from the policy making 
process, it is not even fair to expect people to share the responsibility for the 
outcomes of the policies. In the light of this it seems not unreadable to accept 
the rationality of the following statement:  
 
 “Public conception regarding climate change is the most important thing for climate 
change adaptation. However, adaptation strategy should be made by experts and 
the adaptations should be delivered to general people.” (Interviewee No.27, a 
university professor) 
 
This interviewee distinguishes between the role of experts and the general 
public. This individual sees a dichotomy; experts (in this case policy makers or 
advisory members) make policies and the general public receives the delivery 
of climate change adaptation. This individual overlooks the role of the private 
sector at the stage of policy making as a positive factor for increasing the 
effectiveness of policy implementation (Pelling 2011; Corfee-Morlot et al. 2011; 
Falaleeva et al. 2011; Folke et al. 2005; Chhotray and Stoker 2009a; Doherty 
and Schroeder 2011; Hopper 2009).  
 
Although some of the interviewees mention the importance of public awareness 
and consensus about the essence of climate change adaptation, it does not 
show that they support measures to include the private sector in the process of 
decision making about policy options. Instead, the interview with interviewee 
No.27 reflects the real situation prevailing in policy making in South Korea.  
 
6.2.2. Building adaptive capacity  
 
The next issue for effective adaptation is, interviewees argue, capacity-building 
in institutions and building networks between groups of experts. They point out 
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that building partnerships and networks among groups of climate experts will 
save resources by preventing overlapping of policies between departments and 
in the end an increase in the effectiveness of policy deliveries. Their argument 
can be seen as their suggestion for employing a governance approach. But they 
seem to restrict this to some elite groups of experts. There is another statement 
related to this subject. One interviewee (No.26) states that networking of 
relevant experts is an important way of building capacity in the institutions, and 
a network would be established to connect climate experts working at private or 
governmental institutes. The interviewee optimistically remarks that the network 
can collect useful data and diverse opinions about policy options.  
 
 “ […]. I want to go back to the previous story about networking consulting groups, 
which is also one of the mechanisms for building capacity. When the members meet 
and share information about current problems, they will know what should be done 
and what is not to be done. […] in order to make good progress, and to collect data 
and to do research well…” (Interviewee No.26, a senior level researcher at KACCC) 
 
In the interviewee (No.26)‟s opinion, collecting information and aggregating 
useful knowledge are essential for making rational adaptation policies, this is 
also argued by other researchers (Smithers and Smit 1997; Chikozho 2010; 
Tompkins et al. 2010; Dumollard and Leseur 2011; Boykoff 2009; Juhola and 
Westerhoff 2011; Fussel 2007; Adger 2010; Biesbroek et al. 2010). It is true that 
improving the adaptive capacity of institutions will bring about the collecting of 
more reliable data, and making accurate scientific scenarios, and will result in 
more diverse adaptation policy options which will be helpful for preventing 
maladaptation or unsuccessful adaptation (Barnett and O'Neill 2010). Although 
the interviewees address the important roles of experts and academic scholars, 
they usually mean that building networks is restricted to groups of experts and 
there is no mention of actors from the private sector.  
 
Asked about the engagement of private actors, one of the interviewees (No.26) 
remarks negatively about the participants of the private sectors, arguing that 
there is no need to engage the general public because this is a process of 
creating „national‟ (highlighted by the interviewee) climate change adaptation 
policies. The interviewee argues that initiatives in climate change adaptation 
should be the responsibility of central government. And the person adds that 
although there might be some flaws in a top-down approach, it is the generally 
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accepted process for making national policies. The national policy making 
process, the person believes, should be restricted to certain groups of political 
elites only: 
   
 “Still we are just at the initial stage, aren‟t we? Inevitably there will be lots of trial 
and error. Special conditions and infrastructure should be prepared for making 
adaptation strategies at central government level, first. […]. We (South Korea) need 
to know where (climate change) would result in impact or not. I know we have a big 
hole in this process.”(Interviewee No.26, a senior level researcher at KACCC) 
 
When most interviewees speak of „building capacity‟, they refer to institutional 
capacity at the central level through creating networks of experts. Generally, 
interviewees argue that it would be an efficient use of limited resources. 
Institutional approaches to climate change adaptation can be a good 
governance strategy when the institutions mirror public opinion and can take 
account of the diverse nature of the information which must be processed when 
making policy decisions. But their argument may reflect personal benefits rather 
than the practical effectiveness of adaptation policies, because what must be 
taken into account is the fact that most interviewees are working at government 
institutions or carrying out government-funded research. Building capacity 
through providing more funds can be interpreted as the researchers at the 
institutes hoping to receive more funds for their research or projects.   
 
6.2.3. Prioritizing climate change adaptation  
 
Prioritizing on climate change adaptation is to put forward as a determinant for a 
successful delivery of policies (Dumollard and Leseur 2011; Ford and Pearce 
2010; Bulkeley and Kern 2006; EC 2009; Bele et al. 2011). It seems rational 
that climate change has gained the attention of policy makers and that it should 
be attributed to the government paradigm of low carbon and green growth. 
Interviewees argue that along with the green growth agenda, climate change 
adaptation also became a part of the country‟s political discourse and assumed 
the importance of a policy agenda. 
 
One interviewee (No.17) comments that the government has many policy 
agendas but limited resources; accordingly decision makers should consider 
what is urgent and prioritise them.  
109 
 
 
“Green growth is the same (as climate change). Green growth didn‟t appear 
suddenly in this government term. It was called a different name by previous 
governments like „being sustainable and environmentally friendly‟. But these agenda 
were not policy priorities. […] It is always „agenda issue‟ in the government policies. 
Don‟t you think it makes sense? Climate change is like this. Ministries try to make a 
new department named Green Future Government Department. […]. Think about 
what the key policy agenda of the current government is. For example, if the agenda 
is green growth, and focusing on green growth, then the government allocates 
money to it. […]. In such a way, the budget of the government goes to the area most 
people are interested in.” (Interviewee No.17, a senior level government official) 
 
The interviewee adds to the comments regarding the way to allocate 
government money by addressing the importance of policy priority. When 
central government sets up a national political agenda in South Korea, every 
governmental organization should embrace the agenda in almost every policy, 
and policy makers should consider the political agenda seriously. A political 
agenda item is generally set up by high level politicians through a top-down 
approach. Interviewees are happy about the situation that the current 
government has become interested in climate change as a result of the green 
growth and low carbon paradigm; therefore climate change is treated as a 
significant government policy priority.  
  
So far in this section, I have analysed what could make climate change 
adaptation successful by using the responses of the interviewees. Although the 
interviewees recognise the importance of a public consensus regarding the 
policies, no one mentions about the need to involve diverse actors including 
members of the private sector. Interviewees point out that building network 
between organizations and making partnerships with groups of experts save 
time and money by sharing their information and data. The factors which 
interviewees see as encouraging to the building of adaptive capacity are limited 
to the capacity of building governmental organisations rather than building 
capacity of a participatory governance approach which includes a variety of 
actors from multi-faceted sectors. It seems that interviewees focus on building 
their own organizations.   
 
6.3. What makes some policy makers complacent about the 
process? 
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Some of the interviewees think that current climate change adaptation is in 
good shape. Then the bases for the complacency about the results of policy 
making are examined and critiqued from the perspective of political culture and 
a governance approach under three sub-headings: the power of a new national 
regime as a driving force for climate change adaptation; increased support from 
government; and extreme weather events as potential focusing events. 
 
6.3.1. The powerful new national regime  
 
The interviewees who are members of the advisory board for making the 
NCCAM seem to be satisfied with the progress in climate change policies in 
South Korea. They point out that the first driver for moving forward to climate 
change adaptation is the national key policy agenda: low carbon and green 
growth, which the Korean President announced as a new national paradigm at 
the 60th national independence anniversary (Korea 2008). Although the term 
green growth was not first used by the President, new government of South 
Korea in 2008 decided to take „green growth and low carbon‟ as a new national 
regime and announced it at the 60th anniversary of the founding of South Korea. 
Thus it became a key policy agenda and policy makers have tended to quote 
the word in most policy options. In this section I examine how their political 
attitudes are expressed by the interviewees. 
 
“(I) worked on climate change about three years ago. At the end of the Rho 
government before this government began, green growth appeared. At first low 
carbon was focused on, the importance of (climate change) adaptation was 
perceived, and now policies (regarding climate change) are made….” (Interviewee 
No.7, a senior level researcher working at government-funded institute) 
 
Although there are some negative opinions expressed regarding the low carbon 
and green growth agenda (Kim 2009), the positive influence of the green growth 
trend is reflected in an increases in the numbers of policies related to climate 
change as well as renewable energy and low carbon industry in South Korea. 
Most interviewees agree that the idea of green growth and low carbon is helping 
climate change policy to work well at a central government level and more funds 
are coming into their institutes. 
 
“The community in our country has a greater understanding of climate change 
than other countries. And the government takes green growth as a part of its 
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political agenda.” (Interviewee No.8, a senior level researcher working at a 
government institute) 
 
According to these opinions of these interviewees, as the government chose 
green growth as a platform for national policies, the researchers at institutions 
received more funds to do research regarding climate change than they had 
before. The governmental ministries were required to set up green growth 
departments in the ministries and tended to add the phrase of „green growth 
and low carbon‟ to their policies. In a normal situation it is very difficult to create 
a new department in the administration system of South Korea, but the term 
„green growth‟ unlocks many doors in the Lee government. The interviewee 
(No.32) gives an example of how the green growth agenda is helpful for 
promoting projects related to climate change in the institution:  
 
 “[…]. So, low carbon and green growth work very well. Carbon (that is, greenhouse 
gas emissions) was not treated as a cost in the past. But with the influence of green 
growth, carbon emission regulation is enforced, and carbon itself becomes a cost. 
Then new low carbon technology will be commercialised (thanks to the current 
green growth trend).” (Interviewee No.32, a senior level researcher at government-
funded institute) 
 
“When the law (the Framework Act on Low Carbon, Green Growth, which was 
announced by the Presidential committee) takes effect, we can‟t help taking the 
actions enforced by the Act. Although the law is not detailed, it can provide 
something of a basis.” (Interviewee No.34, a researcher working at government 
institute) 
 
The interviewee is in favour of the green growth agenda and support from the 
binding laws (the FALG). The reason seems to be more or less for personal or 
institutional benefits: thanks to the policy discourse on green growth, the 
interviewee receives funds more easily than before. There are more 
respondents (No.7, No.8, No.14, No.17, No.23, No.34, No.37, No.27, No.30, 
No.31, and No.28) who mention this element of increased funding opportunities 
for their organizations thanks to the green growth agenda:  
 
“Our institution, if possible, is trying to carry out green projects under the concept of 
green territory; focusing on a green theme, green transport, green buildings and 
green construction and many other green policies. […]. We should think about what 
is the policy agenda of the present government. That is green growth. Then, money 
will go to green projects we will give money to the policies of green growth. Funds 
will go there.” (Interviewee, No.17, a senior level government official). 
 
The interviewees (No.27 and No.32) indicate a belief in green growth which is 
very optimistic:  
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“The current government‟s, new slogan is green growth. The title of green growth is 
not only for the current government but will not be abandoned by the next 
government. Green growth has become a great issue. Then, this, climate change is 
not a case which can be closed although the government changes. Because 
phenomena (as a result of climate change) are happening, although the government 
changes, the agenda of green growth and climate change may be sustained” 
(Interviewee, No.27, a professor of a university) 
 
“As green growth is enforced by the President (of South Korea), we (the South 
Koreans) are dealing with it well. We should move fast and go ahead of the world 
(the person was talking about green technology development). What I just worry is 
that, we say too much “green growth, green growth”, and in spite of being good 
concept, the next government might hesitate to keep it. Maybe the term can be 
transformed into another word.” (No.32, a senior level researcher at a government-
funded institute) 
 
Overall, the interviewees are in favour of the government‟s key agenda, green 
growth and low carbon, because of the advantages it brings to their own 
projects or their institutions, rather than from a desire to see the practical 
implementation of climate change adaptation. They utilise the policy trend to 
enhance the performance of their institutional projects. The interviewees‟ 
statements do not necessarily indicate that they are satisfied with the 
government‟s approach to policy making, but they are in favour of a green 
growth agenda because it suits their own interests – which means more funding 
opportunities. 
 
6.3.2. Support from government  
 
The interviewees point to the new national regime as the reason for their 
satisfaction with the present state of climate change policies in South Korea. 
However the second reason reflects the typical political culture of 
authoritarianism and bureaucracy. This section starts with quotes from 
interviewees: 
 
“When it comes to the MB 5  government, green growth became a key 
governmental policy the whole for the whole.” (No.17, a senior level 
government official)  
 
                                                          
5
The Lee government (2008~2013) of South Korea is called the MB government, naming it 
after the initials of the President. 
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“As the President Lee took the office, climate change and green growth 
became two big policy items in our country. As the president is interested, they 
move very fast…and the local governments know the situation (the president is 
interested in climate change and green growth).” (Interviewee No.4, a senior 
level research working at government-funded institute) 
 
“We(the team) are going to report the progress to the President at the end of 
this month. When it is done, I don‟t know what he will say (about that). […]. Of 
course, the President‟s interest is very helpful (for us to work on climate change 
adaptation). […]. The problem is how he will concern himself with it. […]. Such 
policies (like climate change adaptation) cannot be done by our own will, but 
need the will of leaders. […]. So I am concerned about what the President 
might say.” (Interviewee No.26, a senior level researcher at KACCC)  
 
“Of course the concern of the President is very helpful (for working on climate 
change).” (Interviewee No.31, a senior level government official) 
 
“The presidential committee on Green Growth began to make a fire (meaning; 
makes it work well). […]. Our President stayed ahead of (the issues).” 
(Interviewee No.32, a senior level researcher working at government-funded 
institute)  
 
As the above quotations show, the interviewees seem to believe that the 
powerful leadership and top-down approach is working well in governing climate 
change. The national political agenda, as stated in the previous section, is 
generated by central government and the new presidential cabinet. Most 
interviewees claim that the hierarchical approach is, in practice, helping the 
progress of making policies related to climate change adaptation. With the 
encouragement of influential high level politicians, climate change policies are 
enabled to progress faster than they were under the previous government. 
Interviewees state that a top-down approach works in promoting adaptation 
policies in South Korea. Interviewees hold that in response to the interests of 
President Lee, policy makers in government offices should pay more attention 
to and work on green growth policies and show the evidence of progress. These 
remarks show their substantial support for the actions resulting from the 
President‟s leadership. Interviewees seem to believe that the rapid progress 
made by the current government with respect to climate change policies, is due 
to the President‟s concerns: 
 
“The present government has more interest in (climate change). The influence of the 
President acts very positively. It is a real positive driver. As the President has a 
great interest in it, there is a definite positive influence. […]. This has been made 
possible by the national policy agenda. ” (Interviewee No.26, a senior level 
researcher at KACCC) 
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Interviewees argue that promoting climate change policies would need 
governmental intervention and strong leadership. They add that orders from the 
central government and a top-down approach will help to speed up the progress 
of adaptation policies at local levels. One interviewee tells an anecdote of local 
government officials asking for help from central government to promote local 
level climate change policies: 
 
 “They (climate change policy makers in local governments) commonly request 
central government to tell the chief of local authorities to take actions in (climate 
change adaptation).”(Interviewee No.38, a government official) 
 
The story indicates that local governments are not reluctant to follow 
instructions from central government rather do local government officers need 
back-up from central government and/or relevant guidance. According to the 
interviewees who work in central government, local governments are willing to 
follow central government‟s command and control. The opinions of policy 
makers in central government can influence local governments, nudging them 
to perceive green growth, as well as climate change, as important political 
agenda items for local governments (Interviewee No.4, is a senior researcher 
working at government-funded institute and No.40, is a local actor). There are a 
few examples of local governments that have made climate change policies 
supported by central government: For example, JEJUSI-JEJUDO, SEOUL6 , 
INCEHON, and GANGWONDO have instigated pilot programmes with regard to 
climate change supported by the Ministry of Environment. These programmes 
are expected to be used as best practice or good examples for other local level 
strategies. And according to the statement of an interviewee (No.40, a local 
actor): there is an example of a local climate change policy initiated at the local 
level without central government input. The interviewee works at an 
organization funded by a local municipality. It is running programmes related to 
the reduction of greenhouse gas emission: educating citizens about how to 
reduce emissions at home and providing a class for businessmen to raise 
awareness about climate change risks.  
 
“The former mayor was very interested in climate change and mitigating climate 
change through reducing greenhouse gases. […]. So the municipal authority 
made an environmental foundation, which was suggested by him (the former 
                                                          
6
  Seoul city web page for Climate Change adaptation 
(http://cleanair.seoul.go.kr/inform.htm?method=climateAdaptation01).  
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major), and opened a public forum about the policy agenda and collected public 
opinions.” (Interviewee No.40, a local actor) 
 
Even in this instance where the initiative has been taken at the local level, the 
interviewee believes that it is the mayor‟s leaderships in the municipal authority 
that has helped to strengthen the drive to create local climate change policies 
namely mitigating policies. Although the programmes are not funded by central 
government, they are still funded by a local government and are controlled by 
the local authority.  
 
As seen in the responses of the interviewees, a top-down approach and the 
high-level politicians have a powerful influence on the practice of climate 
change policies in South Korea. The interviewees see this as strong leadership 
exercised in a good way. According to the interviewees, the people in charge of 
the delivery local policies want to retain command and control by central 
government. It seems that local actors take this situation as a fudged agenda 
which will change with the changes of central government, as this they have 
experienced this before. Sometimes they may even fully understand and 
support a new policy agenda but governments come and go as do their policies 
(A similar case study has been carried out in the USA (Hess 1998)). Therefore 
they tend to take a passive attitude and evade responsibility. In fact, such 
attitudes are also observed in the remarks of mainstreaming climate change 
adaptation into the existing policies. Mainstreaming is practically recommended 
by many scholars for practical effective delivery of adaptation policies (Juhola 
and Westerhoff 2011; Bele et al. 2011; McEvoy et al. 2008; Biesbroek et al. 
2010; Cimato and Mullan 2010; Lyytimaki; Carmin et al. 2009; Stringer et al. 
2010). However, sometimes this „mainstreaming‟ is misused, it becomes an 
excuse for not taking responsibility instead they simply change the terminology 
of a policy to make it fit into the frame of national policy agenda.   
 
“For the most part, by linking works relevant to climate change to climate change 
adaptation; then, if there is a deficiency, we should make up for it. Then it is not a 
big burden to the person (who is responsible for delivery of adaptation policies).” 
(Interviewee No.4, a senior researcher at government-funded institute) 
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As is the case with powerful leadership, another key driver of climate change 
policies in South Korea is pointed to as command-control by central government. 
When interviewees say central government, from the perspective of climate 
change adaptation, they sometimes mean the Presidential Committee on Green 
Growth. As discussed at Chapter 5 of this thesis, the committee is just an 
advisory organization, but most interviewees see the Committee as having the 
power and authority to command, because it is located at the President office. 
The interviewees do not voice any resistance to the involvement of the 
Presidential Committee without any resistance. 
 
By contrast, when interviewees are asked about the participation of private 
actors and their roles in making policy, they comment that public engagement is 
not common practice in the formulation of national policies in South Korea. The 
interviewees remark that the government should be in sole charge of national 
policy making. The interviewees (No.29, 26 & 28) take for granted the exclusion 
of private actors from policy decision making, arguing as follows:     
 
“Adaptation Measures (National Climate Change Adaptation Measures) is a national 
policy. So there were limits on the public engagement. When the measures are to 
take place, public opinion might be needed. […].”  (Interviewee No.29, a professor of 
a university) 
 
 “It (National Climate Change Adaptation Measures) was a government-led initiative. 
There were no civil actors but … small groups of experts advising the government, 
they could be part of civil actors.” (Interviewee No.26, a senior level researcher at 
KACCC& No.28, a researcher at KACCC) 
 
These interviewees state that local level adaptation policies may include 
stakeholders in the process of decision making, as if they also care about 
participatory governance. However, according to an interviewee (No.33, a 
researcher at a government-funded institute) who helps local governments to 
frame local climate change adaptation strategy, it is not possible for private 
actors to be invited to the decision-making process even at a local level. 
 
Interviewees express positive views towards the style of policy decision making: 
the government-led and top-down approach is generally seen as efficient in 
terms of speeding up climate change adaptation in South Korea. One of the 
interviewee points to the weak capacity of local actors as the reason for 
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command by central government as well as the complexity and uncertainty of 
the degree and location of climate change impacts. 
 
6.3.3. Extreme weather events as focusing events 
 
Interviewees remark that extreme weather events can raise government‟s 
awareness of climate change and the need to adaptation to it. They argue that 
ironically, frequent severe weather events accompanying by a large amount of 
damage are assumed to help policy makers and experts to pay attention to risks 
posed by climate change. Interviewees (No.16 and No.31) claim that there is a 
positive relationship between climate change risks and raising awareness: 
 
 “That‟s natural. It (climate change) is really happening.” […] “Extreme weather 
events used to be an extraordinary incident, but they have become usual events. 
There are many reasons we need to adapt to the change as soon as possible…” 
(Interviewee No.16, a senior level researcher working at government-funded 
institute) 
 
“The department named green future strategy was set-up, the agenda of green 
growth is enforced and extreme weather events become frequent. As was the case 
last year, after the cabbage shock (cabbage farming was impacted by heavy rain 
and a strong typhoon, and the cabbage retail price peaked), people (policy makers) 
became interested in adaptation (to climate change).”(Interviewee No.31, a senior 
level government official) 
 
 “People will change (their behaviours) when they experience something caused by 
climate change in their daily lives. That‟s the way people come to feel the urgency; 
the media will report it and then the public will respond to it.”(Interviewee No.20, a 
researcher working at a government-funded institute) 
 
 “Two big landslides and major power outages seemed to work out positively in our 
country (South Korea). Owing to these big events, climate change adaptation 
became a national issue. It is said that adaptation is essential.” (Interviewee No.28, 
a researcher at KACCC) 
 
These express very optimistic views regarding the way in which policy making 
proceeds: for instance, the extreme weather events and damage caused by 
these events drew the attention of the mass media, which lead to a public 
consensus on the dangers of climate change. They refer to an example of 
substantial action when there was a much damage caused by an unexpected 
flash flood. During a Korean holiday in September 2010, South Korea had 
unexpected heavy rain. About 10,000 people were victims of flash floods at that 
time. These were sparked by an episode of the heaviest rain in the 102 years 
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since Korea began collecting meteorological data (Park 2010b). The primary 
reason for the flash floods was extremely heavy rain which overstretched the 
capacity of the sewage pipelines. However, an increase in the capacity of the 
pipelines had been proposed by experts, but the priority of the Seoul municipal 
administration was not that of adapting to climate change by increasing pipeline 
capacity (Kang 2010). An interviewee (No.4) takes, as an example, this big 
flash flood event in Seoul City commenting on how it made policy makers work 
very quickly: 
 
 “Until the event (flash flood) happened and damage occurred, nobody said that 
the sewage systems should be replaced. […]. The heavy rain came down all over 
the area of Seoul during a big national holiday. The rain water couldn‟t get out of 
the sewage pipelines and caused a big flash flood. That‟s it. Until it really does 
happen and big damage is incurred, no one says that it is time to change the 
sewage systems. So the relevant ministries changed relevant regulations and 
planned to expand the pipeline capacity” (Interviewee No.4, a senior level 
researcher working at a government-funded institute).   
 
The interviewee explains how climate disasters could change the perceptions of 
people and cause policy makers to take action. That event made the relevant 
civil servants respond to the damage and change the rules, for example, for 
expanding the capacity of sewage systems, the construction of rain water 
treatments facilities, and placing restrictions on urbanization in flood prone 
areas (Kang 2010; Hong 2010). However, the interviewee points out that the 
through extreme weather events might catch the attention of the public and 
policy makers temporarily and in the short-term, they do not guarantee that this 
would result in real practical change in the system of policy making. The 
extreme weather events do not always work as focusing events that will result in 
the precautionary actions required to cope with climate change being 
undertaken.  
 
 “They know it was the result of extreme weather. …but that…is… if an accident or 
disaster occurs, budgetary allocations are made, but gradually the priority changes 
again. […]. However, there are some worries about such trends. Even though 
people (policy makers) perceive the risk posed by climate change, it does not lead 
them to formulate policies to respond to climate change.” (Interviewee No.20, a 
researcher working at a government-funded institute) 
 
The impact on policy makers and people in general may be to trigger knee-jerk 
reactions to the extreme weather events which may raise awareness of 
dangerous climate change temporarily and spontaneously. However this 
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awareness becomes blurred as time passes and people will forget the 
seriousness of climate change risks. Thus extreme weather events are not 
necessarily as strong trigger (a focusing event) to the making to making of 
precautionary adaptation strategies as one might expect.    
 
I have explored the reasons why the interviewees feel satisfied with current 
progress of climate change adaptation in South Korea. In summary, the 
interviewees argue that the national green growth agenda made by high level 
politicians; a top-down approach to decision making, and powerful command by 
government, high level politician‟s forceful influence; and extreme weather 
events, are positive drivers of climate change adaptation in South Korea. But 
there are some missing points which have been overlooked in their arguments.  
 
I have examined why interviewees are complacent about the processes and the 
outcome of policy making related to climate change. Most interviewees are 
working in organizations and doing research about climate change. They are 
not necessarily satisfied with the progress of adaptation actions but rather with 
increased funding opportunities on offer when the theme of a green growth and 
low carbon agenda is cited. They are also complacent about efficient ways of 
making policies resulting from a top-down approach and strong pressure from 
central government.   
 
 
6.4. Summary 
 
This chapter has examined the interviewees‟ opinions regarding what would 
determine successful adaptations and the reasons for their being complacent 
about the present status of climate change policies in South Korea. They 
generally agree that, in South Korea, effective drivers of progress in adaptation 
policies (from the perspective of climate change) mostly depend on command 
and control by central government and a government-led and hierarchical 
approach to climate change adaptation:  they view this in a positive light. Table 
16 summarises the factors which are working positively towards climate change 
adaptation as pointed out by the interviewees.  
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Table 16: Factors and Drivers for Successful Climate Change Adaptation (based on 
response of the interviewees) 
Interview topic Summary of the responses 
Public perception  
Green Growth and Low Carbon paradigm 
and global discourse 
Key policy agendas of the present 
government 
  
Influence of high level politicians The perception of that President and the 
leaders of local authorities  place great 
importance on climate policies and the 
seriousness of risks posed by climate 
change  
Command and control by central 
government 
A hierarchical approach works well in 
terms of  speeding up the processes 
Extreme weather events Frequent natural disasters caused by 
extreme weather events 
 
Interviewees point out that several conditions are needed for adaptation to 
climate change to be successful: heightened public perception about the reality 
of climate change; building institutional capacity and prioritising climate change 
adaptation policy. An optimistic view of the process of making policy is 
entertained as people perceive climate change as a danger and this influences 
public opinion, and then policy makers take account of these opinions and make 
policies. Some of the interviewees refer to this as an ideal way to make climate 
change adaptation policies which, they state, is not yet happening in South 
Korea. Building institutional capacity is the second precondition pointed out by 
the interviewees. They assert that effective implementation of adaptation policy 
could be secured if sufficient financial resources were invested in appropriate 
organizational structures. In addition, scientific data and the assessment of 
vulnerability are also stated as further requirements for making the practice of 
adaptation policies efficient. Within the limitations imposed by the availability of 
resources, decision-makers choose what they deem to be the most important 
issue and allocate resources accordingly. Therefore, it is said to be essential to 
place a high priority on adaptation actions if these adaptations are to be 
delivered.  
 
Interviewees state that the progress of present adaptation resulted from: (1) The 
new national paradigm, that is, low carbon and green growth, this reflects timely 
global trends; (2) The influence of high level politicians, which could be reflected 
in strong leadership; (3) Command and control of central government; and (4) 
Extreme weather events. After a new national paradigm which is to achieve low 
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carbon and green growth, was announced in August 2008, the government 
created a legal basis for implementing this paradigm and relevant policies. The 
National Climate Change Adaptation Measures (NCCAM) is one of the policies 
which should be made in accordance with the binding laws (the FALG). Some 
interviewees have argued that high profile political involvement; the command 
and control of central government; the frequent extreme weather events 
accompanied by heavy damage in the urban areas, have helped to draw 
attention to policy makers and make them  take actions by making adaptation 
policies. Therefore, they have argued, there is little objection to the top-down 
approach. In addition, they have argued that climate change adaptation in 
South Korea is the preserve of central government and there is no special need 
to invite actors from the private sector, especially non-experts, into the national 
policy making process. Some of interviewees are very complacent about the 
current status of climate change adaptation policies in terms of the speed with 
which progress is being made. They have no objection to the process, which 
they see as following the usual lines of policy making processes in South Korea. 
They believe that central government has established the right direction for the 
policies and that climate change adaptation will be successfully delivered in the 
right places. The true reasons why some of the interviewees are complacent or 
apathetic about the situation of climate change adaptation in South Korea will 
be discussed in Chapter 7. 
 
Currently South Korean climate change and adaptation to it, has been promoted 
as one of the major items of the government‟s political agenda. However, 
interviewees are worried about any change in the structure after the 2012 
election7 and after a change of government; this would bring changes to the 
political agenda and new institutional schemes, and some of policy agendas 
might be discarded. The interviewees, on the other hand, expect that though the 
next government might not embrace the green growth agenda as a key element 
of their political agenda, as climate change and the risks posed by it will 
continue or become aggravated, the next government is unlikely to abandon the 
climate change agenda. Interviewees seem to be optimistic about the future of 
climate change policies saying that the next government will keep climate 
                                                          
7
 In December 2012, South Korea had a presidential election.  
122 
 
change as one of the top priorities of its political agenda, because the risks 
posed by climate change will continue, and the damage caused by extreme 
weather events will increase. Some of the interviewees point to the example of 
the sustainability agenda in the previous government: as governments change, 
only the title of policies change, the core content of policies is sustained.  
 
This chapter, using the opinions of the interviewees as a basis for its arguments, 
explored why the interviewees are complacent about the current status of 
climate change policies and what they consider to be the preconditions for 
successful adaptation in South Korea. The interviewees take it for granted that it 
must be state-led, top-down and that it excludes private actors from the process 
of creating national adaptation policies. The model of the state establishing pre-
determined policy boundaries is generally accepted by the interviewees. Such a 
governmental approach rather than a governance approach to climate change 
adaptation is accepted as an integral part of the policy culture in South Korea.  
 
The next chapter (Chapter 7) will focus on the negative responses regarding the 
process of decision making about the national climate change adaptation 
policies and their observations regarding the political attitudes expressed in the 
process. 
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Chapter 7. Challenges for climate change governance 
in South Korea 
 
“Understanding the wider implication of adaptation measures requires that many 
important normative and ethical issues be discussed and debated (Adger et al. 2009b, 
p.9)” 
 
 
7.1. Introduction 
 
 
Chapter 6 has discussed why some of the interviewees were complacent about 
aspects of the decision-making process in the context of the political culture and 
from the perspective of a governance approach to climate change adaptation. 
Following on from Chapter 6, Chapter 7 also undertakes a discussion and 
analysis of the responses of the interviewees. In contrast to Chapter 6, Chapter 
7 focuses on the points the interviewees are dissatisfied with regarding the 
current process of climate change adaptation, and aims to identify the barriers 
and challenges that negatively influence adaptation policies in the context of the 
political culture. Sub-divisions within this chapter are grouped under four major 
categories: constraints resulting from the institutional culture; the policy making 
culture; resource constraints; and cognitive constraints. The first theme of 
institutional constraints observed in adaptation governance in South Korea is 
dealt with under the three headings: issues of a lack of horizontal cooperation; 
constraints of an intra-institutional and administrative culture caused by frequent 
changes of job positions in the different governments is also divided into human 
resource constraint and financial constraints; constraints posed by social 
relationships between government and agents, and socio-culture prejudice 
regarding private actors; constraints posed by the policy making culture, (these 
are discussed using three themes of a top-down approach, bureaucracy and 
political populism) and lastly some possible constraints raised by interviewees 
regarding local level of climate change adaptation. Under these themes, 
Chapter 7 seeks to answer of two questions: why do interviewees think of the 
constraints as challenges to adaptation to climate change? And how do the 
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constraints challenge a governance approach to the delivery of adaptation 
policies in South Korea? 
 
Both Chapters 6 and 7 provide empirical information about the knowledge of 
political culture expressed as it impinges on progress in climate change 
adaptation and the challenges to a governance approach in South Korea. 
These two chapters identify practical and empirical information about the status 
of South Korean climate change governance by interviewing the members of 
the advisory board who participated in making national climate change 
adaptation policies in South Korea.  
 
7.2. The constraints posed by institutional culture 
      
The first constraint pointed out is by the institutional arrangement for governing 
climate change set up by the central government, which is called institutional 
constraints. The institutional constraints include the problems raised in intra and 
inter-governmental institutions pertaining to the process of climate change 
adaptation policies. The core of institutional constraint is related to the Ministry 
of Environment which is acting as the main organization for steering climate 
change adaption in central government. The role of the Ministry has been 
determined by the Presidential Committee on Green Growth (the details of this 
committee are described in Chapter 5 of this thesis) for the purpose of 
overseeing and managing the whole process of formulating and implementing 
national climate change adaptation policies in South Korea. As argued by 
Hunters et al. (2012) the institutional arrangements in three countries; the 
Netherlands, Australia and South Africa, are not sufficiently robust to manage 
new challenges caused by climate change (Huntjens et al. 2012), South Korea 
also has issues regarding institutional arrangements for responding to climate 
change adaptation. The Ministry of Environment of South Korea is required to 
steer the overall progress of national climate change adaptation policies. 
However, interviewees complain that the Ministry of Environment, as the 
managing agency for adaptation policies, does not have sufficient capacity to 
handle the agenda properly. This perception creates problems in horizontal 
cooperation between interdepartmental organisations. The detail of weak 
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horizontal and interdepartmental cooperation will be discussed in the following 
section. 
 
Another institutional challenge is posed by frequent changes of job assignment 
inside the institutions, and this can reduce the efficiency of intra-institutional 
performances and give rise to one of the major constraints to the delivery of 
adaptation policies. I will now discuss these challenges in more detail. 
 
7.2.1. Lack of horizontal cooperation  
 
According to Ordinance Article 38 of the Framework Act on Low carbon, Green 
growth (FALG), the minister of the Ministry of Environment of South Korea was 
required to create a climate change adaptation strategy in consultation with 
other ministers in central government within six month the binding law being 
enacted. As specified by the Article of the same law, the Ministry of 
Environment became the steering institution for climate change adaptations, 
while mitigation of impacts created by climate change is mainly controlled by the 
Ministry of Knowledge, and Economy. These two ministries have long history of 
rivalry and conflicts in the South Korean administration (Yu and Yoon 2006; 
Park and Jeong 2004; Joo and Hong 2001). Moreover, conflicts between the 
Ministry of Environment and the Ministry of Knowledge, and Economy have 
become intense over issues related to climate change policies which may 
hamper the effectiveness of delivery of climate change adaptation policies. 
Sometimes they are carrying out duplicating and overlapping policies; for 
example similar policies related to carbon emission reductions and emission 
trading systems (Kim 2012). The Ministry of Knowledge and Economy argues 
that policies regulating carbon emission reductions, especially from the 
industrial sector, should be under its control for the reason that most of the 
regulation of the general industrial sector is already under its management; for 
example, regulations pertaining to the industrial and energy sector in South 
Korea. However, the Ministry of Environment refutes this argument by claiming 
that carbon emission has to be treated as one of pollution, consequently the 
task of emission reduction belongs to the Ministry of Environment. Regulating 
carbon emissions is still an on-going issue generating conflict between the two 
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Ministries regarding in South Korea (Kim 2009; Kim 2012; Yoon 2009a; Yoon 
2009b). However, the Ministry of Environment wants to take the leading role 
with regard to climate change adaptation and this is supported by the 
Presidential Committee on Green Growth. The role designated to the Ministry of 
Environment is challenged. Other governmental organizations are of the opinion 
that the Ministry of Environment lacks the necessary capacity; this in-fighting is 
hindering interdepartmental cooperation.  
 
Owing to this phrase „the minister of the Ministry of Environment for South 
Korea‟, interviewees from other Ministries perceive the NCCAM as a policy that 
belongs to only the Ministry of Environment. Interviewees from non-MOE argue 
that they have formulated their own policies to cope with climate change. The 
following opinions show examples of how the interviewees perceive the 
NCCAM and the steering ministry: 
 
 “This (National Climate Change Adaptation Measures) is not a law, but just a 
strategy with no compulsory provisions. It is an assemblage of many existing 
projects. If special budgets are allocated to it, we will get involved in the delivery (of 
the Measures) very eagerly. Without giving money, they order us to submit reports. 
People don‟t like it. If the Ministry of Environment gives something, then...These 
(national adaptation measures) just increase workloads. Without this extra burden 
we have been working well. Why does the Ministry of Environment try to control 
institutes and command them to submit reports, and then evaluate our work?  We 
don‟t need to hear such judgments (from the Ministry of Environment). We have to 
submit assessment reports regarding everything (relevant to climate change 
adaptation) that we have done. That‟s why people don‟t like it. Look at them (the 
National Climate Change Adaptation Measures). There are lots of projects. 
Regardless of the national adaptation measures, we have been doing well. My 
institute also conducts many projects regarding climate change. We have some (of 
our own) funding for them. That is the current situation. Working with the 
government is always like that.” (Interviewee No.28, a senior research working at a 
government institute) 
 
“Their (the attendees at the meeting) opinions are not representative of their 
ministries. As a matter of fact, at least people of director level should attend the 
meetings, and I think that the Office of the Prime Minister should have hosted the 
meeting. It seems that adaptation policy is not treated that seriously.” (Interviewee 
No.28, a researcher at KACCC) 
 
“Even for me the document is so immature… [..]. When we make our strategy, we 
have our own expert group.”(Interviewee No.31, a senior level government official) 
 
Thus other ministries consider that the Ministry of Environment does not have 
sufficient human resources as a steering institute for climate change adaptation. 
Although the Ministry of Environment collaborates with the Korea Adaptation 
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Centre for Climate Change and the National Institute for Environment Research 
which should provide technical and profession advice for the Ministry of 
Environment, many interviewees from other departments express the fact that 
they have an uneasy relationships with the Ministry of Environment, and doubt 
the capacity of the Ministry of Environment commenting that national adaptation 
policies should not be operated by one weak ministry. One of the interviewees 
(Interviewee No.31) comments as follows: 
 
 “This (climate change adaptation) is not a work that can be performed by only one 
ministry. This is connected to all sectors of our country. […]. It can‟t be practiced by 
only one ministry. If this were so, then the ministry would be an omnipotent ministry, 
but there is no such ministry.” (Interviewee No.31, a senior government official) 
 
According to an interviewee (No.38, a government official), the Ministry of 
Environment has difficulty working with other departments. For example, when 
the Ministry of Environment requests data or reports about climate change 
adaptation from the other institutions, they are reluctant to respond to the 
requests complaining that the Ministry of Environment (MOE) imposes on the 
giving them unnecessary work. Many interviewees from the organization 
outside the Ministry of Environment think of the role of the Ministry of 
Environment as just interdepartmental interference. In fact the role of the 
Ministry is supposed to become a coordinator for the integrated and effective 
delivery of national adaptation policies. However, the irksomeness and 
resentfulness of the relationship and firmly held belief regarding the inadequacy 
of the Ministry of Environment makes interdepartmental cooperation difficult: the 
Ministry of Environment is generally seen as a powerless ministry in the South 
Korean governmental structure. 
 
Two interviewees (Interviewee No.29 & 33) who work in organizations affiliated 
to other ministries complain about the way they have to work with the Ministry of 
Environment and describe how they usually respond to the Ministry‟s requests 
regarding information about adaptation policies. These interviewees claim that 
the Ministry of Environment is meddling in their work.  
 
 “They (Ministry of Environment) always only request data (without rewarding). But 
we do not need to respond to their requests. We may provide some (of the data), 
but we do not need to provide everything.”(Interviewee No. 29, a university 
professor) 
128 
 
 
 “We have our own budget and projects. The only role of the Ministry of 
Environment is just using a „stapler‟. That is just clipping reports with a stapler. Don‟t 
you think so? But we do everything: to evaluate the projects and everything. We can 
decide what we include or exclude, the Ministry of Environment can‟t. That‟s it. Such 
a role can be done by any ministry; it doesn‟t need to be the Ministry of 
Environment.” (Interviewee No.34, a researcher working a government institute) 
 
The interviewees are sceptical about its role for the reason that they consider 
the Ministry of Environment does is not a key player but it just plunders other‟s 
achievements without paying anything. These negative attitudes and 
sectionalism between institutions make horizontal and interdepartmental 
cooperation difficult and challenges to the successful delivery of the NCCAM. 
The attitudes and perception regarding the NCCAM are observed differently 
between organizations whether they are affiliated to the Ministry of Environment 
or to other ministries. Interviewees from institutes funded by the Ministry of 
Environment recognise the NCCAM as a national climate change adaptation 
policy for in which all the governmental ministries should share equal and 
respective responsibility. Interviewees from non-Ministry of Environment 
institutions claim that they perceive the NCCAM as one of the projects of the 
Ministry of Environment, so they accord it a low priority on. Lack of inter-
ministerial cooperation will adversely influence the delivery of the national 
adaptation policies and inefficient administrative management by creating 
wasteful overlaps in the work of some policies among departments.  
 
“The framework of the NCCAM was made by the Ministry of 
Environment…[…].There are a few inter-ministerial collisions…they find it a bit 
difficult to cooperate.”(Interviewee No.38, a government official) 
 
 “As this (the process of making adaptation policies) goes so fast and prematurely, 
there are some conflicts among departments even in the same ministry. […]… Each 
sector acts as an individual entity; there should be inter-ministerial connections, but 
there is no cooperation…” (Interviewee No.33, a researcher working at a 
government-funded institute) 
 
The responses reveal problems and limitations in the current management of 
national climate change adaptation. Recognizing the difficulty of horizontal 
cooperation, an interviewee reveals a plan that the Ministry of Environment will 
build interdepartmental networks. 
 
“These are the same challenges we are facing which I talked about; we have 
difficulty collecting information about (adaptation) policies dispersed in different 
ministries. […]. We are concerned that it is not anybody‟s job to collect information; 
it is not an easy job but it is necessary.” (Interviewee No.38, a government official) 
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Some interviewees argue that each governmental ministry has its own strategy 
to cope with climate change; therefore they do not understand why and for what 
this National Climate Change Adaptation Measures (NCCAM) is needed. These 
attitudes show that the strong familism rooted in Confucianism exists in 
governmental departments (details of this culture have been discussed at 
Chapter 3 of this thesis) so that they place high priority on their own ministerial 
tasks. This hampers cooperative work for effective implementation of climate 
change adaptation policies. Another possible reason for such poor cooperation 
results from the decision making methods adopted for creating national climate 
change adaptations; they are initiated by high level politicians and not by 
collective decisions of participants. If there are serious conflicts among 
governmental organizations during the process of policy making, the outcomes 
of policies can become unsuccessful.   
 
7.2.2. Constraints resulting from the intra-institutional and 
administrative culture  
 
As discussed in the previous section, lack of interdepartmental cooperation and 
mistrust in the capacity of the coordinating department appear to become 
barriers to effective delivery of adaptation policies in South Korea. In addition to 
interdepartmental issues, this section discusses the constraints within 
institutions under current administrative structures. This is a further issue raised 
by interviewees. These are human resource constraints and financial resource 
limitations. The constraints posed by resource limitation are one of the 
commonest and most frequently observed issues in climate change adaptation, 
not only in South Korea. The question to be addressed is how these constraints 
pointed out by interviewees are influencing the delivery of adaptation policies.  
 
7.2.2.1. Human resource constraints 
 
In addition to a lack of horizontal cooperation caused partly by tensions 
between ministries and partly by mistrust in the capacity of the steering 
department, act as inter-institutional constraints for governing climate change 
adaptation, a further constraint is identified by the interviewees. They complain 
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about frequent changes of job positions and tasks-given in their institutions, 
which are attributed to an intra-institutional and long-standing administrative 
culture. Some interviewees argue that this administrative culture makes their 
work fragmented and slows down the progress of implementing policies. 
Interviewees add that assignment changes occur frequently at both central 
government and local government levels. The rearrangements of job positions 
occur more frequently when they are dealing with climate change policies. 
Therefore, some interviewees complain that they sometimes repeat the same 
things over again. 
 
There is another constraint posed by allegiant political culture. Central and local 
governments should create a new department which specifically takes charge of 
green growth in accordance with the Framework Acts on Low carbon, Green 
Growth (FALG). This has not happened as a result some interviewees complain 
that with limited human resources, they are expected to do additional work, they 
find this disconcerting: 
 
 “That (the problem) is human resource, professional people…Not everyone can 
deal with climate change policies.” (Interviewee No.33, a researcher working at a 
government-funded institute) 
 
Therefore, for the most part, existing departments who handle environmental 
issues take on responsibilities additional to their already overloaded tasks. One 
interviewee expresses how local civil servants perceive climate change 
adaptation: 
 
 “Street level civil servants should recognize the importance of the work and, how 
adaptation policies relate to other existing tasks. But they think of it as troublesome 
and extra works.” (Interviewee No.20, a researcher working at a government-funded 
institute) 
 
“We invited officers in charge at local governments and held workshops. But the 
managers repeatedly changed. […].  Newcomers for the position do not understand 
why they should do the jobs (related to climate change adaptation). So, I had to 
explain again.” (Interviewee No.33, a researcher working at a government-funded 
institute) 
 
I personally have experienced frequent change of job assignments in a 
government department. During the period that the interviews were held, the 
key handler of the NCCAM has changed. The person interviewed in October 
2010 was dispatched from another government institution in order to provide 
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professional advice in the making of the national climate change adaptation 
master plan. When I visited the department one year later in 2011, the person-
in-charge had changed. One interviewee (No.39, a researcher at KACCC) 
cynically comments about the situation, stating that climate change adaptation 
is not perceived as urgent or a top priority, hence even the department in 
charge is not fully supported by the ministry itself. As a result, the interviewee 
adds, climate change adaptation policies are not welcomed by any government 
workers.  
 
 7.2.2.2 Financial constraints  
 
Along with human resources, financial provision is commonly pointed out as a 
constraint hampering successful delivery of climate change adaptation policies. 
What must be taken into account is the fact that this remark must be set against 
the statements made of increases in funding at research institutions. It is 
apparent that some see work on climate change as an opportunity, while others 
deem it to be an onerous task. Interviewees from the government sector 
complain that they do not have enough money for making adaptation policies 
and then implementing the policies.  
 
 “Even though we make good plans, we can‟t do anything without a budget or a 
managing team.” (Interviewee No.36, a senior level government official) 
 
 “Then the government has to give separate budgets to cope with climate change. 
But it is not like that. We have to do it (implementing adaptation within our existing 
budget) for ourselves.”(Interviewee No.30, a senior level researcher working at 
government institute) 
 
Under these circumstances, interviewees argue, government workers should 
allocate the existing budget to such additional policies as climate change 
adaptation. In order to avoid budget shortages government workers usually try 
to select policies from existing policies which are relevant to climate change 
instead of initiating new policies. The complaints are as follows: 
 
“The government does not provide a budget (for adaptation). That‟s the problem. 
Separate budgets are not allocated. We cannot invest in (projects relevant to 
climate change adaptation). We only had to change directions under the existing 
budget.”(Interviewee No.21, a senior level researcher working at a government 
institute) 
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Chapter 6 of this thesis pointed out the positive effect of the green growth and 
low carbon political agenda in providing funds for certain organizations. 
However, the responses of some interviewees were to reverse the argument; 
they state that as a result of this political agenda, the street level civil servants 
are under the pressure of extra duties imposed because of limited financial 
resources. Therefore, when they have to choose policy options when their 
budgets are restricted, they choose their organizational key agenda items 
before climate change adaptation, or amend the title of their policies fitting it to 
the category of adaptation measures.  
 
“If we have lots of money, then we can invest in them. But in the order of policy 
priority, climate change adaptation always goes last. With limited resources, the 
funding priority goes to other areas. […]. Our ministry recognises climate change as 
just a factor influencing policies. We should consider diverse variables and choose 
a few policies among them. Although it (climate change) is an important policy 
agenda in the present government, it is used as just one of the factors. Climate 
change is considered in the context of securing a supply of water (for example). At 
least this is true for our ministry. But it may be different for the Ministry of 
Environment. The Ministry of Environment may recognize it (climate change) as a 
key policy agenda.” (Interviewee No.17, a senior level of government official) 
 
The interviewee states that each of the other institutions has its own key 
agendas, and these are seen from their own perspective. The interviewees 
working for other ministries other than the Ministry of Environment regard 
climate change or green growth as a short-term popular theme in the present 
policy discourse. Climate change along with green growth is perceived as a 
„trendy policy agenda‟ which may disappear from new agenda of any future 
government just as the previous „sustainable development‟ disappeared under 
the present government. Therefore, under the pressure of financial limitations, 
interviewees working in government have to choose their own department‟s 
agenda before someone else‟s policies. Their attitudes towards the new policy 
agenda reflect political inertia: when a new government comes, a new political 
agenda appears and when it goes, the agenda will go too. Such attitudes can 
influence decisions regarding policy priorities.  
 
Some reports published by government-funded or government organizations 
announced that the South Korean government had begun to concern itself with 
climate change adaptation and was making it a higher priority than had been 
the case in the past. However, the street level officers who are actually handling 
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climate change seem to accord it a low priority. Interviewees point out that 
giving a high priority to climate change adaptation is helpful for successful 
delivery of adaptation policies. However, many interviewees recognise the 
NCCAM as only one of the projects managed by the Ministry of Environment 
and it is insufficiently funded. This reality encourages them to choose their own 
departmental agenda first, although they may perceive that climate change 
adaptation is essential.  
 
It does, therefore seem doubtful that the progress which interviewees comment 
on as being rapid when central government is in control, can lead to the 
successful delivery of adaptation policies. As the responses made by 
interviewees points out the frequent changes of job positions can cause 
disconnects which, in turn, lead to ineffective policy implementation (many 
interviewees complain of this). It is argued that along with limited human 
resources financial pressures also result in adaptation measures being given a 
low priority. Furthermore, such a situation could be a reason for a decrease in a 
sense of responsibility and accountability for jobs which they undertake. This is 
often pointed out as a flaw in governance approach, but the same phenomena 
are observed in top-down approach in South Korea. By analysing the interviews 
I have found that policy making culture, administrative culture and familism 
inside the government departments impinge on the process of climate change 
adaptation in South Korea. 
 
7.3. Constraints imposed by social relationships  
 
I have discussed the constraints observed among institutions of horizontal and 
vertical relationships. In this section I focus on the special relationships between 
government and private actors. Some of the advisory board members have 
special relationships with government even while they act as board members 
for making the NCCAM. Generally speaking, it is argued that public participation 
is helpful to the successful delivery of adaptation polices. The general view of 
stakeholders and NGOs may influence multiple actors‟ involvement in climate 
change adaptation. What are the norms regarding public or civil society groups 
in South Korea? This question is examined using interviewees‟ responses. 
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7.3.1. The relationship between government and agents  
 
The South Korean government uses institutions, or groups of experts selected 
from universities or research institutions, for the purpose of collecting 
information and advice, and establishing task-force teams or committees. Some 
of the board members are selected from non-governmental institutions, for 
instance private university, but they have a limited role in the decision-making 
for policies owing to the special relationships formed between government and 
the agents. In Korean culture, the relationship is so-called a „GAP-EUL‟ 
relationship. In this relationship, „GAP‟ (usually government side) has power 
over „EUL‟ (usually agent or scholars who carry out projects funded by 
government or government-funded organizations). Under this relationship, EUL 
try not to disturb GAP‟s feelings and tend to obey commands from it (the 
government‟s order and command). It is not easy for EUL to reject or stand 
against GAP‟s decisions. A similar unequal relationship may exist inside 
committees and projects-funded by government. As in the case of the NCCAM, 
the advisory board members are selected from the experts who have performed 
government projects and they are appointed by governments, they are very 
likely to be allocated government-funded projects in the future. Therefore, when 
the government has already decided a certain direction for its policies, the 
invited scholars or researchers tend to follow the direction determined by the 
government. The special relationship with the government negatively influences 
expression thinking along the line of other policy options. Therefore, it is strictly 
true that the advisory board members represent public opinion on matter about 
which they are making policies (Ministry of Environment 2010).  
 
The two arguments below show such a relationship. An interviewee (No.15) 
states that creating a coping strategy in the water sector was initiated by the 
increased public concern about the seriousness of changes in water supply:  
 
“There are many cases of extreme weather events. Therefore policy makers 
and the general public [also] become aware of climate change increase, and 
they are concerned about how water shortages or flood events would be 
impacted more by climate change in the future. So we (the public in South 
Korea) thought that we need to adapt to the change and encourage policy 
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makers to act”. (Interviewee No.15, a senior level of researcher, government-
funded institute) 
 
When the interviewee‟s statement of „encourage policy makers to act‟ was 
accidently given to a government official who was in a position of „GAP‟ with 
respect to the interviewee (No.15), I heard a very different story which 
conflicts with the statement.  
 
“ if we see the case, that is the procedural issue. When we talk about the case 
of climate change coping strategy (for water sector), the first task is to make 
decision in the department of water resource (in Ministry of central 
government). Their priority (policy priority) is not climate change adaptation, 
but to secure management of water resource. In order to achieve the goal of 
policy, if we need a research, we make a contract with engineers for the 
delivery of policies. The work process is not the other way: a researcher 
suggests a policy agenda to the policy maker. […] The engineers at the 
institutes are not a commander, but we (or the department of a ministry).” 
(Interviewee No.17, a senior level of government official)  
 
The interviewee (No.17) comments that engineers who work at 
government-funded institutes are only contract workers who should work 
on the instructions of the government. When asked how recommendations 
made by experts in the institutions are prioritized and policies are chosen, 
one interviewee (No.17, a senior level government official) answers in an 
unpleasant voice, that the researchers do not order policy makers to make 
policies, on the contrary policy makers request researchers to perform 
certain types of research which the government perceives as  needful. 
Owing to this policy culture, the participation of experts in making policies 
is inclined to become pro forma. 
 
Interviewees who are policy makers working in central government among 
the interviewees even doubt the ability of experts on the advisory boards. 
Their concerns are, for example, that sometimes researchers tend to get 
involved in so much technical detail that they fail to consider the 
practicability of their policies. Some of interviewees comment that experts 
on the board need to be controlled by the policy makers setting the 
boundaries within the experts must work unless it is established that they 
have to go beyond the scope of the policies. Regarding the role of in the 
advisory board, some interviewee plainly state that they are simply 
commentators on the documents and should not be suggesting policy 
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directions (comments by Interviewee No.5, a professor at a university;  
No.30, a senior level researcher working at a government institute; and  
No.35, a senior level researcher working at a government-funded institute). 
 
“We (Experts) gave our opinions to the Korea Environment Institute or Korea 
Adaptation Center for Climate Change, and then authored the Adaptation 
Measures. I am commenting only on the contents.” (Interviewee No. 35, a 
senior level researcher working at government-funded institute) 
 
When central government makes decisions on a policy agenda, it requests 
professional and technical opinions from the experts who work at the 
government funded institutions or universities in order to collect more 
diverse ideas. As discussed, cognitive inertia in both experts and 
government challenges the instrument of a type of participatory 
governance. However the experts‟ opinions should take into account the 
limitations of governmental budgets and working practice. 
 
Some interviewees argue that knowledge and concrete data about impacts and 
potential risks are very critical for making practical strategies to cope with 
climate change. Interviewees claim that they are not happy with an 
inappropriate process of making adaptation policies which insists that before a 
basic framework is fully prepared the administrative officers have taken 
command of the policies making.  
 
“Basically if impact assessments and relevant data are sufficiently completed, then 
the policy goals could be quantified… many things are postponed and reversed.” 
(Interviewee No.28, a researcher at KACCC) 
 
 “Impact assessment is required. […]. We should invest more in research.” 
(Interviewee No. 8, a senior level researcher working at a government-funded 
institute) 
 
 “Therefore vulnerability assessment and cost benefit assessment should be done 
correctly in order to decide priorities. Don‟t you think so? As you see (at NCCCAM), 
the scope of adaptation is very broad and diverse because VA (vulnerability 
assessment) has not been done beforehand.” (Interviewee No. 5, a university 
professor) 
 
“(Especially) the local governments have very limited data about what impact will be 
posed and which sectors will be vulnerable to climate change. It is said that 
participatory methods can be used in such situations. But it is impossible for the 
metropolitan councils to make use of participatory methods. […]. But we have 
limited data (about vulnerability and impact) and have to set up adaptation policies. 
So we try to make a strategy with limited information and later amend it. 
(Interviewee No.33, a researcher working at a government-funded institute) 
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Interviewees, mostly those who are researchers think it rational that at the 
outset of creating the national climate change adaptation measures, the 
government should spend more money on collecting scientific data and making 
those technical advances which will be very useful to those involved in creating 
adaptation policies. On the other hand, the policy makers amongst my 
interviewees argue that they know about the phenomena of climate change but 
they do not clearly understand what policies should be established; they need to 
know how much damage is likely to be inflicted by climate change, and what 
benefits they can expect will accrue from the adaptations.  
 
Although the NCCAM include policies to support investment in technical 
development, the advice of researchers is not taken very seriously in the case 
of South Korean adaptation policies. Moreover, policy makers do not fully trust 
the reliability of the data the researchers produce, nor its veracity as the basis of 
making policies. Even some researchers also do not perceive their roles 
seriously (Interviewee No.5 and No.35). In a situation such as this, policy 
recommendations emanating from researchers are not readily accepted by 
policy makers. A couple of interviewees state plainly that they have followed the 
usual procedure of attending several meetings organized by the Korea 
Adaptation Center for Climate Change; and that they replied electronically to the 
drafts of the national adaptation master plan commenting on the technical 
aspects of the document but that their comments appear to have carried little 
weight. Although there is a process in place of collecting diverse opinions, the 
role of experts as the advisors for the NCCAM does not seem to be recognised 
as significant.  
 
7.3.2. Prejudice about stakeholders 
 
Referring to the Framework Act on Low carbon, Green growth, one interviewee 
(Interviewee No.37, a government official) emphasizes the need to have 
stakeholders participating in making adaptation policies. However, most 
interviewees express negative opinions regarding stakeholders‟ participation in 
making adaptation measures.  One reason pointed out by interviewees is that 
138 
 
stakeholders often act primarily in their own interests, which leads to negative 
reactions from the general public. One interviewee cites an example of a flood 
prevention strategy. One reason for rejecting the flood prevention strategy - 
setback from the coastline to a more safe area- is the result of the selfish 
concerns of local stakeholders:  
 
 “That (flooding event) is connected to the benefits of local construction companies. 
If there is a flooding event, that could be a chance to make money for local 
construction companies. The situation hinders making new (prevention) policies. 
They (local stakeholders) oppose it by arguing; why don‟t we build the conventional 
dyke, instead of trying to use unproven new methodologies.” (Interviewee No.41, a 
senior level researcher working at a government-funded institute) 
 
The interviewee adds another reason why the new regulation is difficult to 
implement in South Korea. This reason supports the arguments of those holding 
sceptical opinions regarding the participation of stakeholders, demonstrating 
how they could have a negative influence on local adaptations to climate 
impacts:  
 
“Seventy-eight per cent of the national industrial complexes are located along the 
coastline in our country (South Korea). Owing to their high commercial property 
value, the owners of the properties in these regions are not happy with the setback 
strategy of relocation and the introduction of buffer zones in the vulnerable areas”  
[…]. That‟s on account of their rights. […]  It is not easy for them to give up their 
rights and profits. It will impinge on their property rights. For example, if we 
relocate people in the region „A‟ which is very close to the seashore‟ to region „B‟ 
which is a bit distant from the coastline, the government should compensate for 
the difference of price by exchanging the land they give up. […] In the case of 
highly dangerous areas, we should explain the situation very carefully and make 
them understand the seriousness and unsafely, and try to not cause them any loss, 
for instance, by giving them larger land in the relocation areas than they had at the 
previous one.” (Interviewee 41, a senior level researcher working at a 
government-funded institute)  
 
Another interviewee (Interviewee No.5) tells a story about the negative influence 
of public opinion, commenting that there are some issues which arise from the 
publication of vulnerability assessment maps in South Korea. This interviewee 
argues that if people know that their property is vulnerable to floods and the 
information is open to the public, they will be alarmed because their property 
may be devalued:  
 
“These days we have so many stakeholders. […]. If it is reported that some places 
are vulnerable (to floods), then it could devalue the land price. Stakeholders will not 
be happy with the report and request to open what the report is based on. (But) we 
cannot give an adequate answer because of the high degree of uncertainty which is 
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a feature of the present forecasting mechanism.” (Interviewee No. 5, a university 
professor) 
 
Thus interviewees have negative opinions regarding stakeholders‟ participation 
in decision making, and think of stakeholders as trouble makers and self-
interest groups who work for only their own benefit. One interviewee argues that 
successful adaptation could rest on how well local collectivism and „naysayers‟ 
are dealt with (Interviewee No.36, a senior level government official). Such 
negative images regarding stakeholders, including Non-Governmental 
Organisations (NGOs), has been exacerbated by the experience of the previous 
government (the President Rho government) which tried to utilize public 
engagement more than other governments have (Park 2010a). Non-
governmental organisations or civil society organisations (CSOs) are seldom 
allowed to participate in the process of making policies in South Korea. Only 
since the early 1990s, could CSOs and NGOs engage in the process of making 
policy through different types of committees, forums and in research (Jeon 
2010b). Public engagement in the decision making process about policies does 
not have a long history in South Korea and is still perceived as unfamiliar in its 
political culture. 
 
When a question was asked about whether civil organizations and NGOs 
should be participating in the process of making the NCCAM, one interviewee 
(Interviewee No.27) answered that the national adaptation policy is a master 
plan in the creation of which the NGOs or civil society organisations did not 
need be included. Interviewees seem to think NGOs are not qualified to become 
involved in making decisions about the policies. The following responses show 
negative attitudes towards NGOs: 
 
“Practically, that (the National Climate Change Adaptation Measures) was not what 
NGOs got involved in. If someone doesn‟t know what national policies are and what 
are the implementation procedures, it is not possible to get involved in (making 
policies) and to screen the policies in a short time. As you know, NGOs could 
provide the ideal ideas and suggest the right direction, but they can‟t make the 
detailed policies. That‟s why NGOs have not been invited yet. Later, at the stage of 
implementing each sectoral delivery of policies, NGOs can participate. But in 
making a general framework, it seems inappropriate (to include 
NGOs).”(Interviewee No.28, a researcher at KACCC) 
 
“That‟s right. NGOs don‟t know enough about national policies or national budget 
mechanisms. But the FALG considers that the process of making local adaptation 
action plans should include stakeholders. Stakeholder means local people and 
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NGOs, local academics and local government officials.” (Interviewee No.37, a 
senior level government official) 
 
Negative attitudes towards NGOs or CSOs are observed in the responses of 
interviewees. General views regarding NGOs and CSOs in South Korea are 
similar to the interviewees‟ views (Ra 2006): weak capacity, dependence on 
government support, and working only for their own benefits rather than for 
public interest. The prejudice shown towards private actors may prevent the 
opportunity being taken to open up information to the private sector and asking 
for opinions from diverse members of society. 
 
7.4. The policy making culture  
 
Thus far I have discussed the culture of society or institution and social opinions 
about private actors in South Korea and examined how these constraints 
influence a successful process of climate change adaptation.  Now discussion 
will focus more on the political or policy making culture observed in the process 
of making national climate change adaptation measures. As discussed in 
Chapter 3, the culture of making policies in South Korea can be described as 
central government led and a bureaucratic approach (Kim 2009; Park et al. 
2012a; Lee and Kim 2010). The political culture is a mixture of subject and 
participant, authoritarianism and conservatism rooted in Confucianism, and 
anticommunism. This section will discuss how such a political culture is 
expressed in decision-making about the NCCAM. When policy makers make 
decisions about special policies such as climate change, the usual procedure is 
for government to create advisory boards composed of experts or special 
committees. In this section how the advisory boards and the committees work 
under the influence of these political cultures is examined.  
 
7.4.1. A top-down approach  
 
It is obvious that central government plays a key role in the making of 
adaptation policies to cope with climate change in South Korea. Some of 
interviewees remark that a top-down approach is perceived as a positive factor 
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in making adaptation policies at the initial stage. Interviewees argue that it can 
also be expected to contribute to the efficient delivery of adaptation policies 
down to local levels, the interviewees argue. Some of interviewees state proudly 
that the recent speedy progress in developing climate change policies in South 
Korea is attributed to the national green growth political agenda selected by the 
present government. On the other hand, other interviewees have different views 
regarding the way of approach adopted and are sceptical about the 
practicability of the policies at the stage of implementation. An interviewee 
(No.28) who was directly involved in generating the NCCAM also doubts the 
substantial implementation of the policies: 
 
 “The MB government is interested in (climate change). But I am not sure that this 
interest will follow through generating practical national policies: to allocating 
budgets. Although we make plans to cope with climate change with the help of more 
senior officials, I doubt that practical actions will materialise.”(Interviewee No.28, a 
researcher at KACCC) 
 
Another interviewee (No.30) also cynically commented that the government 
adopted the process of making the NCCAM as similar as usual policy making 
procedure. Owing to orders from high level politicians, policy makers have to 
show some outcomes and that they have taken some actions. Therefore they 
select some policies from the existing similar policies and rearrange them: 
 
“(Decision makers) should understand the importance of the project. […]. As the 
process is not easy, although the agenda has been passed, the next step needs to 
be approved by the Cabinet. […]. The right process is like this: we set a goal (based 
on data) first that the policies can obtain. But we are doing it backward. We select 
policies from existing ones (without correct data and information).” (Interviewee 
No.30, a senior researcher working at a government institute) 
 
Some interviewees complain about the bureaucratic way of making adaptation 
policies and express concern about such procedures. A command from high 
level politician makes policy makers generate policies in haste, even before 
policy makers have collected sufficient data or information from which to select 
proper policy options. Others express uncomfortable feelings about the 
pressure exerted by high level government official commenting that they are 
obliged to make policies to meet the requirements set out by high level 
politicians rather than substantial policy goals.  
 
“The MB government enforces mitigation and adaptation (to climate change). So 
adaptation policies were selected from the exiting polices which seemed relevant to 
climate change. It is asked why these are adaptation policies, but no one has the 
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answer. The current process is going in the opposite direction.” (Interviewee No. 26, 
a senior level researcher at KACCC) 
 
A top-down approach to climate change adaptation has been pointed out as a 
positive driving force for making a good progress by some interviewees (refer to 
Chapter 6). In this chapter it has been shown that other interviewees express 
sceptical views regarding the procedure. Although these interviewees 
acknowledge the procedure has its weaknesses, the general attitudes in the 
process of making the NCCAM seems to have been that the best way forward 
is to follow the usual procedure of policy making. 
   
7.4.2. Bureaucracy 
 
One of the political cultural characteristics of South Korea is bureaucracy in 
administrative structure. Even an interviewee who is a government official 
(Interviewee No.38) claims that the South Korean government has strong 
bureaucratic barriers so that it is not easy to implement policies. Such a 
bureaucratic culture has been observed in climate change adaptation.  
 
One of example of the bureaucratic attitudes of policy makers is seen in a 
distrust of researchers. Sometimes policy makers receive technical advice for 
making adaptation policies and changing the routine regulations, but, they 
seldom take the advice seriously. There was a serious event caused by ignoring 
professional advice from experts. The story of a massive black-out shows how 
serious problems can result from the influence of the bureaucratic culture of 
policy makers. 
 
The massive blackout began on the afternoon of 15th September 2011 in South 
Korea:  
 
 “Although the Korea Metrological Agency announced a warning that this year, the 
temperature will go up and it is extremely hot; the summer will continue until late 
September8, people didn‟t take it seriously and thought it would be all right. They 
(decision makers) ignored the warning and, as usual, shut down some power 
stations for regular check-ups. But people (the public) kept operating air 
conditioners and consumed energy as much as in the summer because of the hot 
                                                          
8
 Summer in South Korea usually ends in late August. 
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temperature. Therefore base energy was not enough (to bear all the energy 
consumption), which caused the massive black out.” (Interviewee No.28, a 
researcher at KACCC)  
 
In 2011, South Korea had an unprecedented heat wave with the average 
maximum temperature of over 30 degree Celsius in the middle of September. 
Although the Korea Meteorological Agency had warned that there would be a 
heat wave in the country, the Korea Power Exchange did not take the warning 
seriously and retained the business as usual scenario of their power-demand 
and supply plan with a maximum power demand of 6.4 million kilowatts, this 
was not sufficient for such hot weather (Hong 2011; Kim et al. 2011). The 
Korean Electric Power stopped 15% of the power generators for annual 
inspection, disregarding the warning. However, the temperature went up and 
the demand for electricity increased beyond the capacity of operating power 
generators. In order to prevent the overload of power generators, Korean 
Electric Power decided to cut off the electricity supply throughout the country on 
a rotational basis starting from 2:30 pm to about 4 pm when they observed that 
the reserved electricity became lower than 15% (the reserved electricity should 
be maintained at a level of over 15%). This electricity cut-off resulted in financial 
damage of 30 billion in Korean currency (KRW), which is about 17 million GBP 
(Segye 2011). Many people who were involved in the incident were fired, 
demoted, or resigned, including the Head of the Ministry of Knowledge and 
Economy (Kim 2011b; Jeong 2011). The incident demonstrates that there is a 
failure to take technical knowledge seriously. Although there were warnings 
about the risks caused by climate change, policy makers ignored them. After 
the incident public opinion swung behind the creation of adaptation strategies to 
cope with climate change and there was a noticeable change in behaviour. 
However, the concern was not sustained for long. According to a news article, 
people turned on air-conditioners even in May 2012 as soon as they felt hot, it 
was as though they had forgotten the black-out in 2011 (Park et al. 2012b).  
 
One interviewee (Interviewee No. 28, a researcher at KACCC) argues that 
policy makers and general people should change their perceptions and 
behaviours in order to cope with more frequent heat waves in future summers 
stating that the blackout incident is a good example of risks occurring without 
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precautionary adaptation strategies having been formulated and the way of 
policy routine can make for serious problems. 
 
The black-out case shows how the bureaucratic attitudes of policy makers can 
hamper effective climate change adaptation. As discussed in the section on „the 
relationship of government and agents, especially with technical experts, on one 
hand, the members of the advisory board argue that scientific information and 
technical knowledge are an essential element to making successful coping 
strategies; on the other hand, the real actions are likely to follow the policy 
routine imposed by an attitude of bureaucracy and elitism on the part of 
government officials: policies belong to policy makers who consider that they 
know best. If the advice of the professional experts had been taken more 
seriously and had influenced the decision-making, the accidents need not have 
occurred.   
 
7.4.3. Political populism 
 
The next feature of the policy culture observed in South Korea is a politician‟s 
key concern of assuring that they gain the voters. The term of elected politicians 
is four years in South Korea, which is not long enough to achieve the goals for 
most actions targeted at adapting to climate change. The fact makes politicians 
turn away from long-term policies to adopting policies which can show effects in 
short-term such as building dykes or visible infrastructure. Such political 
populism on the part of politicians can influence decisions about adaptation 
policies. This section discusses how such attitudes can affect adaptation to 
climate change. 
 
An interviewee expresses an opinion about a potential challenge to the 
implementing of climate change adaptations which is related to the time frame 
difference between the administrative system and climate change adaptation 
system. The effect of adaptation actions does not always appear immediately 
rather does it often take a long to show the results. This fact sometimes makes 
policy makers work hesitant. 
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“Using climate change as a theme helps to attract funding by the current 
government. However the long-term feature of climate change acts as a barrier.” 
(Interviewee No.33, a researcher working at a government-funded institute) 
 
This interviewee (Interviewee No.33) argues that politicians do not usually pay 
attention to policies which take longer time than their terms of office, because 
there is a premium on showing the effectiveness of their activities. If this is not 
visibly effective, the politicians are reluctant to support the political agenda; 
instead, they prefer to build infrastructures which readily attracts public (voters) 
attention and is a substantial policy service to the voters in the short-term. 
Under this South Korean policy making culture, politicians act as one of the 
most powerful agenda-setters at both central and local level. They choose 
policy options by which they can achieve populism, that is, votes in election. 
Because of this it is difficult for politicians to properly prioritise precautionary 
adaptation policies. Thus political culture and the attitudes of politicians affect 
the directions of policies and the decisions made. If there were a variety of 
participants, this might overcome the influence of the biases shown by 
politicians. 
 
7.5. Potential constraints at the local level 
 
Most of my interviewees are members of the advisory board for making national 
climate change adaptation policies. However, some of them are involved in 
creating action plans for local level adaptation strategies too. Even though this 
thesis focuses on national level climate change adaptation, I had opportunities 
to ask questions about local level actions related to climate change adaptation. 
This section discusses how political culture in climate change policies can 
influence local level policies. 
 
The role of local governments is seen as an essential determinant for a 
successful climate change adaptation. However in the case of South Korea, 
there is no formal mechanism for local actors to participate in making adaptation 
policies for national level adaptation policies. Some of the interviewees blame 
local government‟s dependence on central government for funds: 
 
“Local authorities are not working well in our country (South Korea). Except for big 
cities like Seoul city, usually the state handles everything. Local authorities do not 
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feel uncomfortable receiving support from the central government. When a local 
government decides to build a road or construct a dyke, then the local government 
asks for help from central government. Then central government will provide 
everything. As such, local governments are highly dependent on the central 
government.” (Interviewee No.7, a senior level researcher working at government-
funded institute) 
 
This interviewee (Interviewee No.7) implies that the weakness of local 
governments in handling climate change policies results from local 
government‟s unwillingness to take autonomous actions to cope with climate 
change impacts. However, another rational reason for local government‟s 
dependence on central government is that most local governments have a low 
fiscal self-reliance ratio so that they are likely to depend on central 
government‟s support (Lee 2009; Park et al. 2012a). There is another legal 
constraint making it difficult for local governments to take actions in advance. 
According to the Countermeasures against Natural Disasters Acts9 (Clause 5 of 
Article 3), the head of the municipal authorities should take action to prevent 
natural disasters „with the help of central government‟. Due to this Article of this 
law, the local authorities commonly depend on central government to make 
general plans to reduce the damages caused by natural disasters, and risks 
posed by climate change are included in this. Article 3 of the Countermeasures 
against the Natural Disasters Acts also clarifies the location of responsibility; it 
belongs to central government stating that „central government should provide 
financial and technical support to protect the safety of people‟. This context is 
used as the rationality for local authorities not to take the lead roles in 
precautionary actions to cope with climate change at local level. There is 
another relevant legal source to inhibit the local governments taking adaptation 
actions. According to the Local Government Acts in South Korea, local 
governments are not allowed to react to disasters autonomously without 
consultation with central government (Lee and Kim 2010). It is evident that 
these laws legitimize local governments depending on central government and 
their hesitation in taking precautionary adaptation actions. If disasters occur in 
the local areas, the cost of recovery basically would be provided by central 
government in South Korea. Therefore local governments usually wait for help 
from central government (Sourced by an interviewee (No.41, a senior level 
                                                          
9
 The state, in accordance with the Acts and the purpose of the Acts, shall take responsibility 
for making a precautionary general plan with the view of protecting people‟s lives and bodies 
and property and should provide maximum financial and technical support (Own translation 
from the Korean script). 
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researcher working at government-funded institute). The legal system 
constrains multilevel participation in decision making regarding climate change 
policies.  
 
Here is an example describing how South Korean institutional structure 
hampers multilevel governance approach. In 2011, local governments began to 
make local action plans for climate change adaptation under the support and 
control of central government. The costs for making the policies are partly 
sourced from central government: about 50% of the cost for the making of local 
climate scenarios and assessing local specific vulnerability to climate. The other 
50% is the responsibility of local government (informed by Interviewee No.32, a 
researcher working at a government-funded institute and No.38, a government 
official).  
 
So far, I have discussed administrative and institutional structures that can 
hamper a multilevel governance approach to climate change adaptation. One 
interviewee (Interviewee No.33, a researcher working at a government-funded 
institute) points out a lack of cognition of the essence of climate change 
adaptation as a potential local constraint. The interviewee tells a personal 
experience of working with local civil servants: at local government level, 
climate change adaptation is regarded as the same activity as taking 
countermeasures against natural disasters and the strategy for the prevention 
of natural disasters is not a novel policy. The interviewee remarks that for local 
actors, making an action plan for climate change adaptation is onerous because 
it has been ordered by central government. Hence they tend to accept it as 
unnecessary and unimportant and even a tiresome administrative task 
(Interviewee No.33, a researcher working at a government-funded institute). 
Orders issued by central government, especially when local governments are 
not yet in a position of implement them, can result in the making of 
impracticable policies (Kim 2009; Shim 2002; Lee and Kim 2010; Park et al. 
2012a).  
 
Two interviewees (No. 33 and No.38) indicate that central government knows 
that local governments are not capable of fulfilling the command from central 
government, so that central government will have to provide scientific data and 
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technical support. The solutions prepared by central government mainly focus 
on physical and technical support not on social or cultural aspects; for example, 
raising consensual awareness about the essence of climate change adaptation 
and receiving information from local areas. Besides, as one of the interviewees 
(Interviewee No.33, a researcher working at government-funded institute) 
argues, the data provided by central government is sometimes not applicable or 
useful at the local level. 
 
Some of the interviewees (Interviewees No.13, No.33 and No.38) argue that 
when private actors are not invited to the process of making the national 
adaptation policies, whereas local policy makers will invite stakeholders to the 
making of local adaptation plans which is a stated requirement at the 
Framework Act on Low carbon Green Growth (FALG). However, one 
interviewee expresses a sceptical concern about this recommendation, arguing 
that under the current circumstances, it is almost impossible to invite private 
actors to decision making at the local level: 
 
 “Our province is big with many cities and counties. […]. Provincial governments 
should be supported by those cities, but local governments at city level do not 
participate in making present adaptation action plans. To make it right, firstly cities 
and counties make plans, and then the provincial governments have to adapt (to 
climate change). But always provincial plans are made first, so it is very difficult to 
consider all the cities‟ situations.”(Interviewee No.33, a researcher working at 
government-funded institute) 
 
As some of the interviewees indicate, a top-down approach to making 
adaptation policies brings about problems to local climate change adaptation 
based on the following attitudes of central government: (1) The negative 
preconception of a local capacity-central government underestimates local 
actors; (2) Without taking account of local situations, the top-down approach 
leads to inappropriate strategies for local adaptations; and (3) In reality local 
level governance has not yet arrived at a consensus about what climate change 
adaptation measures should be made. These potential constraints will hamper 
the progress of local level adaptations. 
 
I have discussed constraints on successful climate change adaptation focusing 
on the political culture, policy culture in South Korea as well as prevailing local 
constraints. As observed in the responses of interviewees, political culture or 
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the policy style can hamper effective delivery of climate change adaptation in 
South Korea. Besides this the administrative culture and structure also hinder a 
governance approach to successful climate change adaptation. Most of the 
expressions of dissatisfaction discussed in this chapter are related to political 
culture and policy routines. In addition to these cultural aspects, an inadequate 
local technical advance has been pointed out as a challenge to successful 
adaptation.  
 
Thus I have explored the reason why some interviewees are not satisfied and 
what they think as constraints for successful climate change adaptation from the 
perspective of political culture. Based on the findings of the analysis of 
interviews, the following section will outline the general arguments of this 
chapter.    
 
7.6. Summary 
 
Chapter 7 has discussed the negative responses of the interviewees about the 
process of decision making about climate change adaptation policies in South 
Korea. The key point under discussion is the investigation into the influence of 
political, administrative and social cultures in the decision making. These 
include constraints posed by a lack of horizontal and vertical cooperation in 
government and a lack of resources in the organizations. The characteristics of 
the political culture of South Korea are observed as a top-down approach to 
policy making; bureaucracy operating under the influence of Confucianism and 
the effect of populism on politicians striving to win votes. Political culture also 
includes special relationships formed between government and groups of 
experts can be a hindrance to the development of participant and active political 
culture and a governance approach in the delivery of climate change adaptation 
policies. Besides, the negative views held by government bureaucrats towards 
private actors hampers involvement of multiple actors including non-
governmental organizations and stakeholders in the decision making. The 
authoritarian way in which high level politicians have instituted and guided 
policy making and implementation have, it has been claimed, worked well by 
speeding up the creation of climate change policies and making policy makers 
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take climate change more seriously than before. However, there have been 
doubts raised about the substantial effectiveness of climate change adaptation 
in the long run. The constraints observed or pointed out by the interviewees 
may pose challenges to a governance approach to the successful delivery of 
adaptation measures in South Korea. Table 17 briefly outlines the overall 
constraints pointed out by the interviewees. 
 
Table 17: Interviewee response regarding negative factors (Source: The author of 
this thesis) 
Interview topic Summary of the responses 
Institutional culture Lack of inter-governmental cooperation  
Intra-governmental problems 
Weak capacity of local government 
Resource constraints Human and financial resources 
Technical barriers  
Perception barriers Collectivism of stakeholders  
Societal unequal relationship between 
government and the advisory board 
Policy making culture Bureaucracy 
State-centric command system 
Political populism 
 
The administrative culture of changing key policy agendas with changes of 
government has raised concerns about climate change policies. Under the 
green growth trend, climate change has become part of the political discourse. 
When there is a change of government, the green growth and climate change 
agenda may lose their positions as hot policy agendas. Policy disconnections 
between present and new governments may change the whole map of climate 
change policies in South Korea. 
 
State centric and bureaucratic inertia have been observed as the key feature in 
the making of adaptation policies in South Korea. In Chapter 6, a top-down and 
command approach from central government are referred to as a positive factor 
for effective delivery of adaptation policies in South Korea; however, based on 
the analysis of interview responses, the orders from high level politicians or 
central government do not seem to guarantee effective implementation of 
adaptation policies. At the beginning of policy making, a directive from high level 
leaders seems to work well and drives progress forward; however, the practical 
delivery may not proceed well.  
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The traditional government paradigm, which is a vertical and top-down 
approach, seems to work well in terms of speeding up progress at the initiating 
stage. But implementing the policies and achieving the goals of adapting to 
climate change can be different. The aim of climate change adaptation is 
generally conceptualised as building a society which is secure and safe from 
risks and transforming a society so that it is resilient to unexpected changes 
caused by climate change or variability. If the adaptation policies are made in a 
hurry by some high level politician whose main concern is to draw the attentions 
of voters, these goals will not be readily achieved.  
 
The South Korean policy culture is generally characterised by the words of 
authoritarianism and a mixture of subject and participant political culture (refer 
to Chapter 3 of this thesis). The attitudes of policy makers influenced by 
authoritarianism and bureaucracy create an atmosphere of resistance to the 
adoption of diverse policy options which may adapt to climate change more 
effectively. Policy decision makers commonly distrust stakeholder‟s participation 
in making policies, because they think that stakeholders place their own welfare 
before that of the community at large. Such a concern is imposed by the social 
culture of Confucianism: the state is always right and government officials are 
better than the general people, 
 
No government is capable of determining social development in a complex, 
dynamic and diverse society by itself (Eun 2011a). Climate change policy 
should be handled by the participation of multiple actors. Lim and Tang (2002) 
optimistically judged that there would be an improvement in environmental 
policy governance in South Korea, but there have been few changes in 
environmental governance systems in South Korea in the past 10 years (Lim 
and Tang 2002). The current government is criticised for returning to a more 
bureaucratic form of government administration by some scholars. Under these 
conditions, it is not easy to be readily expected that participatory governance by 
multiple actors will be developed for climate change adaptation. Moreover, there 
are doubts expressed about governance approach, arguing that a governance 
paradigm is a „practice-driven model‟ borne in western government history so 
that it is not well fitted to Korean policy culture (Eun 2011a). Thus the difficulty 
of a governance approach regarding climate change adaptation results from not 
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only the powerful state but also the political culture and policy inertia. Although 
scholars argue that a governance approach to climate change and the 
involvement of diverse actors provides more opportunities to achieve successful 
adaptation, in some societies it may take time to change the political culture or 
the policy making culture.  
 
The general characteristics of the South Korean political culture do not fit into a 
western-born governance approach. But there may be one advantage to 
Confucianism: when I asked about what would happen when they do not 
achieve the goal of their policies; and if there are any incentives or punishments, 
one interviewee answered: „then the person-in-charge would lose face in front 
of the others‟. The culture of the high placed authority figures keeping face may 
act as a motivation for the progress of adaptation policies. 
 
Chapter 7 has highlighted and discussed how the political culture has impinged 
on the decision making process by analysing interviews. The challenges and 
barriers posed by political and social culture may adversely influence the 
delivery of adaptation policies as well as a governance approach to climate 
change adaptation. In Chapter 6 some of interviewees have argued that 
progress in making the NCCAM has been rapid and efficient. However, there 
are concerns about whether the policies would be delivered successfully under 
the command and control of government. 
 
I have been discussed matters which have caused satisfaction and those which 
have caused dissatisfaction among my interviewees regarding the process of 
making the NCCAM and have examined the way in which the political culture 
has influenced decision making about climate change adaptation in Chapters 6 
and 7. Following on from the analysis of these interviews, an overview of the 
conclusions and the whole spectrum of this research will be discussed in 
Chapter 8. In that concluding chapter, I will demonstrate how this research can 
contribute to knowledge advancement; and what the findings mean to research 
into climate change adaptation and close the thesis with some suggestions for 
future research undertakings.  
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Chapter 8. Discussion & Conclusion  
 
“In other words, adaptation is a multi-scalar process of multi-level governance, 
concerned with the interaction of individual and collective behaviours acting from the 
bottom-up and the top-down in response to changing circumstances (Adger et al. 
2009a, p.10) ” 
 
 
 
8.1. Introduction 
 
In spite of global efforts to mitigate climate change, the impacts caused by 
these changes will continue for a while, and adapting to climate change 
adaptation is essential and not optional (Adger et al. 2007). Global discourse 
and policies regarding mitigation have been more intense than those on climate 
change adaptation. Recently adaptation has also drawn the attention of 
academic scholars and policy makers, and a number of studies have been 
performed. However there are a few publications dealing with the value or 
culture factors which influence effective climate change adaptation (Barnett 
2010). Notably, as I have argued in the introductory chapter, there is very little 
research about the decision-making process regarding climate change policies 
from the perspective of political culture. In response to this academic gap, I 
have investigated how and which aspects of the political culture have been 
evidently expressed in the way of formulating climate change adaptation 
measures in South Korea. The dominant political culture involved in decision-
making and the way of its influencing a governance approach to climate change 
adaptation in South Korea have been examined. Taking into account the 
powerful influence of a national political agenda, I have sought to answer the 
following questions: What relationship has been formed between government 
and groups of experts who are appointed as the advisory board members? And 
how has the general relationship between central government and local 
governments changed in the context of climate change adaptation? This 
concluding chapter interprets the findings from the research addressed in 
Chapter 5, 6 and 7 and discusses the meaning of these findings in the context 
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of climate change adaptation, and the influence of political cultural on a 
governance approach. 
 
The findings generated in this study can make a contribution to an 
understanding of the situation in a society where participatory political culture is 
restricted and the role of public engagement is not naturally recognized in policy 
decision-making. It can also provide a theoretical background for an empirical 
study of climate change adaptation which recognises the full weight of political 
culture. This study therefore helps to better understand the reasons for limits in 
governing climate change adaptations. Before closing my argument, I propose a 
few suggestions for further research. 
 
8.2. The role of political culture in creating adaptation policies 
 
As the first step in closing my argument, I will discuss the role of political culture 
in climate change adaptation highlighting the key findings from this research. 
For that purpose, this section provides an overview of the findings discussed in 
Chapter 5 over through Chapter 7 of the thesis.  
 
The advisory board was supposed to become an instrument for reflecting the 
way of participatory governance in the decision-making about the national 
climate change adaptation measures. However, the role of the advisory board 
did not seem to be fully realised owing to the political culture or the social 
culture of South Korea. Such challenges were identified at the first step of policy 
agenda-setting until the stage of choosing policy options. This was shown by 
the fact that there is little documentary evidence of public engagement or 
private participation in the initiation and decision-making stages of the climate 
change adaptation process. There are some reports regarding meetings held to 
draft the NCCAM where bargaining among participants concerning the phrases 
used to express policies took place. The secondary sources show that although 
climate change adaptation is a novelty to the policy agenda in South Korea, the 
policy making process seemed to follow the usual decision-making routine: the 
strong influence of a powerful central government and of high level politicians, 
with very limited governance approach. In order to support the findings of this 
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documentary analysis, as well as to articulate the arguments put forward the 
interviews have been recorded and examined in Chapter 6 and 7. These 
responses have been divided on the basis of two main themes: those based on 
positive attitudes and those based on negative attitudes towards political culture 
as expressed in making climate change adaptation measures. It has also been 
observed that the interviewees‟ political attitudes were reflected in the 
governance of climate change adaptation.  
 
The government of South Korea has announced green growth and low carbon 
as its national paradigm, this paradigm, most interviewees argued has worked 
positively on the progressive development of climate change policies. The 
government has established a special committee and the advisory board as 
possible mechanisms to create forums where various opinions can be 
expressed in order to facilitate more effective adaptation policies, but their roles 
have appeared to be limited because of special socio-cultural relationships and 
political culture. By documentary analysis and interviewing advisory members, I 
have sought to identify the challenges facing climate change adaptation through 
a multilevel participation in a governance approach. A top-down political culture 
and the powerful role of government role has tended to ignore the role of 
stakeholders and technical experts in the management of climate change 
adaptation. The case of the NCCAM of South Korea has shown a subject 
political culture rather than a mixture of subject and participatory culture which 
has been identified as the general characteristic of the South Korean political 
culture (Lee 2003). Any single policy maker cannot understand all problems nor 
provide solutions for them, especially regarding climate change. The sharing of 
power and information with multiple and multifaceted actors is essential when 
dealing with an complex issue as governing climate change and adaptation. 
However, the state-centric approach to climate change strongly influenced by 
the dominant political culture of South Korea limits multiple actors‟ involvement 
in decision-making regarding climate change adaptation. The overall discussion 
about the key findings and contribution to academic advance about the 
research will be argued in the following sections.  
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8.2.1. What should be achieved by adaptation policies?  
 
Climate change adaptation in this research refers to the actions that people take 
in response to, or in anticipation of, projected or actual changes in climate, to 
reduce adverse impacts or to take advantage of the opportunities presented by 
climate change (Adger et al. 2007). Although the concept is accepted in the 
South Korean academic society as the definition of climate change adaptation, 
the national climate change adaptation measures (the NCCAM) includes the 
national paradigm „green growth‟ in the vision; building a green growth society. 
But it is not necessarily related to adaptation and instead it reflects the allegiant 
attitudes of policy makers towards a hot political agenda item. The achievement 
of the vision of adaptation is supposed to lead to successful adaptation. As 
discussed in the thesis, increase options for adapting to climate change through 
the participation of multiple actors from diverse areas. The question regarding 
the vision and the goal of climate change adaptation in South Korea was asked 
to the interviewees; some of the responses have shown a utilitarian approach 
towards delivery that provides benefits to as many people as possible; while 
others have expressed an egalitarian approach arguing that the essence should 
be making provision for the social and climate vulnerable groups. Many 
interviewees highlighted the importance of positive attitudes towards climate 
change; climate change and adaptation to it should be taken as an opportunity 
as well as a risk. However, it was not sure if the opinions of advisory board 
members were adopted in the formulation of sectoral goals in the NCCAM. The 
policy goals are generally established by government officials in the 
departments. 
 
8.2.2. Why do some feel satisfied?  
 
Some of the interviewees have argued that the command and control of a 
government-led bureaucratic approach has become the driver for making 
climate change policies. Analysis based on the results of this research, show 
that the mode of adaptation governance is of the more hierarchical type than 
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participatory in South Korea, where the responsibility for policies resides with 
central government. Chapter 6 of this thesis explored the substantial reasons of 
the interviewees feel complacent about the progress of climate change 
adaptation in South Korea. Summarily, under the strong command and control 
of central government, the progress of climate change adaptation has been 
promoted following the usual policy making style in South Korea. The reasons 
for their expressions of satisfaction emerged as two themes: the green growth 
and low carbon of national paradigm; and the global trends of discourse about 
the need of taking adaptation actions to climate change. The interviewees 
identified the present government (at the time of doing the research) of South 
Korea as the key driver of the policy agenda with the help of increased extreme 
weather events. The practical reasons for the satisfaction are that the 
interviewees have had more opportunities to benefit from contracts made with 
government for carrying out projects or funds for the research from the 
government. Using the argument of capacity building, many interviewees have 
claimed that the government should invest in research about scientific and 
technical advancement. Here capacity building does not necessarily mean the 
capacity of the country for coping with climate change. Rather, the responses 
can be interpreted as capacity building in their organizations. When they 
expressed satisfaction with the progress, they generally stated that they have 
achieved a speedy and prompt „mission‟- making the NCCAM within a certain 
time frame stated in the FALG.  They could show the government the outcomes 
of the actions. There have been no substantial monitoring and evaluation 
phases for the NCCAM, so that the actual outcomes of policy delivery have not 
been evaluated.  
 
Talking about the progress in the context of participatory governance in South 
Korea, there was little room for multilevel participatory governance during the 
time when the NCCAM was created. Most interviewees have admitted that 
climate change adaptation policies in the NCCAM have been controlled by 
central government, and argued that a powerful state and strong leadership are 
very helpful for making adaptation policies in efficient way; however, some 
scholars insist that successful implementation requires the involvement of the 
public rather than state-centred process.  
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8.2.3. The influence of political culture on climate change 
policies  
 
In the beginning the climate change policies of South Korea had been narrowly 
framed for focusing on committing to the agreement to the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in 1992 or negotiating 
the multilateral international agreements. As the global and domestic discourse 
about climate change and impacts have increased, the South Korean 
government has decided to change the scope and structures of climate change 
policies (for more detail, refer to Chapter 5 of this thesis). The focal point of 
climate change policies is mitigation rather than adaptation. Still today, coping 
with climate change is largely focused on reducing gas emissions with the 
provision that it does not harm the national economy. As the Lee government 
(the reins of the government is from 2008 to 2013) set up „green growth and low 
carbon‟ as a new national paradigm, the momentum with regard to climate 
policies seemed to have gathered pace in terms of making national policies and 
binding regulations. However, all of the steps of making the coping strategies or 
national climate change adaptation policies, from taking the initiatives to the 
stage of decision making regarding policy options, have been commanded by 
central government by means of a hierarchical ordering system. The 
governance arrangement which appeared in the process is a hierarchical 
governance mode rather than a type of participatory governance.  
 
The expert groups invited as the advisory board members were expected to 
provide professional advice and supposed to represent the private sector. 
However, in reality, the state bureaucrats have played the role of key decision 
makers and have drawn the boundaries for the policy options. The political 
culture have challenged participatory governance mode in the decision-making 
of the NCCAM and limited the role of the advisory board. Moreover, the 
institutional culture hampers interdepartmental cooperation and the lack of 
capacity of intra-organizations has been a major constraint to a multilevel 
governance approach to effective delivery of adaptation measures in South 
Korea. The negative perceptual orientation towards NGOs or CSOs and 
stakeholders certainly plays a detrimental role in opening up the process of 
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policy decision making. Some of the interviewees have worried about local level 
adaptation plans as the follow up to the NCCAM. Similar but even worse than 
the situation at the national level, lack of capacity in local governments has 
been shown to be one of the biggest constraints in generating local climate 
change adaptation strategies. Owing to lack of capacity, local governments are 
claimed to be depending overmuch on central government, therefore local 
actors recognise climate change adaptation as one of central government‟s 
responsibilities and are comfortable with the status quo without any resistant 
feelings. 
 
The findings of this research address challenges imposed by centrally 
controlled authorities which limit multilevel actors participating in adaptation 
governance. The political culture, the institutional culture and socio-cultural 
perceptions do not seem to encourage a participatory governance approach to 
climate change adaptation in South Korea. Excluding or restricting participation 
of various and valuable actors could result in the drawing up of impracticable 
and ineffective paper-documents lacking in tangible and practical adaptation 
strategies. The state-centric and bureaucratic culture in devising policies might 
result in speedy progress. However, this does not necessarily deliver the 
required results when it comes to the implementation of those policies. If the 
adaptation policies are made without consulting multiple actors at the local level 
and in the private sector, they may miss essential and practical knowledge and 
data. The policy makers in central government in South Korea tend to think that 
it is they that should take the lead in making adaptation policies.  As climate 
change and the ways to adapt to it are diverse and complex, for the adaptation 
policies to be practical at the local level, local stakeholders should be involved 
and be encouraged to express their opinions. The state alone cannot solve 
complex and dynamic agenda (Eun 2011b), for instance risks posed by climate 
change. Climate change policy should be addressed by a variety of actors 
through multilevel participation. The implementation of adaptation to climate 
change becomes more effective when the cooperation of stakeholders and 
private actors is enlisted, especially at the local level, the situation could be 
different from that perceived by policy makers at central government.  
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Most interviewees have expressed concerns about the key policy agenda 
change after the presidential election in 201210 that would take place along with 
a change of government. It is possible for new governments to pay less 
attention to climate change or green growth. In general, as a government 
changes, the key political agenda of government also changes. New 
government may choose climate change policies as being less important issue 
and reduce funds or resources for climate change projects and research in the 
organisation.  
 
8.3. Discussion  
 
This research has aimed at identifying the influences that have shaped climate 
change adaptation policies in South Korea, using as research methodologies an 
analysis of the contents of policy documents and a series of interviews with 
advisory members and key actors in climate change sector. I have sought to 
determine which have hampered or which have encouraged the decision-
making about the national climate change adaptation measures.  
 
Many adaptation scholars consider that a governance arrangement is more 
effective for achieving successful adaptation, in which multiple actors from 
multifaceted sectors participate in the decision making process and share 
information among themselves. As I have remarked in Chapter 2 of this thesis, I 
also support the governance approach - namely participatory governance, 
although some scholars have sceptical views regarding governance in the 
delivery of public service (Jessop 1998). As identified in the research, the 
general characteristic of the process of making national climate change 
adaptation policies is a state-led and top-down approach. The process has not 
been much different from the existing routine of policy making in South Korea. 
The challenges to the development of participatory governance for the delivery 
of adaptation policies arise from the political culture, the institutional culture and 
the weak capacity, as well as distrust towards stakeholders or NGOs. The 
general political culture of South Korea is characterized by a mixture of subject 
and participant culture in the context of Almond and Verba‟s cultures. As I found 
                                                          
10
 The write-up for research has begun in 2012 before the election happens. 
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out from this research, the political culture of South Korea exhibits the 
characteristics of a subject rather than the participant culture, at least in the 
context of climate change adaptation. Under such a political culture, it cannot be 
simply a process of applying western-born governance in South Korea as if it 
were a participant cultural society. Taking into account of types of political 
culture, I have attempted to conceptualise three governance arrangements 
(refer to Chapter 2 and 3 in this thesis). The suggested governance types are 
examples that are applied to tackle issues associated with climate change 
adaptation in open and participant culture. There is a case study showing a 
parochial political culture (Finan and Nelson 2009); a type of governance 
suggested for governing environmental issues raised in a society where civil 
culture shows the characteristics of a mixture of subject and participant; and the 
case of a country where the state plays the important role but also admits the 
limitation of state-alone and built a web-based open platform for inviting private 
sector and sharing the experience of good practices with diverse actors. Thus 
governance will act as the lesser of two evils if it is properly incorporated into a 
society in accordance with culture and political structure. 
 
South Korea is a country where the central government holds most of the power, 
making the decisions about policies; civil organisations are generally considered 
to be weak, lacking capacity and seeking their own benefits rather than 
collective goals. It is for these reasons that they are not invited to participate in 
the process of formulating policies. The shift of political culture to more 
participant orientations is not easy, because the owners of power want to keep 
their positions at the centre of decision making. As the private sector builds 
more capacity and a more participatory attitude towards climate change 
adaptation is adopted, the state needs to be more open with the public, 
providing information and greater access to the policy making process. And it 
should collaborate with private companies and civil organisations and receive 
information from local actors for the purpose of more effective policy 
implementation. When civil organisations and stakeholders build partnerships or 
networks for coping with climate change, the authorities generally play the role 
of resource provider and occasionally steer the delivery process of climate 
change adaptation policies if this is needed.  
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Unfortunately, the phrase of „participatory governance‟ is not always regarded in 
a positive light in South Korea. During the presidency of the President Rho 
(from 2003 to 2008) the government adopted participatory policies and tried to 
include civil actors in the process of making policies. However it was argued 
that the inexperienced civil organisations did not play their roles as the 
representing public opinions (Jeong 2003). Owing to the negative image 
developed during that time, people, especially policy makers in central 
government view civil organisations a negatively. Hence some of scholars 
argue that it was too early for South Korea to practice participatory governance 
(Park 2010a). Other scholars argue that non-governmental organisations do not 
have sufficient capacity to participate adequately in policy decision-making (Kim 
and Kang 2004; Kim 2002b; Ra 2006). This has been identified as a barrier to 
effective delivery of adaptation measures in participant culture.    
 
The Korean governance approach to climate change adaptation may be 
different from western governance. Unlike European countries, in South Korea 
the power distribution between central government and local government is less 
balanced, it is centred on the state (Oh 2005; Lee and Kim 2010). The networks 
for horizontal cooperation between local governments have not yet been formed 
properly (Shim 2002). In spite of these constraints, yet taking them into account, 
governance arrangement for successful climate change adaptation should be 
developed making due provision for its own social, institutional and political 
culture. 
 
The aim of this research was to examine how South Korea responds to climate 
change adaptation; this was done by means of an empirical study. Taking into 
account the fact that the South Korean government has a top-down, state-led, 
and authoritarian political culture, I selected it as a case study, because it could 
show how climate change adaptation policies are initiated and formulated under 
a top-down political culture and what are the practical challenges resulting from 
this if it is to adopt governance modes in the decision making. Using the 
conceptual and methodological research frameworks outlined, and primary and 
secondary sources, I have sought to point a way forward towards a changing 
emphasis in the formulation of workable policies.  
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In conclusion, it is evident that the national climate change adaptation policies 
have been initiated and decided following the existing routine of a top-down 
approach in South Korea, although climate change adaptation is a rather novel 
policy agenda. Policy making for the national adaptation measures has been by 
the command of the central government. It seems, however, that there has 
been a significant body of opinion that holds negative views regarding the 
process of decision-making. The elitism of government officials and 
sectionalism among ministries appears to hamper a participant cultural 
approach to decision-making. The fact that the Lee government takes climate 
change as a key policy agenda item under the national paradigm of green 
growth and low carbon is claimed to be a positive driver of climate change 
adaptation in South Korea. However, agenda-setting by high level politicians is 
likely to be unstable or changeable responding to new government as they 
come with different policy agenda.   
 
8.4. Contribution to the advance of knowledge  
 
Before concluding my overall argument, I will demonstrate how this research 
can contribute to the advance of knowledge from the point of academic 
understanding of the political and cultural factors influencing climate change 
adaptation. 
 
In general, my study has discussed the political cultural characteristics 
expressed in the governance approach to climate change adaptation, and has 
identified challenges observed in the process of decision making about national 
climate change adaptation policies. Very little literature has been written on 
social and cultural aspects in South Korea and across the globe, especially the 
political culture influencing the decision making about climate change 
adaptations. For example in South Korea, most literature about climate change 
adaptation published deals with physical, technical and engineering issues: 
collecting climate data, or methods to assess vulnerability, or the cost-
effeteness of building infrastructures to prevent flooding, or an examination of 
diversifying crop varieties etc. Since it is real that successful adaptation is 
determined by the influence of climate factors as much as socio-cultural and 
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political structures, my work will contribute to knowledge advances in 
understanding cultural aspects, particularly the political culture impacts on the 
governance of adaptation to climate change. This research has shown how 
strongly political culture influences the process of policy making, and under the 
political culture policy makers follow the policy routines even though a policy 
agenda is very new and complex. The research found out that the decision-
making process about climate change adaptation has been influenced by the 
existing political culture which seems to hamper a participatory governance 
approach. This research reinforced the argument that political and cultural 
factors can limit a society in the way it tackles climate change adaptation. 
Traditional culture and social relationships restrict expressions of diverse 
opinions even in the case of professional and technical advice. A decision-
making in climate change adaptation which neglects to consult diverse opinions 
and local interest groups can give rise to even social conflicts. Without 
considering local needs carefully, it is challenge for central government to 
understand the local conditions, for instance, the most vulnerable community to 
climate impacts and the way of distributing resources, and responsibility. 
Therefore it is recommended that government should provide opportunities for 
multiple actors to participate in the decision-making process and sharing 
responsibility through participatory governance.  
 
In this study I have expressed my support for governance modes as a more 
proper approach to delivering climate change adaptation for it is likely to include 
more multilevel actors involving them in the decision-making. It is likely that the 
condition of people not exhibiting the characteristics of a participant political 
culture, or even not showing an interest in political objectives, might be used for 
adopting the top-down approach and exercising strong leadership by taking the 
key role in decision-making about climate change adaptation.  
 
8.5. The Way forward 
 
The aims and methodology of this study have been set out above. There are, 
however, some limitations to this research. These include: (1) the selection of 
interviewees was restricted. The majority of the interviewees were selected from 
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the group of experts who had been involved in creating the policies. Most of 
them have worked in government affiliated institutes or are government officials, 
even though some of them have worked in the private sector, they have been 
involved in government-funded research. The restricted spectrum of 
interviewees might have result in biased opinions regarding the role of 
stakeholders and civil organisations. (2) When I conducted this research local 
authorities had played a very minor role in matters concerning climate change 
adaptation. It was recognised when substantial policies are at the stage of 
delivery, the role of civil society organisations should play is a critical factor, and 
that therefore a governance approach may be an appropriate means of 
enhancing the effectiveness of the policies. (3) The imbalance of private and 
public interviewees could, in part, have magnified the bias in favour of strong 
government in making adaptation policies.  
 
Although there are these limitations, my research is the first to conduct 
empirical research into climate change adaptation from the perspective of 
political culture and how it influences the governance approach in South Korea. 
This research may promote further theoretical and empirical research about 
culture‟s influence on climate change adaptation governance not only in South 
Korea but also in other countries across the globe. Through comparative 
analysis among different countries, we can understand more about relationships 
between political culture and effective governing of climate change adaptation 
by analysing different types of political culture in various regions. Therefore, the 
suggested further research can be: a study aims to examine the way cultures 
impinge on the process of adaptation policy making at local level by comparing 
that of national level; and a comparative research to analyse the governance of 
climate change adaptation among other political cultures. 
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Appendix 1. Consent Form 
Geography 
College of Life and Environmental Science 
Basic Consent Form 
     
  
Title: Research about experts‟ opinions regarding Climate change adaptation policies 
of South Korea 
 
This research is carried out for my PhD thesis and supervised by Dr. Suraje Dessai 
and Dr. Clive Sabel and funded by the KOICA/WFK Scholarship. It aims to investigate 
what are experts‟ opinions about Korean adaptation policies in the context of climate 
change and examine how multilevel governance approach to adaptation policy is 
challenged. The interviews are mainly targeted to the members of advisory board for 
the National Climate Change Adaptation Measures 92011-2015). 
 
This interview shall keep the ethics policy of University of Exeter 
(http://admin.exeter.ac.uk/ethics/ethics_policy.pdf), be anonymous. It will be used only 
for this research not for other purposes. There shall be no exposure of personal 
information to the third party. And also, in any time while this research is ongoing, you 
can withdraw your opinion from this research.  
 
If you have any questions about this research, please contact me with email or phone; 
(kp277@exeter.ac.uk / keumjpark@hotmail.com) or (82-10-5232-9410/44-78-1057-
5849). 
 
Researcher: Keumjoo Park 
Supervised by Dr. Suraje and Prof. Clive Sabel 
Geography,  
College of Life and Environmental Sciences 
University of Exeter 
 
Your signature below means that you voluntarily agree to participate in this research 
study.  
Date:                                                                 Name :………………………(signature) 
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Appendix 2. Interview guide continued 
 
Climate change adaptation in South Korea 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Researcher: Keumjoo Park 
Supervised by Dr. Suraje Dessai  
Dr. Clive Sabel 
 
Geography,College of Life and Environmental Sciences 
University of Exeter 
 
Contact : kp277@exeter.ac.uk/ /keumjpark@hotmail.com 
070-7533-9410 / 44-78-1057-5849/82-10-5232-9410 
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Appendix 2. Interview guide continued 
 
How are you?  
At first, I really appreciate your attending this interview. 
My name is Keumjoo Park. I am a PhD student of University of Exeter who is 
doing research about Korean climate change adpatation. 
 
This research is carried out for my PhD thesis and supervised by Dr. Suraje 
Dessai and Dr. Clive Sabel and funded by the KOICA/WFK Scholarship. It 
aims to investigate what are experts‟ opinions about Korean adaptation 
policies in the context of climate change and examine how multilevel 
governance approach to adaptation policy is challenged. 
 
This interview shall keep the ethics policy of Univesity of Exeter 
(http://admin.exeter.ac.uk/ethics/ethics_policy.pdf), be anomymous. It will be 
used only for this research not for other purposes. There shall be no exposure 
of personal information to the third party. And alos, in any time while this 
research is on going, you can withdraw your opinion from this research.  
 
If you have any questions about this research, please contact me with email 
or phone; (kp277@exeter.ac.uk / keumjpark@hotmail.com)  or (82-10-5232-
9410/44-78-1057-5849). 
 
Once again I thank you very much for your attending the interview. 
 
Researcher : Keumjoo Park 
University of Exeter 
 
1. Express gratitude to interviewee 
2. Ice breaking comments 
3. Ask for signing the agreement form and permission to record the 
interview. 
4. Explain briefly about the research 
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Appendix 2. Interview guide continued 
 
[Questions will be as follows but could change according to the situation] 
 
1.1. What was your role of making National Climate Change Adaptation 
Measures (NCCAM)? 
   [Ask more about the meetings for making NCCAM] 
 
1.2. Did you feel satisfied with NCCAM? (Do you think current NCCAM (at 
least in your field include all your concerns (advice)?  
[Talking about the Contents of NCCAM generally and regarding the 
interviewee‟s field] 
 
1.3. What do you think about the “vision” of NCCAM? 
1.4. For successful implementation of the projects listed in NCCAM, what 
do you think should be built first?(what environment should be made 
for the successful implementation of the projects listed in NCCAM?)  
1.5. Most projects in current NCCAM(2011-2015) are related to build data 
basis and collect evidence for making the adaptation policy, [ or I can 
ask about the contents of NCCAM ]  
1.6. Are the plans /projects appropriate? (Reasonable time frame and the 
number of projects etc?)  
1.7. Then what do you think should be included for the next adaptation 
measures (2016-2020)? 
1.8. What approach or direction should the Korean adaptation policy 
pursue?  
1.9. For the desirable direction, do you think current adaptation policy is 
appropriate?  
1.10. If you think we should do something more for the Korean adaptation 
policy, then what could they be?  
1.11. What is successful adaptation in Korea, what state could be a well-
adapted society in Korea?  
1.12. [As higher policy makers including the President Lee have interested 
in climate policy, therefore we (Korean) could get a certain progress 
in adaptation for the short period. (I do not say this sentence directly 
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but can ask about the opinions regarding governor‟s interest in 
climate change adaptation). Do you think this trend will continue for 
the next political regime?  
1.13. How much progress did we get in adaptation compared to other 
countries?  
1.14. Is there something better or lower in climate change adaptation in 
South Korea than other countries?  
1.15. What are the priorities in the Korean adaptation? What should be 
done first to adapt to climate change properly?  
1.16. Is there a way to solve or cope with the priorities?  
1.17. Compared to other environmental policy, do you think adaptation 
policy is responded well (or treated seriously by decision makers?)  
1.18. If there are constraints for implementing adaptation policy, what are 
they? 
1.19.  And how could we reduce the constraints? 
 
[local governments are making adaptation implementation plan] 
1.20. Ask about local adaptation plans: time frame, capacity, and 
constraints. 
 
 
 
Thank you for your time and opinions once again.  
Can I contact you later for more questions, if needed? 
 
-The end- 
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Appendix 3. List of interviewees 
 
Interviewee 
Number 
Institution type Sector Gender Interview 
Record(Y/N) 
1 Government 
funded institute 
General Male N 
2 Governmental 
organisation 
Meteorology Female Y 
3 Governmental 
organisation 
Agriculture Male Y 
4 Governmental 
organisation 
Disaster Male Y 
5 University Ocean/ Fishery Male Y 
6 University Industry/energy Male Y 
7 Government-
funded institution 
Disaster Male Y 
8 Government-
funded institution 
Agriculture Male Y 
9 Governmental 
organisation 
Forest Male Y 
10 University Forest Male Y 
11 Government-
funded institution 
Ocean/Fishery Male Y 
12 Government-
funded institution 
General Female Y 
13 Governmental 
organisation 
Meteorology Female Y 
14 Government-
funded institution 
Ocean/Fishery Male Y 
15 Government-
funded institution 
Water Male Y 
16 Government-
funded institution 
Water Male Y 
17 Governmental 
organisation 
Water Male Y 
18 Governmental Ecosystem Male Y 
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organisation 
19 Government-
funded institution 
Health Female N11 
20 Government-
funded institution 
General Female Y 
21 Governmental 
organisation 
Ocean/Fishery Male Y 
22 Governmental 
organisation 
General Male N 
23 Governmental 
organisation 
General Male Y 
24 Government-
funded institution 
General Male Y12 
25 Governmental 
organisation 
Water Male N 
26 Same person as No.24 
27 University Water Male Y 
28 Government-
funded institution 
General Male Y 
29 University  Disaster Male N 
30 Government-
funded institution 
Forest Male Y 
31 Governmental 
organisation 
Agriculture Male N 
32 Government-
funded institution 
Ocean/Fishery Male Y 
33 Same person as No.20 
34 Governmental 
organisation 
Agriculture Male Y 
35 Government-
funded institution 
Climate change 
prediction/monitoring 
Male Y 
36 Governmental 
organisation 
General Male Y13 
37 Same person as No.36 
                                                          
11
 Electronic mail response 
12
 Telephone Interview 
13
 Telephone Interview 
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38 Governmental 
organisation 
General Female Y 
39 Government-
funded institution 
Water Female Y 
40 Government-
funded institution 
General Male Y 
41 Government-
funded institution 
Ocean/Fishery Male Y 
 
